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INTRODUCTION

Mary and Susan have lived together for five years. Two years
ago, with the help of a mutual friend, Susan gave birth to Adrienne.
But Mary soon decided she "couldn't pass up" a "great career
opportunity" as a manager for a local gay and lesbian political
organization. Susan decided to leave her teaching job in order to raise
Adrienne full time. Increasingly, during the past year, Mary has felt
"too crowded." Two months ago, she announced that she was leaving
for a two-week vacation without Adrienne and Susan. She came back
two days later.
Last week, Mary asked Susan to marry her. Although their state
does not issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples, the local rabbi
does perform such marriages.' Susan feels uncomfortable, and she is
1. Although no reported decision in the United States treats same-sex marriages as
equivalent to other-sex marriages, many religions have performed such marriages. See, e.g.,
Shahar v. Bowers, 70 F.3d 1218, 1225 (11th Cir. 1995) (marriage by Reconstructionist branch of
Judaism); Susan Dixon, Rights of Survivor Lost in Battle over Trust, HAWAII TIMES, Dec. 4, 1996,
at 1 (reporting that two men were married in the West Hollywood Presbyterian Church by an
ordained minister). See generally Marc Fajer, Towards Respectful Representation: Some Thoughts on
Selling Same-Sex Marriage, YALE L. & POL'Y REV. (forthcoming 1997) (manuscript on file with
author). There is some historical evidence that the church performed same-sex unions similar to
marriage in early modem Europe. See JOHN BOSWELL, SAME-SEX UNIONS IN PREMODERN
EUROPE (1994). But see Philip Lyndon Reynolds, Same-Sex Unions: What Boswell Didn't Find,
CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Jan. 18, 1995, at 49, 54 ("One cannot find support.., for the validity of
gay marriage within the tradition of the premodem church.").
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not sure marriage is for her. But she does want to explore the
possibility of formalizing their relationship in some way.
What should Mary and Susan do? Recently, many have focused on
substantive and formal answers: have a wedding ceremony; register as
domestic partner;2 sign an agreement governing the relationship; form a
limited liability corporation. Although other professions, such as psychology and accounting, may help with some aspects of this question, law
has much to say about it as well. Lawyers may help same-sex couples draw
up an agreement to structure their relationship, and may help them modify
that agreement. Many other same-sex 3 couples may invoke the substantive
law of contract should they end their relationship and need to divide property or resolve other claims against one another, such as claims for
support.

4

2. See generally Craig A. Bowman & Blake M. Cornish, Note, A More Perfect Union: A
Legal and Social Analysis of Domestic Partnership Ordinances, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1164
(1992). Several hundred organizations offer at least some benefits to the domestic partners of
employees. See John Hendren, Domestic Partner Plans Growing Trend Nationally, PORTLAND
PRESS HERALD, June 24, 1997, at 4C (KPMG Peat Marwick study shows 13% of all employers,
and 25% of all employers with more than 5000 workers, offer domestic partner plans). For some
current lists of such organizations, see, for example, Liz WINFELD & SUSAN SPIELMAN,
STRAIGHT TALK ABOUT GAYS IN THE WORKPLACE (1996); Partners Task Force for Gay and
Lesbian Couples, Domestic Partnership Benefits (1997) (visited Aug. 9, 1997) <http://www.
buddybuddy.com/d-p.html >.
3. This Article often refers to same-sex marriage and same-sex relationships rather than
"gay and lesbian" in order to postpone a discussion about what it means to be "gay and lesbian"
(if anything) other than that one is in a relationship with someone of the same sex. For rhetorical convenience only, I use the term "lesbian and gay" to refer to people who themselves are
in same-sex relationships or could foresee themselves in such relationships. At least for purposes
of preliminary discussion, one need not resolve larger theoretical questions. See Janet E. Halley,
Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the Argument from Immutability, 46
STAN. L. REv. 503 (1994) (arguing that it is not necessary to characterize lesbian and gay identity
as "immutable" for purposes of constitutional protection under the Equal Protection Clause);
Kenji Yoshino, Suspect Symbols: The Literary Argument for Heightened Scrutiny for Gays, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 1753, 1753 n.1 (1996). In later parts, however, the Article does take on such
larger questions. See supra text accompanying notes 61-76.
4. See, e.g., Posik v. Layton, 695 So. 2d 759, 760 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (enforcing a
"support agreement much like a prenuptial agreement" between two women who were, as the
court coyly noted, "close friends and more"); Martha M. Ertman, ContractualPurgatory for Sexual
Marginorities:Not Heaven, but Not Hell Either, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1107 (1996).
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This Article emphasizes the appropriate process solution.5 What process should Mary and Susan use to organize their relationship? What process should they use to decide how to live, including choosing a legal
arrangement, changing their relationship, and even terminating it Many
scholars think court decisions treat gays and lesbians unfairly, such as those
denying adoption to gay parents. 7 Some rather instinctively suggest that
some form of alternative dispute resolution would be "better": take the
process from the courts and privatize it.' Others, however, fear that courts
5. Of course, as an abstraction, the distinction between process and substance is
notoriously slippery. See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Substance of Process, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 131 (1981);
Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistenceof Process-Based ConstitutionalTheories, 89 YALE L.J.
1063 (1980). For organizational purposes, I contrast a "substantive solution," which would
involve the formal adoption of laws that recognize same-sex marriages or domestic partner
benefits that give same-sex couples some benefits that married couples receive. See infra text
accompanying notes 31-40 (substantive law of marriage and domestic partnership), and a "process
solution" that would involve a choice of forum, particularly litigation in the courts from some
other "alternative," such as mediation, see infra text accompanying notes 41-42.
6. For purposes of analysis, this Article considers efforts to draw up an agreement that
affects a relationship that will continue in some form as examples of privatizing and mediating.
As one mediator for lesbian and gay couples stated, "It's mediation anytime you're in a room
with two people even if there's low conflict." Telephone Interview with Martina Reeves,
Attorney/Mediator Gan. 1991). For the purposes of working with a particular couple, however,
labels such as mediation may impose too much of an adversarial mindset, as one of the founders
of San Francisco-based Gay and Lesbian Alternative Dispute Resolution Services suggested:
When I see an intact couple, there may be mediation involved, but they don't see it as
mediation: they come wanting to draw up an agreement. They don't see themselves in
conflict. If I say, 'I'll mediate,' then it implies a level of disarray and may end up escalating the conflict.
Interview with Amy Oppenheimer, Board Member, Gay and Lesbian Alternative Dispute
Resolution Services, in Berkeley, California (1991).
7. See, e.g., Julie Shapiro, Custody and Conduct: How the Law Fails Lesbian and Gay Parents
and Their Children, 71 IND. L.J. 623, 630 (1996); COMMITTEE ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION
BIAS, Los ANGELES COUNTY BAR ASS'N, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, reprinted in L.A. LAW., Nov.,
1994, at 32; AD HOC COMM. ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION BIAS, Los ANGELES COUNTY BAR
ASS'N, REPORT, reprinted in 4 S.CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 305 (1995) [hereinafter
REPORT ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION BIAS].

8. Much of this suggestion appears in works specifically focused on same-sex couples. See,
e.g., Suzanne Bryant, Mediation for Lesbian and Gay Families, 9 MEDIATION Q. 391 (1992); Isabelle
R. Gunning, Mediation as an Alternative to Court for Lesbian and Gay Families: Some Thoughts on
Douglas McIntyre's Article, 13 MEDIATION Q. 47 (1995); Nan D. Hunter & Nancy D. Polikoff,
Custody Rights of Lesbian Mothers: Legal Theory and Litigation Strategy, 25 BUFF. L. REV. 691
(1976); Ruthann Robson & S.E. Valentine, Lov(h)ers: Lesbians as Intimate Partners and Lesbian
Legal Theory, 63 TEMP. L. REV. 511, 521 n.65 (1990); Gays' Baby Dilemma, CHICAGO SUN
TIMES, June 16, 1997, at 25 (noting that because "gay and lesbian activists say the court system is
usually disappointing ...because ...judges and lawyers try to remedy gay problems from a
heterosexual perspective," some lesbians and gays look for a "mediator familiar with gay and
lesbian family issues") (internal quotation marks omitted). At least one book dedicated more
generally to "family mediation" discusses private justice for couples:
Not every judge is biased against homosexuals, but it is difficult to anticipate how a
particular judge will react. Divorce lawyers know that every judge harbors certain indi-
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are better places for disadvantaged groups.9 One process solution proposes
mediation of gay and lesbian couples by mediators who happen to be gay or
lesbian (or, on some accounts, sensitive to lesbians and gays), or by gay and
lesbian community mediation projects. 0
vidual prejudices, which must be considered when presenting their cases. Parties who
suspect that a family court judge may be hostile can avoid risking their case by reaching a
private settlement with an impartial mediator.
ROBERT COULSON, FAMILY MEDIATION: MANAGING CONFLICT, RESOLVING DISPUTES 57-58

(2d ed. 1996).
9. See, e.g., Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudicein
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1359, 1360 n.8 (1985). Although the authors
do not explicitly discuss the way that mediation may disadvantage same-sex couples, they note
that much of their analysis may apply to other historically disadvantaged groups. There is relatively little quantitative data on how well any disadvantaged group fares in various forms of ADR,
let alone how ADR affects same-sex couples. One quantitative study of small claims actions in
New Mexico concludes that there is relatively little difference based on race, gender, or Hispanic
identity between monetary outcomes in small claims court when parties reach an agreement in
mediation versus when the court awards a judgment. See Gary LaFree & Christine Rack, The
Effects of Participants'Ethnicity and Gender on Monetary Outcomes in Mediated and Adjudicated Civil
Cases, 30 L. & Soc'Y REV. 767, 789 (1996). The study found that minority plaintiffs and white,
non-Hispanics agreed, on average, to less money than the court awarded similar plaintiffs. See id.
Although the study raises cause for concern, further research is needed to address the question of
bias in mediations involving intimate relationships for at least two reasons. First, the mediations
did not involve intimate relationships, which may have different dynamics for a variety of reasons. For example, some claim that women negotiators are more relational and concerned with
an "ethic of caring." See generally CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL
THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982). The evidence is mixed at best for the proposition
that women generally negotiate differently than men. See, e.g., Mary Anne Case, Of Richard
Epstein and Other Radical Feminists, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 369, 376-78 (1995); Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Portia Redux, VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 75, 87-88 (1994) [hereinafter MenkelMeadow, Portia Redux]. Nevertheless, the mere fact that individuals appear to negotiate with
more concern for others, even if not true, may disadvantage women in negotiation. See Carol M.
Rose, Women and Property: Gaining and Losing Ground, 78 VA. L. REV. 421 (1992). Such an
ethic of caring-or the perception of such an ethic-is more likely to present itself in disputes
involving former intimates than in property disputes in small claims court. Exactly how this
would affect same-sex couples deserves further attention.
Second, the study excluded any consideration of nonquantifiable parts of settlements. Such
nonmonetary settlements represent a major appeal of negotiation over adjudication in general,
and they may be far more prominent in disputes between intimates, which may involve such
nonmonetary aspects as child custody, property with sentimental value, and, in cases of violence,
stay-away orders. See ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD:
SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 52-54 (1992) (discussing how parents might
negotiate agreements that leave both parents better off than the judgment that a court would
impose); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway? A Philosophicaland Democratic
Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663 (1995) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow,
Whose Dispute?].
10. See Gunning, supra note 8 (describing the history of such mediation projects in Los
Angeles, New York, and San Francisco); Telephone Interview with Roberta Bennett (describing
the founding of the Los Angeles gay mediation project); Interview with Amy Oppenheimer
(describing the founding of the San Francisco-based Gay and Lesbian Alternative Dispute
Resolution Services).
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This Article uses the example of such "gay and lesbian mediation" to
explore some more general questions about different understandings of
mediation and dispute resolution. In particular, the Article addresses the
question of the roles of individualism and community in mediation. A very
narrow part of this general question is the "role of law" when people
resolve disputes outside of litigation, whether through mediation, arbitration, negotiation, or some other hybrid process of ADR. This Article
treats law as just one example, albeit a very important example, of the way
in which community norms and values may affect the way individuals
resolve disputes. In many standard accounts of mediation, for example,
parties bargain "in the shadow of the law""1 and treat law as one source of
community norms; mediators often feel they may-and perhaps
must-consider how a court might apply law to a particular dispute, such as
how a court would divide a couple's property or determine responsibility for
children that a couple raised.'
This Article looks more broadly at the
question of what other sources of community may apply in mediation.
There may often be a tension, quite often not articulated or even
understood, between two very different understandings of the proper role of
such norms: mediation as private ordering and mediation as communityenhancing. In a private-orderingunderstanding of mediation, a mediator simply teases out the parties' values and helps them craft a resolution that
reflects their values. The implicit notion of such mediators is that parties
can (and perhaps should) discover their own values and how they apply to
problems; the values of law or other parts of a community are relevant only
if a party wants to bring up such values. The implicit notion of the good
mediator is one who mirrors the parties' values and helps work those values
into an agreement about a particular dispute. The implicit notion of neutrality is that a mediator is neutral when the mediator is passive about
raising values. Overall, the mediation should facilitate agreement which,
among other things, means avoiding the kind of bias that couples like Mary
and Susan fear.
A community-enhancing understanding of mediation regards mediation
instead as a means of helping individuals order their activities and resolve
11. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Komhauser, Bargainingin the Shadow of the Law: The Case
of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 997 (1979).
12. For a critical discussion of the attention that mediators pay to law as a norm as opposed
to other sources of norms, see supra text accompanying notes 128-160 (indicating that mediators
often mention what a court might do, but do not mention other sources of norms, such as what
people in a relevant community might think).
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their disputes consistent with the values of some relevant community."
This is sometimes an explicit understanding of some alternative dispute
resolution: a rabbinical court or lay Jewish court works to make disputants
resolve their disagreements in accordance with Jewish law. A recent article
similarly proposes ADR by the "Islamic community" as a way to enforce
Islamic law in the United States.' 4 Such community-enhancing mediation involves two levels. At the more superficial level, communityenhancing mediation means that a particular body of principles, such as
Jewish or Islamic law, or some less formal set of community practices,
should determine the outcome of a particular dispute. This would mean
that how a couple divides property and child care should reflect the norms
or practices of the community. In a less obvious way, a second aspect is
that the process of mediation reinforces the individuals' sense of connection to a particular community and may make the individuals, at some
level of consciousness, think of themselves as members of that community
so thoroughly that they themselves order their lives according to the norms
of the community without any additional process.' 5 A Jewish disputant
leaves a Jewish tribunal thinking and identifying himself as a Jew and,
13. See Sally Engle Merry, Sorting Out Popular Justice, in THE POSSIBILITY OF POPULAR
JUSTICE: A CASE STUDY OF COMMUNITY vMIATION IN THE UNITED STATES 45-46 (Sally
Engle Merry & Neal Milner eds., 1993). Merry theorizes a "communitarian tradition of popular

justice," that "typically develop[s] in small[er] communities that are explicitly dedicated to maintaining a separate social order and moral code," such as Amish, utopian American communities,
and Chinese-American communities. In forums within this communitarian tradition, such as

Chinese-American family courts, "[c]ommunity norms rather than... legal rules ... govern."
Id. Such forums may lead to results that courts of the state would not issue; the results reflect the
norms of the smaller community, not the larger state. See id.
14. See Irshad Abdal-Haqq & Qadir Abdal-Haqq, Community-Based Arbitration as a Vehicle
for Implementing Islamic Law in the United States, 1 J. ISLAMIC L. 61 (1996).
15. Sol Roth describes how his vision of a Jewish community depends on how members of
such a community think:
Fundamental to the existence of a community is the exemplification of certain attitudes
by its citizens ....The community focus is primarily the cultivation of internal com-

mitment to values by which the community defines itself. It may employ force and
persuasion to accomplish its purpose-the rod in the classroom and ostracism in the
public domain, for example-but its essential goal is the development of attitudes, the

inculcation of commitment.
SOL ROTH, HALAKHAH AND POLmCS: THE JEWISH IDEA OF THE STATE 2 (1988) (emphasis
added); see also SIMON AGRANAT, Prologue to ISRAEL GOLDSTEIN, JEWISH JUSTICE AND
CONCILIATION: HISTORY OF THE JEWISH CONCILIATION BOARD OF AMERICA, 1930-1980, at xxi

(1981) ("Jewish juridicial autonomy ... has played a major part in preserving the separate
existence and identity of the Jewish people as a religio-national entity.'); ISRAEL GOLDSTEIN,
TOWARD A SOLUTION 321 (1940) ("A Jewish medium for adjudication and conciliation is
indispensable to every well-organized Jewish community, supplementing educational, philanthropic, religious and other institutions for the strengthening of Jewish consciousness, [and]

inculcation of Jewish content ....

") (emphasis

added).
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when faced with a problem in the future, may think, "As a Jew, what
should I do?" or even "I am a Jew so, of course, I have to .... 16 The
implicit image of both mediators and parties is that individuals are members
of communities and/or should be members of communities.
I doubt that either the private ordering or the community-enhancing
model of mediation is ideal. This is partly because this Article is not a
strategy piece addressed to some elite lesbian and gay community decisionmakers; different Marys and Susans may prefer some processes over
others. 17 More importantly, I doubt that either the private-ordering or
16. Many accounts of negotiation model it as though individuals have readily identifiable
goals, such as increasing income, and then self-consciously try to maximize such goals. This
notion is often highly individualistic; different individuals have different individual "tastes." See,
e.g., GARY BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES 3-4 (1996) (economists typically assume preferences are "independent ...of the behavior of everyone else"); Colin Camerer & Richard H.
Thaler, Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners, J.ECON. PERSP. 209, 209 (1995) ("Economics can be
distinguished from other social sciences by the belief that most (all?) behavior can be explained
by assuming that agents have stable, well-defined preferences and make rational choices consistent with those preferences."). One might hope such a model describes how people act in
general (such as to make an aggregate model of how, for instance, inflation is tied to increases in
wages), even if it does not describe how many individuals actually act. See RICHARD A. POSNER,
OVERCOMING LAW 16 (1995) ("A market may behave rationally, and hence the economic model
of human behavior may apply to it, even if most of the individual buyers (or buys) are irrational."). To the extent that this Article focuses on how well mediation serves the interest of
actual individuals in each individual case, such an aggregate approach is less helpful. As I have
argued elsewhere, often (though not necessarily always) individuals do not reason explicitly about
the proper means to reach a particular goal; individuals think about who they are and then act
the way they think such individuals should act. See Clark Freshman, Re-Visioningthe Dependency
Crisisand the Negotiator's Dilemma, 22 L. AND SOC. INQUIRY 101 (1997). Other authors, including Robert Baruch Bush and Joseph Folger, also believe that, in the process of negotiation or
mediation, individuals may change their sense of self or otherwise change internally. See ROBERT
A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO
CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNION 2 (1994) (individuals may develop

"moral growth" through mediation). Bush and Folger, however, regard such moral growth as an
internal attitudinal change rather than something that is necessarily reflected in changed behavior. Although they believe mediators will help parties reach a settlement just as often by focusing
on such internal growth as focusing on solving problems, see id. at 107, they still see internal
change as the important goal-so much so that their example of a "successful" mediation involves
the parties to the mediation rushing forward with litigation. See id. at 107, 186-87. In contrast,
this Article's approach to negotiation treats individuals' sense of identity and community as often
intimately connected with what individuals actually do and the kind of agreements they actually
reach.
17. In one account of civil rights, those individuals who are identified as "leaders" determine "priorities," so that one fights the right fight at the right time. For a nuanced analysis and
limited defense of such a view, see William B. Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate: Addressing Disputes
Among Group Members and Lauyers in Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 YALE L.J. 1623, 1634, 1668
(1997) (arguing that lawyers doing cases affecting minorities should consult with professional civil
rights lawyers on questions of legal strategy). During the struggle to try to bridge the legal gulf
between whites and African Americans, leaders of the NAACP often made decisions about when
to challenge particular kinds of laws; this included decisions to delay challenging rules that
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community-enhancing understandings of mediation reflect the most valuable way to help couples like Mary and Susan structure their relationship
and resolve personal disputes. The private-ordering understanding may
neglect the many ways in which individuals may want to know how various
communities they respect might understand their disputes. For example,
Mary and Susan may be quite interested to know how other female couples
share their income and expenses."8 At the same time, wanting to know
how communities may understand disputes is not the same, as the community-enhancing account suggests, as surrendering one's ability to resolve
disputes to those in positions of power (at least the power to resolve disputes) within those communities. And so even if they may be interested to
learn if most such couples pool all their resources, they may want to do
otherwise.
I therefore propose a rather different model of mediation designed to
tease out the kinds of preferences and values that individuals would express
if they were given information about different values and different options
and were encouraged to consider seriously these different values and
options. I call this, rather infelicitously, community-enabling mediation.
Such a process enables individuals to make informed choices about the
kinds of communities they value and what weight, if any, to give to the
norms such individuals may associate with that community. As discussed
more fully in Part V, this would mean that a mediator would expose Mary
and Susan not just to what other women couples do, but also what other
Jewish couples do, as well as what other groups of individuals do. Susan
and Mary might choose to mimic the most popular practices of women
couples, Jewish couples, or some other couples; they might largely construct
their own arrangements. Whatever their choice, it would be relatively
informed.
restricted marriage, namely the laws that actually criminalized white and African-American persons who married each other. See MARK TuSHNET, THE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST
SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950, at 164 (1987); cf. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M.
SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW

(William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (describing Henry Hart's unpublished
letters criticizing the Supreme Court's dismissal of a 1955 challenge to Virginia's ban on
white-African American marriages as based upon unprincipled reasoning); see also SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON 144 (Andrew Sullivan ed., 1997) (comparing debate about challenges
to miscegenation laws and debates about same-sex marriage).
Individuals sometimes identified as gay and lesbian leaders, including attorneys for gay and
lesbian rights organizations, initially turned down the opportunity to litigate same-sex marriage in
Hawaii, but offered support after individual litigants had some success. See Rubenstein, supra, at
1637-38.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 140-141.
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I. OVERVIEW AND APPLICATION TO OTHER COMMUNITIES

To preview, then, the Article principally explores two main dangers
with gay and lesbian mediation, dangers very likely similar for other dispute

resolution mechanisms specifically designed for other groups, such as Jewish
mediation services, arbitration for a particular industry, and so on. The
first danger is that parties to such processes may not know what they are
getting into because the two appeals of such community dispute resolution
fora-to promote private ordering and to enhance the community-will
often be in some tension. Part II of this Article sets the background for
this potential danger by contrasting the two visions and showing how mediators might so fully assume one vision that they wholly neglect the
other-without making that clear to parties like Mary and Susan. This
should help mediators consider the extent to which they share each vision
and how to explain it to parties, it should assist parties in making more
informed choices about mediation processes, and it should help teachers of
mediation expose students to consider critically the different kinds of mediation. Part II also situates the Article within the well-reported controversy
about whether states should recognize same-sex marriages and the theoretical controversies about identity and essentialism associated with postmodernism, pragmatism, and Critical Race Theory.19
The second danger is that both visions are incomplete, primarily
because they do not adequately consider the role of different potential identities and communities. The private-ordering vision implicitly assumes that
the only source of bias or discomfort is some particular identity, such as
"homophobia"; the community-enhancing vision implicitly assumes that
the only community that should be furthered is a community based on one

characteristic or value of the parties, such as the lesbian and gay community. More generally, apart from the particular context of same-sex
relationships, the private-ordering vision, in general, places too little
emphasis on the potential importance of different communities; the community-enhancing vision, in general, places too much weight on enhancing
one aspect of community when parties might value other communities as
well.
19. Although these questions of identity are often associated with Critical Race Theory,
they are also associated with questions of identity other than race. This has led Martha Fineman
to suggest the broader term "perspective scholarship." See MARTHA FINEMAN, THE NET.ERED
MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 25 (1995)
("Perspective scholarship ... adds the possibility of color and texture to the legal palette by
introducing diverse and often divergent viewpoints based on the social and cultural experiences
of race, gender, class, religion, and sexual orientation, for example.").
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Part III considers the question whether community mediation will
serve individual interests better, particularly the ability of individuals to
engage in private ordering. Part IV considers the question of how community mediation may relate to community interests, particularly the way
in which community mediation may enforce community norms and fix
individuals' commitment to existing communities.
Part V sketches out a different role for dispute resolution: communityenabling mediation should be designed to allow individuals to make
informed decisions about how to organize their lives and intimate relationships by exposing them to competing norms, including competing
communities. Unlike community-enhancing mediation, this will not necessarily enforce existing community norms, nor strengthen the way individuals think of themselves as committed to the communities that claim
them among their members. Instead, this vision of mediation facilitates
new relationships and arrangements that may better fit individual needs. In
any event, even if individuals choose to follow existing community norms,
that choice will be an informed one, consistent with the value placed not
merely on community but on community as a product of the informed
decisions of individuals.
A word up front about the scope of the ideas introduced here: I try to
develop a model of what process we use to structure relationships between
individuals or groups and other individuals and groups, as well as the kind
of mediation that best helps facilitate those relationships. I think the
model works well for a variety of relationships. In working from the example of same-sex relationships to a general theory, I follow Robert Mnookin
and Lewis Kornhauser's pioneering work that used the example of divorce
to outline a general theory of what role law plays when parties reach an
agreement. Some might have thought divorce law a rather narrow area
from which to extract general observations about the shadow not just of
divorce law but "the shadow of the law."2 ° Nevertheless, their scholarship
20. Although Robert Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser's work has been widely extrapolated
to discuss the role of laws on many negotiations, the text of their article is quite modest in its
claims, even expressing reluctance to conclude that divorce laws cast a strong shadow on every
aspect of every couple's married life:
In addition to affecting couples' bargaining behavior at the time of dissolution, divorce

law may also influence a broad range of prior family decisions, for example, when,
whether, and whom to marry; the number, timing, and spacing of children; the
allocation of resources during marriage; and whether and when to divorce. These effects,
however, seem more speculative and remote. Many believe that people decide to marry
and raise children without any consideration of the legal standards governing divorce
dispositions. At any rate, given the present state of knowledge, both theoretical and
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went on to dominate the field, becoming one of the most cited law review
articles of all time.21
The analysis of lesbian and gay mediation in this Article also may
apply to many other kinds of communities and varieties of ADR. First,
same-sex relationships often involve individuals who could be described as
"different" in a wide variety of ways. In a world in which all sorts of differences become more and more usual-whether differences between corporate culture in organizations from different countries that must work
together, or workplaces involving individuals from different cultural, linguistic, racial, and other backgrounds-this is an important example of a
more general social condition (often called the "postmodem condition").22
In ways similar to how this Article suggests that differences of perspectives, experience, and value may make it hard to speak of a singular gay
and lesbian community, it may be difficult to speak of other communities as
empirical, concerning the effects of legal rules on behavior, this article does not attempt
to trace out more general, long-term effects.
Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 11, at 951-52 n.4.
21. See Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles Revisited, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
751, 766 (1996) (reporting that their article was cited 357 times in law reviews, making it the
twenty-third most frequently cited article of all time).

22. See, e.g., WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY: POWER AND FREEDOM IN LATE
MODERNITY 34-35 (1995) (The breakdown of prior existing communities based on such things as
a sense of place or geographic community may lead people to "resort to fierce assertions of
'identities' in order to know/invent who, where, and what they are."); Jonathan Simon, Inevitable
Dependencies: A Comment on Martha A. Fineman, The Neutered Mother, the Sexual Family, and
Other Twentieth Century Tragedies, 5 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 152, 165 (1995) (book review)
(Postmodem conditions make it hard to identify cultures based on old features such as a stable
geography: "It is difficult to imagine how Durkheim would even locate 'France' today, with its
economy determined by German bankers, and its increasingly multicultural and multilinguistic
population."). The idea of such diffuse postmodem conditions, unlike relatively abstract philosophies of postmodernism, "takes seriously the concrete features of lived experience," but does
not assume that one will get closer to some transcendent, true, or authentic description of
experience. See id.
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one, be they based on personal characteristics (such as the idea of people of
color, African Americans, and Jews) or commercial attributes 3 (such as
"the" garment industry).
Second, relatively little law restricts the scope of how individuals can
organize same-sex relationships. In a relatively narrow sense, this typifies
the condition of many individuals and their "families" now that only a
minority of the population resides in so-called nuclear families.2 4 It also
more generally typifies the way that other organizations may face looser
requirements about organization, including some new organizational forms.
Ultimately, the more general currents and tensions discussed here may
apply to a wide range of activities when individuals and groups order,
reorder, and sometimes dissolve relationships with other individuals and
groups. How does a law partnership decide to divide up its valuable reputation (often characterized as goodwill) if some partners want to break with
other partners? How does an organization resolve disputes about what help,
23. For a description of how arbitration allows private trade groups to enforce laws and
norms that such trade groups make, see Soia Mentschikoff, CommercialArbitration, 61 COLUM. L.
REV. 846, 848 (1961) ("Obviously, when a trade group develops its own rules of law, it requires as
deciders of disputes persons who are acquainted with the standards it has developed. Since this

knowledgeability does not reside in the judges of any formal legal system, the drive toward institutionalized private machinery is reinforced."). The problematic aspect to such private law making and norm making, however, is that those making laws and norms may make them for those
who do not choose such laws and norms in a meaningful sense and/or who are treated equally
and respectfully by such norms. Cf. Mark C. Suchman & Mia L. Cahill, The Hired Gun as
Facilitator:Lawyers and the Suppression of Business Disputes in Silicon Valley, 21 L. & Soc. INQUIRY

679, 697 (1996) (noting that Silicon Valley lawyers may help create Silicon Valley norms,
including norms about what is an acceptable conflict of interest for an attorney representing
multiple parties to the same deal, that conflict with norms of wider communities, such as relevant

provisions of legal ethics).
24. See Curtis Morgan, Living in the 90s: Typical Households Lose Ground to Broader Kinds of
Togetherness, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 27, 1996, at 1B (showing that only 25.5% of households live
in families with married parents and children, according to the Census Bureau 1995 Current
Population Survey).
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if

any, the organization will offer to those within it who want to care for

25
children, parents, siblings, or others?

II.

CONTEXT: POPULAR AND THEORETICAL DISCOURSES

This Article arises in the midst of a rich context. A small part of that
context is the particular debate about how same-sex couples should treat
each other, and how the state should treat them. This is often characterized rather narrowly as the same-sex marriage debate.26 The larger
part of this context is theoretical. Part of that context involves theories
about how individuals fit into their communities-often associated with
ideas such as communitarianism, civic republicanism, and citizenship. It is
more popularly associated with buzzwords like individualism and community. Another part of this debate involves the question of how individuals define communities, particularly the way that even the seemingly
least controversial definitions of groups, such as women, may mask very real
differences, such as differences based on race, class, sexual orientation, and
so on. This controversy, highlighted by scholars associated with Critical
Race Theory, is often called "essentialism" for the way that it defines a
group based on some subset, such as women based on the experiences of
white women, as if the experience of white women were the essential
experience. Because both the private-ordering vision and communityenhancing vision may regard some reason for Susan and Mary to seek mediation designed for those like they (to avoid bias against "them"; to promote
"their" community), it is crucial to understand how such theories complicate which "they" is most like Mary and Susan.
A.

Context, Part One: The Same-Sex Marriage Debate

How should same-sex couples organize their relationships and resolve
relationship disputes? One occasion for asking this general question now is
25. Martha Fineman has proposed that society and law (through mechanisms such as tax
law) should help individuals care for dependents, or individuals who physically cannot care for

themselves. See FINEMAN, supra note 19, at 131-32. This is a fascinating and powerful idea and
an idea that may, regardless of how much any court or legislature treats it, inform how organizations set up benefits policies and how individuals divide up their own time and resources. See
Freshman, supra note 16.
26. Although two recent books also include some information on same-sex relationships in
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: THE MORAL AND LEGAL
DEBATE (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds., 1997); SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND
CON, supra note 17.

general, both use "marriage" in the title. See
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that many same-sex couples are inching closer to a judicial declaration that
Hawaii's own constitution compels it to offer same-sex couples the same
marriage that the state offers to couples when the two parties are of different sexes.17 The Hawaiian case, however, is only a small part of a
larger landscape.
Contemporaneous with the push to same-sex marriage, there has been
an increasing and parallel privatized regime of same-sex couples on three
fronts: domestic partnership plans that treat same-sex couples like differentsex married couples; private agreements by same-sex couples; and gay and
lesbian mediation designed to resolve disputes involving same-sex couples.
Many think privatizing means moving responsibility for something, such as
railroads, from the state to nonstate entities.28 Many organizations have
adopted spousal equivalent or domestic partner policies that extend treatment afforded married couples to persons who qualify as domestic
partners-13% of all employers and 25% of employers with more than 5000
workers, according to a 1997 KPMG Peat Marwick survey.29 Privatizing
same-sex marriage also means the way many couples themselves-though
the numbers are not easily accessible-have reduced their relationship to
agreements and have turned to ADR providers and courts to give effect to
these agreements.'
In effect, such employers, couples, gays themselves,
27. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (remanding case to the trial court to

determine whether state recognition only for different-sex couples satisfies strict scrutiny); Baehr
v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct., Dec. 3, 1996) (holding that limiting
marriages to different sex couples does not satisfy strict scrutiny); see Defense of Marriage Act,
Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996). Although popular accounts largely focus on how
legislators have considered such questions in the United States, some courts and tribunals, here
and abroad, have held that organizations and governments must treat same-sex couples the same
as married different-sex couples, even if the state does not recognize same-sex marriages. See, e.g.,
Gay Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 585 N.Y.S.2d 1016 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (affirming
municipal court's denial of motion to dismiss complaint seeking equal benefits for same-sex
couples); Grievance of B.M., No. 92-32 (Vt. Labor Relations Bd., June 4, 1993) (requiring equal
benefits for unmarried same-sex couples and married opposite-sex couples).
How much effect this will have on those couples and couples not in Hawaii depends on
thorny questions beyond the scope of this Article, such as: When may states avoid their obligation to treat same-sex marriages in Hawaii the way they treat opposite-sex marriages? This is
the so-called conflict of laws or recognition of official state acts question. When may the federal
government deny benefits to such same-sex marriages, such as often favorable tax treatment, that
it affords to opposite-sex marriages?
28. See e.g., George L. Priest, Introduction: The Aims of Privatization, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 1, 1 (1988) ("Privatization refers to the shift from government provision of functions and
services to provision by the private sector.").
29. See Hendren, supra note 2.
30. We know some agreements exist when parties go to court to enforce them. See supra
note 4. We have less of an idea exactly how many agreements are made but never litigated, or
litigated but resolved through settlement or unpublished decisions.
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and gay and lesbian mediation assume the function of defining their relationship rather than simply looking to how the state treats them.
It is tempting to think that all of this privatization is merely a compromise, 31 a settling for something that is less than incorporation into the
existing marriage regime.32 Certainly some political figures" and members of the popular press 34 have treated domestic partnership as such. A
pay
fairer representation is that some same-sex couples would, for example,
35 And
more.
pay
would
others
and
married,
as
treated
were
they
if
tax
less
31.

Some of the suspicion of privatization may reflect an excessive association of

privatization as a concept with particular advocates of privatization, such as political conservatives, and particular kinds of privatization, such as those that are inattentive to the less
advantaged. Compare Paul Starr, The Meaning of Privatization, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 6, 32-33
(1988) (stating that "privatization as a political practice" often means a "transfer of wealth" from
one racial or ethnic group to another), with Priest, supra note 28, at 4 (commenting that "Starr's
survey views privatization from the excessively narrow prospect of current U.S. conservative
political support").
32. For a very interesting exchange that explores privatizing same-sex relationships through
the substantive law of contract, compare Ertman, supra note 4 (offering qualified defense of the
value of privatizing), and Nancy Ehrenreich, The Progressive Potential in Privatization, 73 DENV. U.
L. REv. 1235 (1996) (offering a qualified defense of privatization) with Mary Becker, Problems with
the Privatization of Heterosexuality, 73 DENV. U. L. REv. 1169 (1996) (criticizing privatization), and
Alan K. Chen, "Meet the New Boss ... " 73 DENY. U. L. REV. 1253 (1996) (criticizing privatization).
33. After the Hawaiian Supreme Court remanded a suit seeking to end Hawaiian officials'
refusal to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples for a lower-court determination whether the
refusal satisfied strict scrutiny, see supra note 27, the Hawaiian Governor proposed a compromise
that would continue to deny marriage licenses but would offer domestic partnership with equivalent rights to same-sex couples. See Richard Halloran, Hawaii Faces Crucial Round in Same-Sex
Marriage Debate, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 25, 1996, at Gi.
The Hawaiian legislature rejected the suggestion that Hawaii "get out of the business" of
marriage. Instead, it proposed a compromise: a constitutional amendment, subject to ratification
by voters, that would give the legislature the power to exclude same-sex couples from marriage.
See H.B. No. 117, 19th Leg. (Haw. 1997), and a domestic partner-type bill, styled as a "reciprocal
beneficiary bill" that would give certain rights and privileges to two people who cannot
marry-including not only same-sex couples but, for example, "a widowed mother and her
unmarried son." H.B. No. 118, 19th Leg. (Haw. 1997).
34. See, e.g., Ellen Goodman, "Postpone the Hawaiian Wedding," MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 8,
1996, at 3L ("Domestic partnership-once a far out notion of an everything-but-marriage
commitment with its benefits and responsibilities-is now the conservative alternative."); "Aloha
to Life Partners," MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 13, 1996, at 34A (editorial in favor of Florida legislation
to recognize a "domestic contract" as "common ground" to be found between those who seek
same-sex marriage and those who "react viscerally" to talk of same-sex marriage).
35. For any two given individuals, the two may pay more tax if they file as married, or they
may pay less tax if they file as married, depending on how much each makes. See David L.
Chambers, What If? The Legal Consequences of Marriage and the Legal Needs of Lesbian and Gay
Male Couples, 95 MicH. L. REV. 447, 472-73 (1996) (describing how marriage disadvantages
many couples if both earn wages but advantages couples if only one earns wages). See generally
Patricia A. Cain, Same-Sex Couples and the Federal Tax Laws, I LAW & SEXUALITY 97 (1991)
(describing the range of tax consequences, including not only income taxes but also estate taxes
upon death).
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one might also be tempted to think that domestic partnership is a kind of
substantive compromise, an acquiescence to the idea that same-sex marriage
cannot be justified in a public debate on substantive terms." To view
domestic partnership-and privatization of same-sex relationships
generally-as a compromise raises serious questions of political strategy (why
settle for less?) and antidiscrimination (why does separate but equal seem
for gays and lesbians than it does for African Americans
more acceptable
37
and women?).
Many people consider privatization arguments all the time, but there is
a particular reason to think about privatizing same-sex marriage. In many
contexts, the more one favors simply merging same-sex couples into the
existing laws and institutions of marriage, the harder it is for others to
privatize. Many employers that now treat domestic patterns as spouses
claim to do so because same-sex couples cannot marry; to win same-sex
marriage may often mean to lose the ability to structure relationships in the
more flexible ways that domestic partnership definitions may allow."8 It
would be nice if, as some proponents of marriage suggest, one could have a
choice-be single, be a domestic partner with benefits and burdens, be
married with benefits and burdens 39-but there is a strong likelihood that,
the more marriage becomes legal in various states, the fewer organizations
will allow domestic partnership. Thus, the question of whether an individual supports marriage or domestic partnership may involve a choice of
36. Michael Sandel makes the case most strongly:
The problem with the neutral case for toleration is the opposite side of its appeal; it
leaves wholly unchallenged the adverse views of homosexuality itself. But unless those

views can be plausibly addressed, even a court ruling in their favor is unlikely to win for
homosexuals more than a thin and fragile toleration.

MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOcRACY'S DiScoNTENT 107 (1996). For a critique of Sandel's
argument, see infa text accompanying notes 168-169; see also RICHARD POSNER, SEX AND

REASON 313 (1993) (referring to domestic partnership as an "intermediate solution" because

"public hostility to homosexuals... is too widespread to make homosexual marriage a feasible
possibility"); Ertman, supra note 4, at 1114-15 (referring to same-sex recognition through con-

tract as a "purgatory" and "resting place.., while they wait to achieve public rights").
37. See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996) (holding that Virginia cannot

keep women out of a state military college by building a military college for women).
38. See, e.g., BARBARA FRIED, DOMESTIC PARTNER BENEFITS: A CASE STUDY 31 (1994)
(emphasizing that a strong reason to provide domestic partner benefits is that same-sex couples
cannot get state recognition for their marriages).
39. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDOE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM
SEXUAL LiBERTY TO CVILIZD COMMITMENT 79 (1996) ("[lI]t is not completely clear that the

choice has to be made" between domestic partnership and same-sex marriage.); Chambers, supra
note 35, at 476 ("The opportunity for legal marriage, at the very least, provides a choice to
opposite-sex couples whether to marry or not, a choice from which lesbian and gay couples could
benefit....").
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competing strategies. This choice is similar to the way in which elite
African-American litigation organizations chose a strategy that may have
made it more difficult to achieve certain outcomes later. Just as the push
for formal equality may have made it harder for African Americans later to
seek autonomy for African-American institutions, such as traditionally
African-American schools, 4° so, too, "success" in "gaining marriage
rights" may limit the ability for lesbians and gays to structure alternatives to
marriage.
The relationship between the choice of substantive law (marriage,
domestic partnership, or something else) and process law (adjudication or
mediation) is also complicated for other reasons. To a large extent, one
must-at least by omission-decide the process question regardless of the
outcome of substantive debates about marriage or domestic partnership.
Whether there is marriage, domestic partnership, or some form of contract
as a substantive matter, parties largely may choose whether such substantive
issues get addressed in court or in some form of ADR. State-recognized
marriage and children present complications. If the state recognizes a
marriage, then couples who want the state to recognize a second marriage
need a court, not some alternative process, to enter a divorce decree,
although ADR may help lead to a settlement that courts adopt after cursory
review. 41 If there are children involved, then some jurisdictions give
courts exclusive authority to make decisions affecting children, although, as
with divorce, the courts may approve what the adults agree to through
42
some ADR process.

40. See TUSHNEr, supra note 17. For a provocative recent critique of integration, see generally ROY L. BROOKS, INTEGRATION OR SEPARATION? A STRATEGY FOR RACIAL EQuALrrY
(1996); see also supra note 17.
41. See Mnookin & Komhauser, supra note 11, at 954-55 (noting that courts vary in how
thoroughly they will review an agreement between a married couple before approving it as part of
a divorce decree).
42. See Sporleder v. Hermes, 471 N.W.2d 202, 204 (Wis. 1991) (denying any rights to the
nonbiological mother even though she and the biological mother signed a co-parenting
agreement with a mediation clause), overruled by Holtzman v. Knott, 533 N.W.2d 419, 424-37
(Wis. 1995) (holding that a court could consider visitation on the basis of a co-parenting agreement); see also Ertman, supra note 32, at 1138-42 (discussing how courts have applied contract
law to same-sex couples); Elizabeth A. Jenkins, Annotation, Validity and Construcion of Provisions
for Arbitration of Disputes as to Alimony or Support Payments or Child Visitation or Custody Matters,
38 A.L.R. 5TH 69 (1996) (noting that courts often enforce arbitration agreements on issues of
spousal support, but frequently require some review of decisions affecting children).
Of course, it is unclear how often someone in a same-sex relationship would want or need a
court to order some ADR process. Parties may often have numerous incentives to choose alternative to courts, and lesbians and gays may have the additional desire to avoid publicity and to
(at least sometimes) find less biased third parties than judges. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supa
note 11, at 984 (commenting that even if a court will not force parties to abide by an agreement,
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Context, Part Two: The Communitarian Vision of ADR

To understand the appeal of the community-enhancing vision of mediation, one should appreciate the larger appeal to community in popular and
legal discourse. Anyone who reads a newspaper knows that individualism
gets a bad rap these days. People who call themselves community leaders
want us all to think about communities and relating to each other. We
spend too much time bowling alone.43 And even when we get together,
or think about each other, we think and talk as individuals about things
like "my rights" rather than "our community." Some philosophers see a
similar problem. We build philosophical systems by thinking about the
needs of individuals and what individuals might agree to. This is Sandel's
famous critique of Rawls' theory of justice: He wants us to accept as fair the
kind of agreement that we think individuals-what Sandel calls "unencumbered selves"-would reach." Like-minded legal scholars want to think
and talk and imagine about our "republic." Such republican thinking looks
to the community and how we may develop our individual capacities and
our virtue by relating to our community, which then has its own communitywide virtue.
This community talk is a dreamy and heady picture. Its sentiments, if
its
full vocabulary, inform one way of thinking about same-sex relanot
tionships. Indeed, these sentiments make us want to rename same-sex
relationships as marriage. Especially those who see or at least profess to see
same-sex as "virtually normal,"45 equivalent to different-sex couples in
every way, regard marriage as a link-often even as the very last step-in
blurring same-sex couples into a generic American community-or at least a
community in which the gender of one's romantic partner is irrelevant.
Others see (or envision) different kinds of community: some, for example,
invoke a community such as "lesbian feminists" and imagine the kind of
mores and rules that should inform such relationships; 46 others imagine a
community of friends, not romantically involved, but with a similar sense
the parties may do so because they value their relationship, their reputation for honoring
agreements, or the "embarrassment of reneging").
43. See Robert Putnam, Bowling Alone, 6 J. DEMOCRACY 65 (1995) (suggesting that individuals spend too little time in group and community activities, as illustrated by the decline in
persons bowling in leagues).
44.

See generally SANDEL, supra note 36; MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE Llmrrs

OF JusTic (1982).
45.

See ANDREW SULLIVAN, VIRTUALLY NoRMAL (1995).

46. See Bonnie J. Engelhardt & Katherine Triantafillou, Mediation for Lesbians, inLESBIAN
PSYCHOLOGIES: EXPLORATIONS AND CHALLENGES 327, 329 (Boston Lesbian Psychologies
Collective ed., 1987).
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of their identity as lesbians and gays;47 and some imagine a community of
persons providing the care that an individual cannot physically provide for
herself. This is Fineman's proposal to abolish legal recognition for any
marriage, and instead recognize and privilege relationship based on a person
caring for someone who cannot physically care for herself, such as a parent
for a child, or a child for a disabled relative or friend."

These are serious disagreements about any community that has a claim
to describe same-sex relationships, 49 but one might also construct a common appeal to privatizing same-sex relationships. By ending the state's
monopoly on marriage, at least as to same-sex couples, privatizing may offer
the best chance for such communities and community leaders to shape how
same-sex couples organize and lead their lives. In short, an appeal of privatizing is not "State, let me alone," but rather "State, let us alone." It is
thus writ small the implication by Rawls that at least some communities
may have overlapping reasons to have a relatively minimal state that does
not define every aspect of the good life.Y This is the potential of
community-enabling mediation in Part V. On the other hand, community
in practice may also mean the way community enforces its norms on those
it claims as members-even if those members do (or should) want some
other community.5 '
This is the danger of community-enhancing
mediation in Part IV.
C. Context, Part Three: The Private-Ordering Vision of ADR
Private ordering is an established ideal of legal process scholars:
Individuals can and should often structure relationships and resolve
47. See SIMON LEVAY & ELISABEH NONAS, CITY OF FRIENDS 31-32 (1995) (describing the
history of companionate homosexuality in history and how it may sometimes be hard to draw a
distinction between "friends" and "lovers").
48. See FInMAN, supra note 19.
49. See infra note 60.
50. See JOHN RAWLS, PoLmCAL LIBERALISM 155 (1993) (persons may support political
institutions but "recognize values and virtues belonging to other parts of life").
51. Marc Galanter makes this point very well:
Although by definition indigenous law may have the virtues of being familiar, understandable and independent of professionals, it is not always the expression of harmonious
egalitarianism. It often reflects narrow and parochial concerns; it is often based on relations of domination; its coerciveness may be harsh and indiscriminate; protections that
are available in public forums may be absent.
Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Orderingand Indigenous Law, 19 J. LEGAL
PLURALISM & UNOFIcIAL L. 1, 25 (1981); see also supra text accompanying notes 11-17.
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disagreements without turning to the state."s The kinds of specialized dispute resolution projects that have been established in New York, Los
Angeles, and San Francisco 3 to resolve disputes involving lesbians and
gays resemble the kinds of specialized tribunals that Henry Hart and Albert
5 4 In some ways,
Sacks discussed in their famous legal process materials.
private ordering goes at least as far back as John Stewart Mill. Individuals
are individuals, individuals have different needs, and happy individuals
need to be individuals who can grow differently with different interests and
needs."s Private ordering nests with a variety of public purposes as well.
Private ordering might also get the "right" solution because it involves
local knowledge, what actually happens in a particular trade, industry, or
workplace.- s Individuals closer to the scene might get the facts right
better than distant, general jurists.
So, too, the private-ordering impulse pushes to privatizing same-sex
relationship. The feared central power is not a foreign land, but local and
national governments that have treated lesbians and gays badly, or even
violently, 7 criminalizing sex between people of the same sex, and denying
52. Much of what Henry Hart and Albert Sacks say about the theoretical potential and
practical limits of crafting rules for arbitration apply to crafting the rules for a mediation:
Within broad limits ... private parties who submit an existing dispute to arbitration may write their own ticket about the terms of submission if they can agree to a
ticket. There is an old story about the girl who, dreaming, found herself threatened by
an ominously male character, and said tremulously, "Wh-what are you going to do
now?", only to receive the answer, "How do I know, lady? This isyour dream." The
arbitration of an existing dispute is the parties' dream, and they can make it what they
want it to be.
The trouble is that it takes time and money to draft elaborate private
laws ....Only in the most exceptional circumstances can a private disputant stop to
negotiate and draft a complete constitution, together with a substantive and procedural
code, for the governance of his private court.
HART & SACKS, supra note 17, at 310.
53. See Gunning, supra note 8, at 48-49 (listing gay and lesbian community mediation
projects).

See HART & SACKS, supra note 17.
55. See JOHN STUART MILL, UTILrARIANISM, ON LIBERTY, AND CONSIDERATIONS ON
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 126, 136 (H.B. Acton ed., 1972) (Past interpretations of exper54.

iences may be accurate, but not applicable, to a particular individual with different needs and
wants.).

56. See Lon L. Fuller, CoUective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 1963 Wis. L. REv. 3, 11
([P]arties may be better off with arbitration than court because "[a]rbitrators... are compelled to
acquire a knowledge of industrial processes, modes of compensation, complex incentive plans,
and job classifications. ..."); Mentschikoff, supra note 23.
.57. See supra note 7. See generally Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM.
L. REV. 1431 (1992).
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jobs to those deemed gays and lesbians.58 So, too, officials got local
knowledge wrong, assuming, for example, that lesbian and gay parents
might molest children, when reliable data indicated heterosexuals and
homosexuals had no significant difference in such activities. 59 And so,
too, some might say the state got wrong the institution of marriage. A
marriage modeled on a man and a woman might not fit two women or two
men.

60

D. Context, Part Four: The Tension Between Communitarian and
Private-Ordering Visions
Although the private-ordering and communitarian visions of ADR
both point to privatizing same-sex relationships, the overlapping impulses
also mask a profound disagreement. Think again of Mary and Susan.
There are many ways to approach their relationship and disagreements;
many solutions they might choose. The rhetoric of mediation may not give
them a full sense of their choices. Do Mary and Susan have a pathology-a
problem "merging"-or a different way of ordering their relationship?
Many psychologists might suspect there is a problem with "merger," with
Mary and Susan becoming "one" rather than "respecting" each other's
"boundaries." Others might see Mary and Susan as enacting a different
approach to relationships, a way that reflects the gendered way in which
women tend to grow closer than men. These two attitudes imply different
legal arrangements, such as a carefully measured and nuanced division of
assets and responsibilities to guard against merger or a more general com58. I say presumed to be gay rather than merely gay because individuals often discriminate
against persons who never tell the discriminators that they are gay; rather, the discriminators

assume the individuals are gay because they fit stereotypes of homosexuality. In particular, men
are often labeled gay when they do not act like stereotypical men, and women are labeled
lesbians when they do not act like stereotypical women. See generally, e.g., Mary Anne C. Case,

Dsaggregauing Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man inthe Law and Feminist

Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1 (1995); Clark Freshman, Note, Beyond Atomized Discrimination: Use
of Acts of Discrimination Against "Other" Minorities to Prove Discriminatory Motivation Under Federal
Enployment Law, 43 STAN. L. REv. 241, 265-66 (1990).
59. See, e.g., AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N, LESBIAN AND GAY PARENTING
(1997); Gregory M. Herek, Myths About Sexual Orientation: A Lauryer's Guide to Social Science
Research, 1 L. & SOC'Y REv. 133, 152-56 (1991); Shapiro, supra note 7.
60. See Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian
Marriage Will Not "Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage," 79 VA. L. REV.
1535, 1541 (1993) ("Everything in our political history suggests that a concerted effort to achieve
the legalization of lesbian and gay marriage will valorize the current institution of marriage... [including] grossly hierarchical, gendered marriage.").
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mitment to shared assets and income that values their common
commitment and life.
So I worry about Mary and Susan. I think they deserve to understand
the competing ways that they could organize their relationship, ways that
communities
reflect different values of different communities-including
6
that Mary and Susan may need to create in the future. There is a good
chance that these real choices will get buried in the rhetoric and discourse
of whatever process they choose. Imagine what many mediators trained as
therapists might tell them:
You know, it's not an uncommon problem, especially with two
women. You grow up being told that women need to be understanding and relationship oriented. And then you feel drawn to
other women, who, being women, have heard the same messages.
You wind up beginning to lose yourself. You may hear that many
others in the women's community, whether lesbians or not, whether
with friends or with lovers have the same problem. That's only
natural, but you need to learn to separate sometimes. It's healthier.
So you really need to keep some of your finances individually, not
mix everything up. And frankly, Susan, maybe you don't want to
share your baby with Mary.6
61. This Article addresses the way in which parties may not understand the range of views
that mediators have about the role of bias and community in mediation. This is part of a more
general question of whether parties fully understand the various practices that may get labeled as
various forms of ADR. See Kimberlee K.Kovach, What Is Real Mediation, and Who Should Decide,
3 DiSP. RESOL. MAO. 5, 8 (1996) ("Many parties, participating in mediation for the first

time, will believe that whatever the mediator does is part of mediation."); Leonard L. Riskin,

UnderstandigMediator'sOrientations,Strategies, and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, I HARV.
NEGOTIATION L. REV. 7 (1996). Increasingly, people question, "Do lawyers have a duty to
inform clients about alternatives to litigation?" without discussing just what it would mean to tell
clients about alternatives to litigation. CompareRobert F. Cochran, Jr., Must Lawjers Tell Clients
About ADR?, 48 ARB. J. 8 (1993) (discussing in general terms whether disciplinary rules or
malpractice liability may require a lawyer to tell clients about "alternative dispute resolution"),
with NATHAN CRYSTAL, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: PROBLEMS OF PRACTICE AND THE
might counsel
PROFESSION 365-70 (1996) (providing an outstanding introduction to how a lawyer

a client about the varieties of ADR).

62. Consider how one psychotherapist explains her "therapeutic strategy" for therapy for
lesbians:
Definite values about relationships form an underlying ethic in many lesbian relationships: openness of emotional expression, mutual nurturing, sensitivity to the other's
needs, and a willingness to be vulnerable. These are gender-related values, entwined in
women's psychological and cultural development. Respect for individuality is also
valued, but it can be at odds with those other values that encourage connection over
separateness. When one woman moves in the direction of greater independence and
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And imagine what a mediator trained to be sensitive to the values of the
lesbian community might say:
You know, it's not an uncommon problem. You're two women
growing up in a heterosexist and homophobic society. Heterosexist
because it just assumes what's best for you is whatever is best for a
man and a woman. And homophobic because it feels uncomfortable

with, or even hostile to, any relationship between two women that
doesn't involve a man. So, Susan, when you want to be apart, that's
you listening to that heterosexism, the idea that you have to be like
the kind of nagging wife and kind of aloof husband you saw on TV.
That's not a lesbian relationship. Lesbian relationships are closer.
You're going to have to accept that and mourn the loss of that Ozzie
and Harriet picture. This is the time when couples like you really

need to come together. You don't need more than one checking
account or to keep track of who put in what. And Adrienne is both
of yours, no matter what the law might say.

Neither mediator script lets the couple appreciate the dilemma they face,
what I have elsewhere called the "contemporary negotiator's dilemma":
How do individuals want to identify themselves and the communities that
they value?63 Instead, each mediator tells the couple what is natural and

normal versus a problem and pathological."

And each script has legal

separateness, she often feels guilty or anxious over her "selfishness" or "coldness" that
has allowed her to turn her back, even temporarily, on her partner's needs. She feels she
is violatg that ethic of lesbian relationships.
Beverly Burch, Psychotherapy and the Dynamics of Merger in Lesbian Couples, in CONTEMPORARY
PERsPEcTives ON PSYCHOTHERAPY wrrH LESBIANS AND GAY MEN 61-62 (Terry S. Stein &
Carol J. Cohen eds., 1986) (emphasis added). I am not using Burch's chapter as the equivalent of
the dialogue in the text, but as an example of the kinds of overemphasis on traditional relationships that she herself also discusses:
The observation that merger is frequently a problem in lesbian relationships is relatively
recent; yet it has proved to be so useful that it is already in danger of being overworked.... Lesbian relationships are often closer than other coupled relationships. This
is natural, even predictable, outcome of women's desire and capacity for emotional
connection. Lesbian relationships will look and feel different from other relationships.
Their emotional intensity may be misunderstood or interpreted pathologically if we
assume they should reflect the norms of heterosexual relationships.
Id. at 69.
63. See Freshman, supra note 16.
64. See Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in
Child Custody Decisionma/ing, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727, 766 (1988) ("Mediation advocates often
characterize [women's] opposition to shared custody as pathological."); Trina Grillo, The

Mediation Aternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1568 (1991) (Women's
concerns are often treated as some kind of pathology in mediation.). See generally Clark
Freshman, Were Patricia Williams and Ronald Dworkin Separated At Birth?, 95 COLUM. L.REv.
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implications: the first script may lead to an agreement that keeps assets
separate as "healthy"; the second script may lead to an agreement of shared
assets as "normal for lesbians."
Although much of this Article deals with same-sex couples, my concerns apply to all individuals who live in a world in which we may feel torn
between communities, including communities we can only imagine. I
worry that some couples may not make informed decisions about how they
want to relate to their intimate partners and how they want to resolve
disputes because of similar assumptions about how people ike them in other
ways do things or what the realities of such people are. And so I worry very
much about the suggestion that the "culturally competent" way to help an
Asian couple in Canada resolve differences is to let the couple hear from an
Asian social worker about how other Asians deal with family life in
Canada.6 I am glad that people may get information to help them make
informed decisions, and that information certainly might include how other
people who share some similar history or background conduct their lives, or
the values of various communities. In the best case scenario, however,
inviting input from only one community, such as an Asian community,
biases decisions in favor of adopting such values rather than that of a rival
community, such as a community of women.6 That's the least troubling
scenario, but I worry that such an "expert" or a similar "culturally sensitive" mediator might say something like:
A lot of white people don't understand how our people handle
things. White people keep trying to make men and women act
completely the same. Our people understand that men and women
each have their place. The good thing about mediation is that you
don't have to do what white people do. You can respect our heritage
and our people and live and prosper the way our people have lived
and prospered for thousands of years.
Although some such speeches may invoke thousands of years of community
(such as Jewish communities), and some may focus on hundreds of years of
similar experiences (such as the experience of slavery by African
1568, 1589-91 (1995) (criticizing the way that some scholarship does not take seriously the views
of scholars outside of historically preferred groups-including African-American women such as

Patricia Williams-but rather dismisses such women themselves for some kind of pathology).
65. See Allan Barsky et al., Cultural Competence in Family Mediation, 13 MEDIATION Q.
167 (1996).
66. See Christine A. Littleton, Does It Still Make Sense to Talk About 'Women'?, 1 UCLA
WOMEN'S L.J. 15 (1991); Richard Rorty, Feminism and Pragmatism,in POSTMODERMNSM AND LAW
19 (Dennis Paterson ed., 1994).
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Americans), the speeches may create a false sense of necessity-a necessity
67
to choose only such older, more "appropriate" values.
I think same-sex couples deserve a process that lets them think
through this conflict and lets them make informed decisions about their
future, as individuals and as constituents of various communities. This is
the process I outline in the last portion of this Article, a process I rather
infelicitously call identity-enhancing mediation.
E.

Context, Part Five: Essentialism and Defining Communities

Both the private-ordering and community empowerment rationales
hold a great deal of attraction, and involve a great deal of value, but both
teeter on two related tensions: How do we know what the "gay and lesbian
community" is? If we want to give effect to private ordering and avoid bias,
how do we know that a particular same-sex couple shares more in common
with a particular gay or lesbian person or community than with some other
person or community? Perhaps Susan and Mary only worry about homophobia and what other lesbians do, or perhaps they worry about class bias
and want to know about Jewish practices, too. If we want to serve the
interests of a community, as a community, how do we know which community has the best claim to represent or regulate a particular couple? As
with much scholarship after the 1980s, this concern partly reflects the
essentialist critique associated with Critical Race Theory. Just as AfricanAmerican women could question whether feminism crafted by white feminists fit African-American women, so, in a parallel way, persons of color or
poorer persons may question whether "the" gay and lesbian community best
serves the interest of such persons s
67. 1 do not think that arguments about the way that values of a larger group may not fit
the experience of a smaller or otherwise less-valued or powerful group are wrong or suspect. But
see Jim Chen, Diversity and Damnation, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1839, 1904 (1996) (asserting that
"minority scholars have fewer degrees of freedom than their white counterparts" because anyone
expressing a view "deviating from the one true racialist faith, their reward is the public flogging
once reserved for apostates and other degenerate reprobates"). Rather, I think that such arguments are a valuable part of a larger discussion of what aspects of which communities a given
individual finds valuable.
68. See LEVAY & NONAS, supra note 47, at 151-73; cf.Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Out Yet
Unseen: A Racial Critique of Gay and Lesbian Legal Theory and Political Discourse, 29 CONN. L.
REv. 561, 585-635 (1997); Cynthia A. Savage, Culture and Mediation:A Red Herring,5 AM. U. J.
GENDER & L. 269, 277-78 (1996) ("Each individual is influenced by a number of subcultures and
sources of diversity at any one time."); Frank Valdes, Presentation to American Association of

Law Schools Workshop on Sexual Orientation Issues (Oct. 1996).
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My concern with the difficulty of identifying the relevant source of
bias and the relevant community only partially tracks that kind of essentialist critique. First, that kind of essentialist critique is itself subject to the
same criticisms that it imposes on others. If the essential community
cannot be X because it neglects the experience of persons who are plausibly
X and Y, then all we need is a Z to come along and question that critique.69 This is not a fatal flaw in one reading of the essentialist critique.
A postmodem reading of the essentialist critique would be that every
notion of identity is subject to some form of this kind of criticism. 70 This
does not mean that the essentialist critique is merely an intellectual play69. As Mark Kelman has suggested, once one shows that a given category could be
subdivided by one additional characteristic, as Harris famously did by separating black women
from all women, see Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in FeministLegal Theory, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 581 (1990) [hereinafter Race and Essentialism], the question arises why one should not add
additional characteristics to further divide the identified:
If Harris is read to suggest only that one can always construct increasingly accurate demographic groups to predict, probabilistically, how the subgroup's respondent will tend to
view a social event, I find nothing the least bit problematic in her claim. If this were
her claim, though, I see no reason why she wouldn't test all the sociological predictors of
"attitude" (religious belief, income, party affiliations and so on) in deconstructing the
needlessly large category, "women."
Mark Kelman, Reasonable Evidence of Reasonableness, in QUESTIONS OF EVIDENCE: PROOF,
PRACTICE, AND PERSUASION ACROSS THE DISCIPLINES 169, 180 n.10 games Chandler et
al.
eds., 1994); see also Martha Minow, Not Only For Myself: Identity, Politics, and Law, 75 OR. L.
REV. 647, 656 (1996) (the idea of "multiple, intersecting groups.., implies ultimately that each
person is alone at the unique crossroad of each intersecting group"). Harris herself recognizes a
similar point and invites criticism that her own views may be essentialist in some problematic
way. Harris, supra, at 585; see also Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The Unbearable Lightness of
Identity, 2 APR. Am.L. & POL'Y REP. 207, 212 (1995) ("identities are always fluid, dynamic, and
multiple"). Kelman identifies another interpretation of Harris' critique of essentialism: "Mhe
essentialism Harris attacks could be understood as demanding that all actors in a category have
identical beliefs given only an epistemology that centralizes viewpoint as the ultimate validator."
Kelman, supra. To the extent that one adopts such a uniform viewpoint description, as Roth
does implicitly of the Jewish community, supra note 15, then it makes sense that people in such a
community would not face any bias-but that is only because of the way one has defined the
community! See Minow, supra, at 674 ("All of us have been betrayed at times by those who
claim to be like us.").
70. See Margaret Jane Radin & Frank Michelman, Pragmatist and PoststructuralistCritical
Legal Practice, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1019 (1991).
iThere is always waiting to be made a pragmatic judgment about whether now is a good
time to place feminist jurisprudence, say, or critical race theory, under critical inspection.
All jurisprudences have structural instabilities that poststructuralists could address, and
practical liabilities and limitations that pragmatists could address. It is always open to
question whether addressing them is, at the moment, a useful thing to do.
Id. at 1045; see also GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS 4 (1995) ("Postmodernists
do not claim that they can successfully avoid the predicaments and paradoxes they have
found ....Moreover, the existence of predicament and paradox in the texts of postmodernists,
as well as those in the texts and discourse of everyone else, are seen by postmodemists as part of
the 'situation' they call the postmodern condition.") (internal citation omitted).
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thing, a game of scholarship for scholarship's sake. A pragmatic reading of
the essentialist critique, which I advance here, is that one needs to be
sensitive to think about the appropriate identity for the particular task at
hand:71 when we are trying to construct a system for resolving disputes
that avoids bias affecting X, we want a notion of X that helps us address
that kind of bias, even if, for other purposes, there might be a version of X
that was more useful, or more authentic, or otherwise valuable. And so we
might define someone as, for instance, lesbian for some purposes, but a
person of color for others. Similarly, much of the essentialist critique
depends on the notion that the categories themselves have less content
than we imagine. This is the social construction-historical contingency
argument: in other times and other places, people did not even sort people
into X or Y. We discovered race only relatively recently; same-sex practices
were not always identified as some particular, stable identity like homosexuality;" the idea of people of color may displace to some degree Black
as a race or Hispanic/Latino as an ethnicity. By extension, one may imagine that our notions of the relevant categories of bias, including the identification of bias involving any same-sex couples as homophobia, may be a
social construction that no longer best fits the needs of same-sex couples
today. I mention these frameworks-essentialism, Critical Race Theory,
postmodernism, pragmatism-primarily to situate my discussion in various
73
contemporary legal movements.
71. See RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY 73-74 (1989) (noting
that postmodem scholars are "never quite able to take themselves seriously because [they are]
always aware that the terms in which they describe themselves are subject to change, always
aware of the contingency and fragility of their final vocabularies, and thus of their selves"). As I
suggest below, this fluidity leaves open rich possibilities for exploring the potential and limits of
the ways in which we can understand one another free from bias, although, as with any notion in
our postmodem condition, these possibilities are necessarily tentative and subject to change. See
FINEMAN, supra note 19, at 54 ("I'm interested in exploring whether it is possible to have an
affirmative politics of difference that defines groups and classifications tenuously, whereby group
identification is recognized as politically necessary but is also seen... as 'ambiguous, relational,
shifting,' without 'clear boundaries' that bind people in 'all circumstances for all time.'").
72. See, e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION 101-02
(1990); IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1996);

Kenneth L.Karst, Myths of Identity: Individual and Group Portraits of Race and Sexual Orientation,
43 UCLA L. REv. 263 (1995); Francisco Valdes, Unpacking Hetero-Patriarchy: Tracing the
Conflation of Sex, Gender & Sexual Orientation to Its Origins, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 161 (1996).
73. To some degree, the idea that the kind of identity we discuss may vary with circumstance predates these more recent movements. Gordon Allport's famous study of prejudice
also makes a similar point: "[I1n group memberships are not permanently fixed. For certain purposes an individual may affirm one category of membership, for other purposes a slightly larger

HeinOnline -- 44 UCLA L. Rev. 1714 1996-1997

Privatizing Same-Sex "Marriage"

1715

The second related point is that, however novel and insightful the
essentialist/social construction critique might once have been, and however
useful it may be to play it out in new areas, it might be time to also start
thinking about such issues in new ways. We know that identity is not fixed
in time and place; we know that a community may not really have the best
claim to represent the interests of a particular individual. What is to be
done?74 Elsewhere, I and others have tried to trace out the ways in which
what we once thought of as "different" forms of discrimination against
75
and related solutions.
"different" groups may often have related sources
All these contexts inform why I worry about how to define communities and identities for two purposes. One is simply to avoid bias and
particular
category." Allport also implies that the definition of "groups" may be a function of
societies at particular times:
The minorities problem springs from the existence of fairly well defined "out-groups"
disliked by those who control the political and other organs of power in society. Such
dislike arises not because the members of the groups have done or threatened acts harmful to the community, but because membership in the group is itself considered a cause
for distrust or even hostility. These unpopular groups are often called "minorities," and
the dominant group "the majority"; and for the sake of convenience that terminology is
followed here, even though the "minority" can be and sometimes is a numerical
majority.
GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 11 (25th Anniversary ed. 1979); see Louis
Lusky, Minority Rights and the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 1, 2 (1942).
74. The fact that much of the work on bias, essentialism, and understanding has focused on
limits is not a limitation of such scholarship, but rather is a reflection of an understandable stage
in the development of a richer understanding of bias and the ways to overcome it: one may very
the
well seek to understand that which one eventually wishes to overcome. Nevertheless, given
demanded
have
some
that
understandable
is
it
bias,
overcome
to
wants
one
which
with
urgency
efforts
quicker, more certain, more "objective" accounts of how descriptions of bias may further
.
to overcome bias. Cf MINDA, supra note 70, at 245 (1986) ("A practical strategy for fostering
constructive engagement across the frontiers of race, class, gender, and language needs to be
developed. New neopragmatist and ironist criticism offers no new vantage points for analyzing
and confronting these problems as the monolithic forms of jurisprudence fragment and break
down."). As Carrie Menkel-Meadow has observed, building on the work of Pauline Rosenau in
classifying various strands of postmodem thought, some "nihilistic postmoderns" may question
any account of knowledge, and "affirmative postmoderns" may emphasize instead the variety of
ways one can know things, such as appeals to "empathy and affective, as well as rational, ways of
knowing." See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodern,
Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5, 15-16 (1996) (citing PAULINE M. ROSENAU,
POST MODERNISM AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: INSIGHTS, INROADS, AND INTRUSIONS (1991)).
Black
75. See, e.g., KimberI6 Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A
CHI.
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U.
and
Diversity
Valdes,
Francisco
58;
note
supra
Freshman,
Clark
LEGAL F. 139, 151-52;
Discrimination in Our Midst: Musings on Constitutional Schizophrenia, Cultural Conflimt, and
'Interculturalism" at the Threshold of a New Century, 5 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 293 (1993); Francisco
Valdes, Sex and Race in Queer Legal Culture: Ruminations on Identities & Inter-connectivities, 5 S.
CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 25 (1995).
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otherwise facilitate private ordering. The second is to think about
community as a relevant source of norms or practices that couples may
want to consider in how they structure their relationships, change their
relationships, and sometimes end their relationships. In part, this may only
be because such norms help them structure their relationship as a couple
(private ordering); in part, it may also be because such individuals also want
to follow community norms (community-enhancing). In the next part, I
consider the ways that privatizing may fulfill the private-ordering vision.
My tentative answer turns out to be a skeptical one: many forms of bias
may be related, and may be best understood in a privatized context, but
others may only be deceptively similar and may require careful consideration to avoid in any context. In Part IV, I push claims about
"community" mediation even further, not just about whether this or that
community accurately represents what particular individuals say they want
now, but also whether such expressed preferences deserve respect. In the
final part, I argue that the best process to organize and regulate relationships is one that goes beyond express preferences to help parties make
informed decisions about the ways they want to organize their lives, including the kinds of norms and the kinds of communities they want to value.
As may be apparent, the arguments below are severable: one may agree
with my critique of the limits of private ordering, but reject my criticism of
mediation that enhances existing communities; regardless of what one
thinks of the critiques of either vision, one may accept or reject my own
outline of community-enabling mediation.
III. DoEs MEDIATION FACILITATE PRIVATE ORDERING?

The impulse to private ordering may be understood as a secular faith.
Its basic creed:76 The individual has the ability to set up his life with other
individuals in ways that fit the individual's needs as well as possible. This
creed has a modem faith in an individual's ability to know what he wants,
with whom he wants to spend time, to what he wants to devote his energy,
and so on. Much recent scholarship on alternative dispute resolution implicitly questions this creed. Individuals do not always negotiate as well as
they might to get what they want or, perhaps, need.77 This scholarship
76. See generaUy SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, AMERICAN POLITICS: THE PROMISE OF
DISHARMONY (1981) (describing the American "creed").
77. Because we sometimes look at what individuals say they want and other times at what
we think they need, I provisionally use the term "ends." See infra text accompanying notes
233-237.
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emphasizes "barriers" that individuals face in trying to accomplish their
ends. Some detail psychological processes that make it hard for individuals
to judge different options rationally, such as a tendency to avoid losses
7
more urgently than to seek gains of equal value. " Some emphasize lack of
information, such as the inability to tell whether those we deal with are
being truthful.79 And some of this scholarship emphasizes barriers involving how parties relate to each other, such as the tendency to discount solus
All of this
tions that adverse parties offer ("Consider the source!").
rein"barriers"
of
notion
the
scholarship is quite valuable. Nevertheless,
forces a part of the secular creed. If the creed simpliciter says, "Parties can
know their own interests and achieve them," then the creed-cum-barriers
types of barriers, parties can know their own interests
says, "But for certain
8'
them."
and achieve
To explore such a vision of negotiation, this part considers whether
same-sex couples would order their lives better-free from bias and inefficiency-if they used gay and lesbian community mediation. This part in
turn considers several possibilities: that such mediation involves less animus
because such mediators will not be homophobic; that such mediation will
be better because such mediators "understand" gay culture-an argument
that raises the danger that what a mediator understands is a culture that a
party does not fully embrace; that such mediation will be better because,
regardless of how well parties escape animus and substantive bias, at least
the parties will negotiate better because they will (however mistakenly) feel
"safe." Finally, this part considers what we should understand as "mediator
neutrality" when individuals may feel drawn to several communities-at
78. See BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995); Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, Gains, Losses and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113, 118 (1996) ("I
do not question the basic premise that litigants try to achieve the best possible outcome, but I do
question their ability to identify the most favorable options when risk and uncertainty are
involved.").
79. See Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Ian Ayres, Economic Rationales for Mediation, 80 VA. L.
REV. 323 (1994) (indicating that mediators could be used to overcome parties' tendency not to
disclose their true bottom line, leading to inefficient bargaining); Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H.
Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 509, 522-34 (1994) (suggesting that clients may use lawyers with ethical
reputations as a means to overcome the distrust among any given party that the information from
some other party is not accurate).
80. See Lee Ross, Reactive Devaluationin Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, in BARRIERS TO
CONFLICT RESOLUTION, supra note 78, at 28 ("The very offer of a particular proposal or
concession-especially if the offer comes from an adversary-may diminish its apparent value or
attractiveness in the eyes of the recipient.").
81. Cf. Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement
Negotiationsand the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319 (1991).
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least if they are exposed to full information about such communities and
their values.
To preview, I wind up skeptical of just how well gay and lesbian mediation will let couples engage in private ordering for two principal reasons.
First, although gay and lesbian mediation may remove bias in the sense of
anti-gay animus, it may not eliminate animus based on other characteristics
of some people in same-sex relationships, such as their race or class. At a
minimum, this point should trouble those in same-sex relationships who
might face bias based on such characteristics; it may also trouble those who
might not face such bias themselves, but find such bias disturbing.'s Second, gay and lesbian mediation may overemphasize legal values and neglect
values of various communities. This overemphasis of legal values may
characterize much mediation, but it is particularly troublesome when, as
with lesbians and gays, the relevant legal values may not have reflected
lesbian and gay needs.
Skip and Charles
Skip and Charles met at Harvard Law School, where both got high
enough grades to be put automatically on Harvard Law Review. In
many long hours in the library, Skip and Charles soon found out they
both went to well-known prep schools, that both their fathers were
managing partners of prominent Northeast law firms, and that both of
them played hockey and lacrosse. (Some classmates might have
described them both as white and Episcopalian, but Skip and Charles
never noticed such things.) They also discovered, eventually, that both
of them found other men attractive, including each other.
Several years later, they decided to move in together. Careful as
always, they discussed how they could formalize their relationship.
After doing their own research, each consulted with separate attorneys,
and they drafted a complex agreement, spelling out the expenses they
would share equally, detailing the known resources of each, and how
they would divide such assets and future assets and income if they
decided to change their relationship or even end it. They also agreed to

a clause that stated- "In the event of any disagreement between us that
we cannot resolve by ourselves, we agree not to go to court but instead
to seek mediation by a mediator affiliated with a gay and lesbian community mediation project or, if none is then in existence, by a mediator
82. See Judith Shklar, Giving Injustice Its Due, 98 YALE L.J. 1135, 1150-51 (1989)
(describing "surrogate victims").
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who is gay. In the event mediation does not produce an agreement
within one month, either of us may elect to have an arbitration by a
different person with the same qualifications as the mediator.,s
A. Animus and Private Ordering
Have Skip and Charles made a good process choice? Many accounts of
gay and lesbian couples detail horrible, homophobic-sounding court deciOthers report casual homophobia even in cases that do not
sions."
involve issues of sexual orientation:
One lesbian attorney wrote that, after she shook hands with the
clerk of the court, a government official "commented to the clerk of
the court, knowing that I was a lesbian, 'How can you stand her
putting her hands on you?"85
A number of accounts often rather casually suggest that some other 6process,
such as community mediation, might reduce "bias" or "prejudice. '8
To begin with, one should understand the kind of judicial bias that
privatization tries to avoid. Of course, Skip and Charles may have generic
reasons for favoring alternatives to the courts, such as a general belief that
courts cost more money, have less flexibility in fashioning remedies, or take
too long to make decisions. All of these propositions have been debated,
and this Article is not the occasion to assess them. Rather, the focus here
is not on the decision by Skip and Charles to seek some alternative to
court, but to seek an alternative that is conspicuously gay. And, as part of
a same-sex couple in a society that historically stigmatizes same-sex couples,
Skip and Charles may have a more intense interest in keeping their dispute
private, which is a generic appeal of ADR. 7
83. Although this vignette may seem excessively narrow, it reflects the view that many who
came to "the gay community" were not as wealthy or well off as people like Skip and Charles.
See KATHY WESTON, FAMILIES WE CHOOSE: LESBIANS, GAYS, KINSHIP 129 (1991) (observing
that many who were disappointed in appeals to the gay and lesbian community "associated community strictly with wealthy gay men, who were neither representative of nor identical with the
totality of gay people").
84. See supra note 7.
85. Report on Sexual Orientation Bias, supra note 7, at 319.
86. See supranote 8.
87. Advocates of mediation for lesbians and gays emphasize the importance of privacy:
"Because it maintains privacy, mediation may be even more appropriate for dispute resolution
involving lesbians and gay men than for similar disputes involving heterosexuals. Many gay
people live two separate lives-one in public and one in private." Bryant, supra note 8, at 391.
Apart from such purely individualistic concerns, individuals may want to keep disputes with
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Most likely, however, couples like Skip and Charles would choose to
draft the gay ADR clause that they did because they fear anti-gay bias.
Their most basic fear is crude animus: the courts will be so overwhelmed by
a reaction to their same-sex relationship that it will muck up the facts. The
idea behind this kind of bias is that an individual decisionmaker does not
accurately perceive basic facts;" couples like Skip and Charles want the
same basic treatment.89 To the extent that the argument for gay and lesbian mediation is an argument for freedom from bias, it parallels some of
the arguments for other identitybased dispute resolution systems, 9 such as
Jewish lay arbitration in areas in which Jews face intense prejudice. 0
All this gives individuals like Skip and Charles a reason to try to avoid
judicial bias by looking to another forum such as gay and lesbian community mediation. But will Skip and Charles face similar bias in medisame-sex partners private (or not) because of the way they think it will affect a larger lesbian and
gay community. See Part IV infra.
88. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 7, at 660 n.211 ("Bias leads judges to ignore evidence
contrary to their beliefs or to reach conclusions in the absence of evidence."). Some people
assert that the very notion of "bias" or "prejudice" depends on a notion that there is some truth
"out there" that is independent of the perspective and interpretations of various persons. See
Cass Sunstein, "On Finding Facts," in QUESTIONS OF EVIDENCE, supra note 69, at 196 ("There
really are facts, and truth, and objectivity, at least for purposes of everything we ought to care
about. The very notion of bias-not a dispensable motion-makes sense only with some such
assumptions."). In custody cases, for example, this view would imply that picking one person to
raise a child rather than another is in the "best interests of a child." Although many accounts of
bias, particularly in the area of bias affecting lesbians and gays, speaks this language of "bias" as
getting the facts wrong, I disagree that we can only say there is "bias" if there is deviation from
the "truth." We can still believe that there is no truth (or at least no truth knowable to humankind) and believe in bias. We may believe that "bias" is procedural, when the procedures for
establishing "facts" do not give individuals a fair opportunity to present their version of facts and
a fair opportunity to have those considered. See Kelman, supra note 69, at 176 (expressing some
confidence that "one may (at least claim to) believe that there are ultimately no 'true' propositions about either 'external facts' . . . or values, but believe that existing institutions will
unduly discount the beliefs of oppressed people unless we self-consciously alter their natural tendencies"); cf. DENNIS PATTERSON, LAW AND TRUTH 163 (1997) (even if the way we speak of
truth does not correspond to some transcendent truth, it "does not mean that we cannot come up
with better and worse ways of carrying on our practices").
89. Of course, many not as virtually "normal" as Skip and Charles may not want sameness
of treatment; they may want to redefine normalcy itself to reflect their needs, such as needs as
women. See, e.g., MARTHA A. FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY 20-22 (1991); Littleton,
supra note 66, at 33 n.84
In a sense, the community-enhancing notion of mediation discussed in the next part is an
institutional response to critics of formal equality: A different notion of equality is defined by
some subcommunity, and that subcommunity enforces its different notion of equality through its
own processes, such as community mediation.
90. 1 MENACHEM ELON, JEWISH LAW: HISTORY, SOURCES, PRINCIPLES 35 n.106 (Bernard
Auerbach & Melvin J. Sykes trans., Jewish Publication Society, 1994) (noting that some argued
that Jews should take their disputes before lay Jewish tribunals rather than courts because of the
"fairness of the judges").
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ation? To answer that question, we need to understand the ways in which
bias may disadvantage some individuals in mediation. There are several
possibilities. One way that mediation may incorporate bias is the way in
which parties themselves may be encouraged to recreate biases. Standard
mediation questions designed to get one party to step into the shoes of
another may, Isabelle Gunning fears, entrap parties in frameworks ("cultural
myths" as she calls them) that may make it hard to advocate on one's own
behalf.9' According to Gunning's recent critique of bias in mediation, a
mediator's usual method of mirroring the language and values of the parties
may lead the mediator to incorporate biased frameworks. If Skip and
Charles had different incomes or assets, one might imagine a mediator who
listened to the wealthier one invoke self-reliance and suggest to the other,
"I think what you're saying is, 'A man has got to take care of himself."'
Another way to describe how such bias infects a bargaining process is to
think of the mediator as reinforcing some role type for the parties: you are,
92
for instance, a man, and a man has to do what a man has to do. The
bias may be quite insidious because it may be hard for a party to invoke
responses such as, "Well, I have a different conception of who I am," or
"Well, I have a different conception of what a man should do." A second
related way in which the mediator's bias may disable a process is by making
a party feel so uncomfortable and under-valued that the party does not
meaningfully participate in mediation. 93 Perhaps the party will never say
enough to reach an agreement; perhaps the party will "agree" to get out of
an uncomfortable situation, but then not follow through on his "agreement." A third variation is that the real issue is not what the mediator
does, but how the parties regard him: if one party thinks the mediator and
91.

See Isabelle R. Gunning, Diversity Issues in Mediation: ControllingNegative CulturalMyths,

1995 J. Disp. REsOL. 55, 79.
92. See Freshman, supra note 16 (describing how a notion of "doing what one has to do"

may depend on the ways in which an individual is able to redefine how he thinks about which
"one" of competing identities or roles he adopts).
93. See Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J.
1545, 1586 (1991); FINEMAN, supra note 89, at 167. Mediators often favor joint custody of children and react to women who want sole custody-perhaps because "[tihe prospect of a continued
relationship with an ex-spouse may be too horrifying to contemplate"-as if the women have
some psychological problem or ill motive. See id. Mediators sometimes assume mothers are
"clinging and overly dependent on their roles as mothers"; sometimes mediators assume the
women are "greedy" and using children to get more money; other times mediators think women
are "vindictive" and "use the children to get back at their ex-husbands." Id.; see Lela P. Love,
The Top Ten Reasons Why Mediators Should Not Evaluate, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 937, 937-38
(1997) (indicating that mediators sometimes make direct suggestions of good outcomes and sometimes "evaluaten by making and articulating a judgment that the party is acting sick as a ploy to
advance her position").
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the other party share some essential characteristic, such as race, the party
with a different race may feel so uncomfortable that she performs poorly in
94
the mediation.
The first two critiques might be addressed by educating mediators as to
certain stereotypes and language and behavior that may be interpreted as
demeaning or stereotyping.95 The third critique often pushes toward some
form of identity-matching, such as ensuring that mediations between
Latinos involve Latino mediators rather than merely those sensitive to
Latino cultures. This same division also applies to discussion of gay and
lesbian couples. Although there are only a few published works that specifically address the condition of lesbians and gays in mediation, one published exchange reflects this split: some think those who mediate with gay
and lesbian couples should learn more about gay and lesbian culture; others
think there is a need for mediators to be lesbians and gays themselves, or at
least interact with lesbian and gays in some personal way. 6 This same
debate also occurs in scholarship on therapy, some of which suggests that
gays and lesbians should have gay and lesbian therapists, and other schol94. See LaFree & Rack, supra note 9, at 786 (discussing that when two nonwhite mediators
mediated a small claims case, there were significantly different results from cases in which one or
more mediators were white). I thought about this expectation more during the live UCLA
Symposium on Alternative Dispute Resolution, which is embodied in this volume of the UCLA
Law Review. During her talk, Carrie Menkel-Meadow mentioned how women seem relieved
when they learn that she will be the arbitrator in their cases.
95. The most recent National Institute for Trial Advocacy training materials for mediators
unambiguously favor greater training for mediators in different cultures, but does not
unambiguously address whether mediators must be screened so that they share certain identity
characteristics with parties. See MARK D. BENNET7 & MICHELE S. G. HERMANN, THE ART OF
MEDIATION 115-16 (1996). On the one hand, one might interpret the manual as leaving
identity-matching open because it states, "[We do know that there is a problem [with different
outcomes for members of different groups] which cannot be dismissed by saying that a good mediator can mediate anything." Id. at 116. On the other hand, the manual emphasizes short term
solutions and the need for more empirical work "to explore the causes of disparate outcomes in
mediation and to learn what interventions might ameliorate or erase this phenomenon." Id.
96. Compare Gunning, supra note 8, at 50 (emphasizing that mediators for lesbian and gay
couples should have a "textured and personal understanding of lesbian and gay lives" by
interacting with lesbians and gays rather than just reading social science data on lesbians and
gays), and Teresa V. Carey, CredentialingFor Mediators-To Be or Not To Be? 30 U.S.F. L. REV.
635, 637 & 637 n.7 (1996) (West Hollywood mediation project in a largely gay community told a
heterosexual mediator that he could not perform mediation for lesbians and gays), and Telephone
Interview with Martina Reeves, AttorneylMediator (Mar. 1991) (stating she did not think such
mediators had to be lesbian or gay, but she would worry if mediators "never hang out with
lesbians or gay men"), with Douglas Mclntryre, Gay Parents and Child Custody: A Struggle Under
the Legal System, 12 MEDIATION Q. 135, 143-45 (1994) (emphasizing that mediators for lesbians
and gays should study social science data on lesbians and gays).
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arship that suggests that gays and lesbians should have therapists familiar
with gay and lesbian cultures. 7 For the remainder of this Article, I will
bracket this discussion and use lesbian and gay mediation to refer to mediation that aims to be fair and effective for same-sex couples, whether or not
the mediators themselves are lesbian or gay.
As applied to same-sex couples, lesbian and gay mediation promises
the best chance to avoid animus with "virtually normal" couples like Skip
and Charles, who are unlikely to be viewed through any bias other than
homophobia. This is good news for Skip and Charles, but it may be less
reassuring to others in same-sex relationships. A wealth of new scholarship
on gays and lesbians of color, and of different classes, and a more general
appreciation of how such "intersections" of discrimination operate, make it
hard to believe that any lesbian or gay mediator will provide a safe and
effective environment for mediation for every same-sex couple.9" One gay
man of color describes the question starkly: "As a gay man of color I find
certain aspects of my identity empowered and fortified within the space of
the ethnic family while other aspects of my identity are negated in that
very space I fall in between what seems to me a split between the racially
97. Compare, e.g., Reese M. House & Elizabeth Holloway, Empowering the Counseling
Professional to Work with Gay and Lesbian Issues in Counseling Gay. Men and Lesbians, in
COUNSELING GAY MEN & LESBIANS: JOURNEY TO THE END OF THE RAINBOW (Sari H. Dworkin
& Fernando J. Gutierrez eds., 1992) ("all counselors have gay and lesbian clients', and Donald L.
Mosher, Scared Straight: Homosexual Threat in Heterosexual Therapists, in GAYS, LESBIANS, AND
THEIR THERAPISTS 187 (Charles Silverstein ed., 1991) (describing how a heterosexual therapist
says he "managed to change to work effectively with gay men and lesbian women"), with, e.g.,
Horold Kooden, Self Disclosure: The Gay Male Therapist as Agent of Social Change, in GAYS,
LESBIANS AND THEIR THERAPISTS, at 142, 146 (commenting that because there are few gay male
role models, "Iflor many gay males, psychotherapy with a gay male therapist ... is their first
experience toward making the transition to adult manhood"), and Minow, supra note 69, at 650
(describing "a gay person who wanted a gay lawyer").
98. See, e.g., Hutchinson, supra note 68, at 583-613 (on lesbians and gays who may also be
some combination of poor, African-American, and Hispanic); Valdes, supra note 68 (African
Americans and Hispanics); Ruthann Robson, To Market, To Market: Considering Class In the
Context of Lesbian Legal Theories and Reforms, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD., 173,
173-74, 178-84 (1995) (class). For a therapeutic perspective on such differences, see
COUNSELING GAY MEN & LESBIANS, supra note 97, at 114-75 (chapters on Asian Americans,
Latinos, African Americans, and persons with physical disabilities). Although coupling between
persons of different races has increased, such coupling remains less common than one would
expect if race were not a factor in coupling. Rachel Moran, Interracial Intimacy (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the author). Despite the numerous publications on intersectionality,
many studies of court bias, as Resnik notes, simply ignore intersections and choose to study bias
without looking at intersectionality. Judith Resnik, Asking About Gender in Courts, 21 SIGNS
952, 975 (1996).
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marked family and the white queer. '"'
scenario:

Consider a more complicated

Mary and Susan: Part 2
Recall that Susan and Mary lived together for five years, Susan
gave birth to Adrienne, but Susan then took a job at a local gay and
lesbian political organization, leaving Mary to take care of Adrienne.
Recall that the couple considered getting married by a local rabbi.
Three years later. Susan leaves her work at the political organization and takes a job in a Fortune 500 corporation. Susan decides
that she wants to live apart from Mary, and would prefer Mary not to
raise Adrienne. Susan decides that, however much she likes equality
and tolerance as a goal, she does not want Adrienne to have the burden
of explaining why she has "two Mommies." But Mary insists that she
would like to continue to care for Adrienne, and she would like Susan's
financial support to do so.
B. Bias Beyond Homophobia: Whose Community? What Bias?
Susan and Mary did not agree in advance to use a gay and lesbian
mediation process; should they choose such a process now? At first blush,
the argument for lesbian and gay mediation might seem even stronger than
for Skip and Charles. After all, Skip and Charles did not have children,
about whom courts show particularly egregious treatment of lesbians and
gays. It would be tempting to suggest that Susan and Mary, to avoid bias
because judges would perceive them as lesbian, should let some kind of gay
and lesbian mediation process facilitate their agreement about Adrienne,
or, if they still cannot reach an agreement, to enter a binding decision.
In more specific ways than Skip and Charles, Susan and Mary may fear
a court will treat them unfairly in making decisions about their child. Both
might fear that, if a court were aware of the prior same-sex relationship, it
might deny both Susan and Mary custody, awarding custody to another
relative. So a decisionmaker might decide in otherwise equivalent cases,
for example, that those who are primary caretakers for a child deserve at
least some visitation rights, but might deny Susan any such visitation
99. FEAR OF A QUEER PLANET xvii (Michael Warner ed., 1993) (internal quotations omitted); see also GEORGE C. PAVLICH, JUSTIcE FRAGMENTED: MEDIATING COMMUNITY DIsPUrEs

UNDER POSTMODERN CONDITIONS 152 (1996) ("[C]ommunity mediation might become part of a
range of democratic practices through which people are able to formulate social identities that
best capture the particular oppressions they must face on a daily basis.").
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rights. Similarly, a court might not make Susan provide any financial
support to Mary to care for Adrienne, even if a court would make a husband in the same position as Susan provide support.
Although gay and lesbian mediation may well help avoid such biases if
Skip and Charles had a child, Susan and Mary face a more tangled web of
prejudices. Mary may fear that a judge would see her as irresponsible
because she was only a full-time mother, not engaged in market work. If
Mary had not worked in the past, or lacked advanced education, she might
fear that the judge's bias would also be class-based, a prejudice that it was
irresponsible to devote herself to mothering.'0 ° Thus, pure anti-gay bias
may not be what full-time mothers like Mary fear most. Instead, she may
fear that her full-time mothering will be valued less than the wage-earning
work that Susan does.' 0' On the other hand, Susan may reasonably fear
that a judge might value her less because he saw her as a stereotypically
ambitious person who neglected hands-on mothering.'02
Even for Susans and Marys who do not have children, class-related
questions may also arise. One mediator described a mediation between two
women, one wealthier and one from a working-class background, over the
division of a house when they ended their relationship. The wealthier
woman had contributed more money toward the house. In the first mediation, the women "worked out an agreement that made sense for them" on
splitting the profits. Later, however, the parties agreed to meet again when
the profits from the house fell short of their expectations. In both mediations, the "give and take" involved acknowledging the contribution of the
working class woman and also her partner in not simply charging rent.
"The solution they chose," the mediator concluded, "had nothing to do
with law, but what felt good emotionally for them. "'103
100. See Linda C. McClain, "Irresponsible" Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 339 (1996). See
generally Anita L. Allen, On Being a Role Model, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 22, 32 (1990)
(describing the way white women law students at a gathering "seemed barely aware of the
significance of class and racial divisions among women").
101. See FINEMAN, supra note 19, at 9 (commenting that one should refer to caretaking
rather than caregiving because "[n]urturing work should not be assumed to be 'given' as a gift, to
either the dependent or the society that benefits from the 'caregivers' sacrifices").
102. In sociological terms, a factfinder may stereotype all women as fitting only one
stereotype, such as Mother or Iron Maiden, a domineering, cold autocrat. See Martha Chamallas,
Listening to Dr. Fiske: The Easy Case of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 15 VT. L. REV. 89 (1990).
In psychological terms, a factfinder may only view women through schemas that incorporate such
assumptions about women. See generally Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories:
A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV.
1161 (1995).
103. See Telephone Interview with Martina Reeves, supra note 96.
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Another problem Susan and Mary may face is how courts treat affection. It might be easy to conclude that at least that kind of bias is really
just because Susan and Mary are in a same-sex relationship.' ° It is often
unremarkable when men and women show affection for each other in front
of children: a father refers to a girlfriend, a father holds hands with a
girlfriend-these are not the kinds of things even reported in cases, let
alone weighed for judicial significance. When a man shows affection for
another man, or a woman refers to the fact that a woman is a "girlfriend,"
then these activities may be recognized as events, 0 5 and sometimes to the
degree that courts will make custody decisions on such encounters that
would be unremarkable if the participants were of different sexes.'°6
Even when it comes to distorted views of what constitutes appropriate
affection in front of children, some gays and lesbians may face other forms
of biases as well. The stereotype of hypersexuality is not merely a preconception of gay men but also of people of color. 1°7 In addition, with
two women, because stereotypes of lesbians do not include the same degree
of hypersexuality as stereotypes of gay men, the only (or predominant) relevant stereotype of hypersexuality may be the stereotypical assumption that
those who are poorer, less white, or both, are more hypersexual.' °8
Byron and Saul

Byron is a sixty-year-old heart surgeon who works long hours. He
often hires sex workers (also known as prostitutes). He begins to feel
close to Saul, a twenty-something sex worker, and suggests that Saul
give up his work and move in with him. Saul also has some feelings for
Byron, but he does not want to lose his independence. Byron's attor-

ney drafts an agreement that says Byron will support Saul in returnfor
104. See Shapiro, supra note 7.
105. See Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role
Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511, 587-90
(1992).
106. See, e.g., Chicoine v. Chicoine, 479 N.W.2d 891, 892-93 (S.D. 1992) (holding that the
trial court abused its discretion in letting mother have visitation rights when the mother and a
woman were "affectionate toward each other in front of the children, caressing, kissing and saying 'Ilove you"'); Shapiro, supra note 7.
107. See, e.g., Hutchinson, supranote 68, at 569 (describing stereotype of "hot" Latin male);
cf.,
e.g., Allen, supra note 100, at 29-30 (describing the need for role models for women of color
to deal with sexual harassment in the academy); Crenshaw, supra note 75, at 157-60 (describing
abuse of women of color because of their perceived sexual availability).
108. See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color,
Equality and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1438-39 (1991).
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9
Saul helping around the house and escorting him to various parties.'O
Byron and Saul have a falling out when Byron learns that Saul has
continued to see some men for money.

C. Substance and Private Ordering: The Problem of Thick Procedure
The procedural bias paradigm set out above assumes that those claiming bias and those supposedly biased share the same substantive values, but
the biased cannot get past their bias to see the underlying facts. The procedural bias chorus is: "Can't you see? Don't you understand?" Feminist
critiques of mediation identify a different kind of bias, a thickness of procedure that makes it much easier to bring about certain substantive outcomes than others. For example, express law says that courts should award
sole custody in some circumstances, but mediators often make those who
request such custody (typically women) feel so awful that women "agree" to
joint custody; ° express law states that the mere fact of same-sex orientation and, in some jurisdictions, even same-sex acts does not render a
potential parent less fit, but, as a procedural matter, appellate practice will
uphold trial court decisions denying custody to lesbians or gays even when
there is no competent evidence that the parents are unfit."' The criticism of procedure is not really an attack on procedure as such, but rather
Thick
how procedure in practice embodies contested normative views.m
procedure is a real problem for same-sex couples-not just in courts, but in
alternative processes as well. "Thick procedure," in general, means that
the choice of procedures, including the configuration of decisionmakers as
judges, mediators, and so on, in fact channels parties to agree to certain
substantive arrangements."'
One form of thick procedure that may involve many privatized samesex relationships involves contested issues about contract formation. In
some instances, same-sex couples may reduce an agreement to writing, and
109. This vignette is based on an interview with a therapist, who requested that identifying
characteristics be changed to protect the identity of his patient.
110. See FINEMAN, supra note 89, at 156-57.
111. See Shapiro, supra note 7, at 630-32.
112. Cf. Mark Kelman, A Rejoinder to Cass Sunstein, in QUESTIONS OF EVIDENCE, supra note
69, at 199, 202 ("We suppress the fact that we really do differ on what our normative conceptions are ... " and instead cling to "unshakeable beliefs in frequently unproven and
unprovable 'facts.'").
113. Cf. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTIE § 60, at 396 (1973) (describing a theory of
justice that depends on arranging institutions that facilitate a range of possible substantive goals
and therefore presupposes only a "thin conception of the good").
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parole evidence rules may exclude some evidence about intent.114 On
the other hand, many same-sex relationships may depend on oral or
implied-in-fact contracts."' Just what oral statements jurors (or judges
acting as fact-finders) find credible, and just what facts imply what agreement, may depend on visceral reactions to what particular parties value
and do.
Though most attention to bias involving same-sex couples focuses on
custody, bias may also involve issues of fault and determinations of support.
One familiar kind of fault at common law involved one spouse having
sexual relations with someone other than the spouse. Black letter law in
most states says that fault plays relatively little role in financial issues such
as property division and support payments.11 6 And, in same-sex relationships recognized by contract law, provisions about sex are probably not
enforceable because courts often say sex cannot be consideration for a
contract.1 7 Nevertheless, such fault may enter judicial determinations
covertly.18 For example, a partner who violates the norms of fidelity
may be judged to be generally less credible.119
Consider Saul's situation. Saul has a written agreement with Byron,
and the written agreement formally does not depend on any promises that
Saul will have sex with Byron or refrain from having sex with others.
When Byron tries to enforce that agreement, however, he may have difficulty. A gay or lesbian mediator might be interested in discussing how
114.

See Ertman, supranote 4, at 1137-40& 1139 n.130 (merger clause). For an example of

such a contract, see LENORE J. WEIrZMAN, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT: SPOUSES, LOVERS, AND

THE LAW 316-19 (1981).
115. See Ertman, supra note 4, at 1141-42; Paul Freud Wotman, Panel Comments at the
American Association of Law Schools Joint Meeting of Sections on Contracts and Sexual
Orientation Issues, in San Antonio, Tex. Uan. 1996).
116. See, e.g., LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORcE REVOLUTION 29 (1985). Recently,
although some state legislators have tried to reintroduce the concept of fault into divorce statutes,
these efforts generally have not been successful. See Laura Bradford, Note, The Counterrevolution:
A Critique of Recent Proposals to Reform No-Fauh Divorce Laws, 49 STAN. L. REV. 607, 613-14
(1997); Laura Gatland, Putting the Blame on No-Fault, ABA J., April, 1997, at 50, 52. But see
Kevin Sack, Stricter MarriagePact Gets Big Boost, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1997, at 1, available in
1997 WL 7841248 (reporting that Louisiana adopted law allowing couples to elect either a marriage that would allow no-fault divorce or a "covenant marriage," which would limit the grounds
for divorce).
117. See, e.g., Bower v. Weisman, 650 F. Supp. 1415, 1424 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Marvin v.
Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 113-14 (Cal. 1976).
118. See MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 9, at 95 (reporting that "there is evidence that
in the private negotiation that occurs at the time of separation, 'fault' is indeed considered, at
least with respect to the transfer of money and property").
119. Cf. PAVLICH, supra note 99, at 175 n.31 (In a mediation between a husband and
wife, the mediator asked the husband if "he was 'seeing' anybody else, '... another woman,
perhaps?'").
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Saul and Byron feel about the overall relationship, including Byron's
resentment that Saul was intimate with other men. There would be a good
chance that the mediator might share some of Byron's feelings about sexual
exclusivity. Some might characterize that perspective as a set of shared
assumptions about monogamy or relationships.12 Others might suspect
that the feelings involved a lingering discomfort at same-sex intimacy, what
some might call "internalized homophobia." In any event, Saul might not
feel comfortable with the mediator and might interpret his communication,
both verbal and nonverbal, as judgmental. This might lead Saul to forego
some of the benefits he would have gotten under his agreement with Byron
because Saul might feel less capable of insisting that Byron pay him accord120. The assumption that same-sex relationships should resemble the monogamy that is at
least a formal feature of contemporary marriage is often associated with the notion of "virtually
normal" gays and lesbians. See SULLIVAN, supra note 45. Sometimes, as in Sullivan's work, an
author will explicitly say he thinks monogamy is a worthy norm. Often, however, the defense of
monogamy is not explicit, but rather a subtextual idea, often in images of how gays and lesbians
live or want to live:
[G]ays and lesbians are not interested in merely "being gay" (whatever that means): they
are interested in engaging in conduct: making love, forming relationships, dating, displaying photos of partners in the workplace, wearing wedding rings, living together in
rental units, holding hands in public and otherwise expressing desire, affection, and
commitment.
Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Is Amendment 2 Really a Bill of Attinder? Some Questions About Professor
Amar's Analysis of Romer, 95 Mici. L. REV. 236, 249-50 (1996).
It is both a problem and problematic to figure out how many gays and lesbians share some
norm of monogamy and/or actually practice monogamy. It is problematic because there are different definitions of who is gay and lesbian. A relevant part of that problem is how one classifies
persons who do not consider themselves gay, but who engage in some sexual activity with persons
of the same sex. Many men who get paid by the sexual encounter do not think of themselves as
gay. See DONALD J. WEST & Buz DE VILLIERS, MALE PROSTITUTION 22-32 (1992). In addition,
people from different national origins may be less likely to identify as gay. Some accounts of
Mexican culture, for example, report that the word mayante "designates the active masculine
participant in a homosexual pairing but does not connote him homosexual." JOESEPH CARRIER,
DE LOS OTROS: INTIMACY AND HOMOSEXUALITY AMONG MEXICAN MEN 11 (1995). Apart
from such problematics, it is a problem to get descriptions of behavior because individuals may
report behavior that they think a surveyor wants to hear; individuals may also fail to report
behavior accurately because they themselves repress memories of behavior that does not conform
to their perception of societal norms. See Marc E. Elovitz, Adoption by Lesbian and Gay People:
The Use and Mis-Use of Social Science Research, 2 DUKE J. GEN. L. & POL'Y 207, 209 (1995).
With these caveats in mind, much evidence suggests that relatively few gay men practice
monogamy. See Jay P. Paul et al., The Impact of the HIV Epidemic on U. S. Gay Male
Communities, in LESBIAN, GAY AND BISEXUAL IDENTITIES OVER THE LIFESPAN: PSYCHOLOGICAL
PERSPECnVES 366 (Anthony R. D'augelli & Charlottee J. Patterson eds., 1995) (although a
majority of gay men agree "It's best to be monogamous," a study reports "the percentage of relationships that were monogamous remained less than 10 percent at most times"). But see Larry
McFarland, Male Couples in Context: Issues for Therapeutic Consideration (1997) (visited Aug. 8,
1997) <http://www.buddybuddy.com/mcfarla-l.html> (discussing studies that suggest more
male-male couples are sexually exclusive since the spread of HIV).
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ing to their agreement. In effect, then, the mediation involves a thick
procedure that, de facto, exacts a penalty for those who, like Saul, violate a
norm of monogamy. In theory, one also might imagine a reverse scenario:
mediators who share norms of non-monogamy and who may treat those
who value monogamy as unreasonable, politically incorrect, or psyIn either scenario, however, parties might object
chologically not well.'
that they did not realize that the choice of gay and lesbian mediation as a
forum (or as a process) would subject them to particular norms. And in
either case, parties might not object because the norms operate through the
way in which a mediator may pathologize, such as characterizing differing
views as symptomatic of "internalized homophobia."
In addition, a mediation between Saul and Byron might combine some
of the forms of animus discussed above. Saul is younger than Byron, and he
On the other hand,
may face certain bias because of his relative youth.'
there is evidence that older gay men may not be valued very highly by
other gay men, young and old, which may disadvantage the older Byron in
the mediation. Likewise, in many such situations, the younger person may
also be a person of color or of a different social class, or less well educated
or able to perform in a verbally intensive mediation.
Perceived Animus, Private Ordering, and Therapeutic Mediation

D.

The previous subsections have considered the ways in which the
impulse to avoid procedural bias involving same-sex couples does not necessarily require gay or lesbian mediators because the relevant sources of bias
may depend on other real or perceived characteristics of such couples, such
121.

Walters, for example, fears that much of the recent queer theory that treats sexuality as

a postmodem, ever-changing thing isbased on the experience of gay men of a certain period who
engaged in sex with many different persons and who may not have known sexual partners well.
Susanna Danuta Walters, From Here to Queer: Radical Feminism, Postmodernism, and the Lesbian
Menace (Or, Why Can't a Woman Be More Like a Fag?), 21 SIGNS 830, 850 (1996) ("Now gay
male sex and its histories become the very model of radical chic: the backroom replaces the
consciousness-raising session as a site of transformation.").
122. Some believe that the AIDS epidemic has exacerbated tensions between younger and
older gay men:
Historical changes in the gay community as a consequence of the AIDS epidemic have
contributed to a "generation gap" between older and younger gay men. Every generation
feels the need to assert its independence from previous generations, yet the highly threatening nature of AIDS may have intensified the younger generation's motivation to separate themselves from their gay elders ....

Young men have expressed feelings ranging

from envy to bewilderment to disgust in reconciling the differences between their experience and that of the earlier generation.
Paul et al., supra note 120, at 376.
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as race, poverty, and so on. This raises the question whether 'perhaps gay
and lesbian mediation facilitates private ordering because same-sex couples
think that homophobia is the most relevant form of bias and that gay and
lesbian mediators will best understand them.
Much psychological literature suggests that practicing therapists, who
13
may practice a kind of couples therapy that is a form of mediation, 2
think lesbian and gay men have better therapeutic experiences with other
lesbians and gay men."2 4 To the extent that one views a process of mediation as therapeutic, regardless of agreements reached, then this therapeutic
literature would be consistent with gay and lesbian mediation (at least to
the extent that it suggests better therapeutic results when same-sex couples
have lesbian or gay mediators).'
The strongest argument for gay and lesbian mediation, then, may be
that couples who feel comfortable that lesbian and gay mediators are free
from bias-even if they are sometimes mistaken in this belief, as the previous subsections suggest-may reach better agreements. 6 Part of this
"better" assessment may depend on the notion that parties are more satisfied or, the closely related notion, that there will be better "compliance,"
largely because the parties feel more satisfied. This is a common theme of
123. See Engelhardt & Triantafallou, supra note 46, at 332-41 (describing mediation involving a therapist and an attorney); Telephone Interview with Roberta Bennett, supra note 10 (plans
to offer mediation to same-sex couples involving a therapist and an attorney); see generally Gerald

R. Williams, Negotiation as a Healing Process, 1996 J. DisP. RES. 1, 42 n.123.
124. See William Holahan & Sue A. Gibson, Heterosexual Therapists Leading Lesbian and Gay
Therapy Groups: Therapeutic and Political Realities, 72 J. COUNSELING & DEv. 591, 594 (1994)
(surveying various views about the importance of gay and lesbian identity and familiarity with
lesbians and gays and concluding that "[a]lthough it is surely desirable for gay and lesbian groups
to be led by experienced group therapists who are lesbian or gay ....this condition is not necessary for clients to have a beneficial group therapy experience."); see also supra note 97.
125. See Roger I. Abrams et al., Arbitral Therapy, 46 RUTGERs L. REv. 1751, 1757-58 (1994)
(emphasizing that one of the reasons that parties may find arbitration therapeutic is because they
find it comfortable); see generally BRUcE J. WINICK, THE RIGHT TO REFUSE MENTAL HEALTH
TRFATMENT 385-88 (1997) (negotiation and ADR may serve therapeutic role).
126. Several people who discuss various efforts to establish lesbian and gay community mediation discuss how they perceived a need to create an environment in which lesbians and gays
"feel safe." Engelhardt & Triantafillou, supra note 46, at 328 (an attorney and a therapist who
founded a lesbian mediation project in Boston state:
[olne of the reasons this process [of lesbian mediation] is so important is that courts are
unable to deal with conflicts between lesbians without "punishing" the participants for
their homosexuality. Hence, gay people do not generally have access to courts without
the attendant fear of being found out. A lesbian mediation service is unique because it
provides an additional level of safety for the participants.)
Center Quality of Life Programs (last modified Aug. 1, 1996) <http://www.gaycenter.org/
quality.html> (stating that the independent Lesbian and Gay Mediation Service, founded in
New York in 1990, affiliated with the Lesbian and Gay Community Center to, among other
things, "provide a safe space for clients").
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much scholarship and popular press about mediation, but it is a view that I
largely reject below in sketching out a concept of community-enabling
mediation. 2 7 To preview that argument briefly, I suggest that a mediation is more valuable if it leads parties to consider the range of possible
ways of structuring their relationship, including the potential views of a
variety of communities. So, to the extent that couples merely self-report
satisfaction, or one infers satisfaction from compliance, one will not necessarily know that the couples have chosen the kind of relationship that is

best for them.
A second and more difficult argument to consider is that couples who
falsely believe that gay and lesbian mediation will be fairest and most "safe"
will feel free to be more creative about problemsolving, including choosing
the kind of relationship that is best for them. This argument is particularly
difficult because the kind of elaborate community-enabling mediation I
sketch out below may require more time and emotional commitment than
some other forms of mediation. Thus, there may be a tradeoff between the
ultimate goal to consider all forms of relationships and communities, which
would not necessarily put gay and lesbian identity at the center, and the
of process with someone with
willingness of couples to engage in that kind
128
comfort.
complete
feel
not
do
whom they
E. The Limits of Passive Neutrality in Postmodem Conditions
For the reasons discussed above, individuals in same-sex relationships
may want (and/or need) to know more about a process in which lesbians
and gays will be involved: different people in same-sex couples may have
other identifications based on such things as race, class, ethnicity, disability, age, and just plain views of the world. One would hope for an
understanding of the role of the mediator that would help individuals juggle
these different commitments-and let them try on other commitments and
values they might find valuable. Instead, descriptions of ideals of mediation
and mediation practice often betray a notion of passive neutrality. For
127.
128.

See infra notes 227-238 and accompanying text.
A final consideration is whether it violates principles or laws of antidiscrimination to

give effect to a couple's belief that only a lesbian or gay person may mediate their dispute. This
is a serious question and deserves full treatment elsewhere. In many jurisdictions, the legal answer
will be easy: many courts do not see discrimination against lesbians and gays as illegal
discrimination; in other jurisdictions, statutes or court decisions do prohibit such discrimination.
See generally, e.g., Developments in the Law: Employment Discrimination, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1568,
1625-30 (1996) (surveying state laws that prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation).
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purposes of this Article, the most important feature of passive neutrality is
its theory and practice29 of passive norms: mediators try not to describe
values, principles, and norms-with the striking exception of legal norms
that often include predictions of what a court might do.'Passive neutrality disables and impoverishes mediation practice in at
least three ways. First, by giving legal norms special attention, it empowers
those who can best articulate legal arguments, either because they have
more legal rights and/or because they are better at making legal arguments.
129. Like many practices of mediation, passive neutrality may differ from expressed ideals.
One of the most comprehensive studies of a wide variety of mediators by a wide variety of
academics from different disciplines discussed how various mediators shape mediations:
[We turn the spotlight on the mediators as the pivotal players. Mediators are not passive participants in any sense. Rather they actively construct the ways a dispute will be
handled .... They participate in the definition of the problem, choreograph the agenda
and meetings, exercise control over communication and information, and have direct

input nto the tpes of agreements that are possible.

DEBORAH M. KOLB AND ASSOCIATES, WHEN TALK WORKS: PROILES OF MEDIATORS xiv

(Jeffrey Z. Rubin ed., 1994) (emphasis added).
130. Another aspect of passive neutrality is the practice of passive emotion: the notion that
the mediator is only neutral if the mediator shows no emotion, or at least a compressed spectrum
of emotion. One middle-aged, white male mediator in San Francisco who offers his mediation
services for a fee, exemplifies passive emotion. He recognizes that some gays and lesbians may
feel uncomfortable if he mediates: "We're in an era when people in various minority communities are suspicious of anybody who's a white male. For example, two black men could walk
in and say, 'I don't want to deal with this white dude.'" Interview with a San Francisco mediator (1991). Thatmediator's complaint is that the suspicion of bias is applied unfairly, casting
suspicion only on white men: "I think a lesbian, feminist, separatist should recognize that she,
too, is going to bring her trip into the mediation-that's part of the problem. It's an attitude that
looks one way but not the other." He identifies a particular test for identifying bias; which
equates bias with a very strong reaction by the mediator: "Mediators really need to know limits.
If a problem stimulates a strong reaction in you, you can't mediate. You can't be a
neutral ....

Knowing one's neutrality boundaries is the most important thing."

Passive emotion may have a close affinity with the experience of relatively privileged status
in a society in two ways. First, those perceived with certain traits, such as those perceived as
women or effeminate men, may be labeled emotional for traits that would be characterized more
favorably in men, such as "going with one's gut" or "laying it on the line." See FINEMAN, supra
note 19 (women); Grillo, supra note 93 (women); see generally Case, supra note 58, at 28-30
(society may not value traits associated with women, such as higher pitched voices, whether they
occur in women or men); Menkel-Meadow, Portia Redux, supra note 9 (traits associated with men
are valued more as good lawyering qualities than traits associated with women). Second, the
experience of feeling emotion and anger may track a generally different experience because those
from relatively disadvantaged groups may harbor more anger and resentment because of the various kinds of indignities-such as being called "too emotional." See Peggy C. Davis, Law as
MicroAgression, 98 YALE L.J. 1559 (1989). On the other hand, there are those who believe that
relatively privileged people in same-sex couples-those who would not face any bias if they were
not lesbian or gay-may harbor more anger because they have lost the privilege they grew up
expecting. See John C. Gonsiorek, Gay Male Identities: Concepts and Issues, in LESBIAN, GAY,
AND BISEXUAL IDENTrES OVER THE LIFESPAN: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 24, 27 (Anthony

R. D'Augelli & Charlotte J. Patterson eds., 1995).

HeinOnline -- 44 UCLA L. Rev. 1733 1996-1997

1734

44 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1687 (1997)

Second, passive neutrality may cramp couples' ability to engage in private
ordering because individuals may not have enough sense of the alternative
ways they might structure their lives and alternative values they might try
to apply. Third, even if couples might arrive at the same arrangements,
those arrangements might be more valuable (to them or others) to the
extent they were chosen after a process of considering alternatives rather
than built upon a sense of false necessity.
We should carefully consider what types of values inform a mediation:
is it solely the parties' values or some other set of values such as "the law,"
the community, the industry, and so on?13' Most agree that mediators do
not simply facilitate settlement and discussion according to the express
values of the parties. 3 ' This happens in at least two related ways. First,

mediators channel discussion toward certain types of values rather than
others by expressing varying degrees of approval or disapproval for certain
values. Second, mediators may use certain kinds of values as limits on the
kinds of agreements possible, such as expressing disapproval for agreements
that vary "too much" from what a court might do.
Of all the possible values to bring to a mediation, it is not entirely
clear why mediators invoke legal values, let alone predictions of courtroom
outcomes. Many mediators and scholars of mediation 33 accept rather
quickly that mediators should give special treatment to legal principles and
legal outcomes. The strongest view is that the mediators should let parties
know what a court would do.134 An intermediate view is that mediators
131. Riskin distinguishes between those mediators who "facilitate" settlements and those
who "evaluate" settlements. Riskin, supranote 61, at 24. According to this typology, evaluative
mediation "assumes that the participants want and need her [the mediator] to provide some
guidance as the appropriate grounds for settlement-based on law, industry practice, or

technology." Id.

132. See supra note 129; see also text accompanying notes 91-94.
133. Scholarship on ADR sometimes privileges legal norms less explicitly in the way that it
structures research and scholarship. In a comprehensive yet concise typology of approaches to
mediation, Riskin, for example, defines "narrow" mediation as mediation that focuses on "litigation" issues and broader mediation as focusing on "other" issues. See Riskin, supra note 61, at
19 ("In very narrow mediations, the primary goal is to settle the matter in dispute through an
agreement that approximates the result that would be produced by the likely alternative process,
such as a trial, without the delay or expense of using that alternative process."). In making litigation "narrow," the implicit assumption is that litigation is the unavoidable core and inevitable
as a possible source of norms, and all other sources of norms are more peripheral.
134. The Commission on Qualifications of the Society of Professionals in Dispute
Resolutions draws an implicit distinction between legal norms and principles and other norms
and principles. SOCIETY OF PRO'LS IN DISP. RESOL., QUALIFYING NEUrRAL'S: THE BASIC
standards explicitly
PRINCIPLES: REPORT OF SPIDR COMM'N ON QUALIFICATIONS 18 (1989). Its

for mediation recommend that a mediator be able to "help the parties identify principles and
criteria that will guide their decisionmaking." But its more general standards that describe the
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should tell parties that they should familiarize themselves with relevant
legal principles and what a court might decide in similar cases.135 The
weakest version of this approach is that lawyers should warn parties if they
"give up" what mediators perceive as their "legal rights" or what a court
would likely award.136
To varying degrees, each of these positions privileges legal outcomes
and legal norms over other conceivable norms. A typical article on mediation raises the danger that, if a party is "uninformed," then she may feel
cheated.'3 7 This general account makes enough sense and is the model
for informed consent in other professions, such as medicine. The curious
aspect is that accounts often treat information about what a court would do
"knowledge of the particular dispute resolution process being used" mention two special roles for
knowledge of legal norms and practices:
In mediation, knowledge of the process that will be used to resolve the dispute if no
agreement is reached, such as judicial or administrative adjudication or arbitration;
Where parties' legal rights and remedies are involved, awareness of the legal standards that would be applicable if the case were taken to a court or other legal forum.
Id. at 19; see also Andrew S. Morrison, Comment, Is Divorce Mediation The PracticeOf Law? A
Matter Of Perspective, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1093, 1134 (1987) (stating that "the lawyer divorce mediator should inform the parties how the local custom and laws would apply in their case").
135. See FLA. R. CIv. P. 10.090(b) (1997) ("When a mediator believes a party does not
understand or appreciate how an agreement may adversely affect legal rights or obligations, the
mediator shall advise the participants to seek independent legal counsel."). It is interesting that
the Florida rules otherwise generally provide that "[a] mediator shall assist the parties in reaching
an informed and voluntary settlement[,]" but do not define what "information" about community
practices or other values-if any-are necessary to make an "informed" decision. FLA. R. CIV. P.
10.060(a) (1997). The text of the rule implicitly assumes couples need to know about
rights-even if they can't afford to go to court-but do not need to know about community
values-even if such values would give them valuable ideas. Apart from the text of the rule,
however, Florida's Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel has interpreted the mediation rules to
preclude the mediator from introducing any values, even legal rights. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Beyond
Formalism and False Dichotomies: The Need For Institutionalizinga Flexible Concept of the Mediator's
Role, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 949, 968-69 (1997) (discussing panel opinion that a mediator may
not even ask why a party in a wrongful death action did not seek damages for loss of consortium).
In contrast to Florida's mediation rules, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct for lawyers
recognize that clients may be less interested in purely technical legal advice than in broader
moral and ethical considerations-the kind of considerations that this Article has associated with,
among other things, community norms. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
2.1[2] ("Advice couched in narrowly legal terms may be of little value to a client, especially
where practical considerations, such as costs or effects on other people, are predominant") (emphasis
supplied). Nevertheless, the Model Rules yoke this concern to a concern with legal outcomes by
noting that "moral and ethical considerations ... may decisively influence how the law will be

applied." Id.
136. See, e.g., Robert J. Condlin, "Cases on Both Sides": Patterns of Argument in Legal DisputeNegotiation, 44 MD. L. REV. 65, 133 (1985) ("A person who has been fooled, intimidated, or
cajoled into believing that his legal rights do not exist, has not made an informed and free choice
to trade off those rights.").
137. See id. at 133-34.
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as the only relevant information. To varying degrees, such approaches
recommend a lawyer make a special effort to compare what the parties say
to what a court might do, and should do so more thoroughly and more
consistently than referencing: (1) what members of the community of one
or more parties would value or do; (2) what one or more parties might do
after considering the values of various communities; (3) what social science
research might suggest.1 31 In effect, this often means parties may never
consider such other values. 139 For example, a mediator who was not
limited by a notion of passive neutrality might tell a couple seeking help
with a cohabitation agreement that many same-sex couples choose to pool
their assets in a joint account;14° she might even direct the couple to
scholarly articles that considered whether such pooling of assets might tend
similar to lawfully recognized
to keep a same-sex couple together in a way
4'
partners.'
heterosexual
involving
marriages
The passive neutrality defense of privileging predictions about what a
court might do is that parties want to know what a court might do.'
One often-cited account of legal negotiation simply states that individuals
138.

Of course, as discussed further below, introducing what a "community" values may be

problematic depending on how one defines a community. It is less of a problem, however, if one
discusses several different values and practices of different groups of individuals. How an expert
may introduce information without overwhelming parties with his views, however, remains a
problem, whether these views be based on law or social science. See supra note 93.
139. See AUSTIN SARAT & WILLIAM L.F. FELSTINER, DIVORcE LAWYERS AND THEIR
CLIENTS 126 (1995) (when lawyers predict what courts will do, it "relieves both lawyer and client
of the moral responsibility for figuring out what is fair and of communicating that in a persuasive
way to the other side"). Although this passage from Sarat and Felstiner presumes that parties
"figure out what is fair" individually, the passage more generally is consistent with the idea that
emphasis on what a court does limits what parties can do on their own, be that adversarial or
problem-solving negotiation.
140. See BETTY BERZON, PERMANENT PARTNERS: BUILDING GAY & LESBIAN
RELATIONSHIPS THAT LAST 261-62 (1988) (noting that a "variety of options for money management are possible" and listing "a few of the most common"). Some may wonder if there is a
danger in allowing mediators to discuss "common" options and/or social science data because
different professionals might characterize the information in different ways. This seems sensible
enough, but this does not distinguish such descriptions from descriptions about likely legal outcomes about which lawyers frequently disagree. See infra text accompanying notes 153-154.
141. See L.A. Kurdek, The Dissolution of Gay and Lesbian Couples, 8 J. Soc. & PERS.
RELATIONSHIPS 265 (1991). This example assumes that the parties would value staying together.
See Paul et al., supra note 120.
142. See id. at 122 (divorce clients often ask what a court would do); Susan S. Silbey & Sally
E. Merry, Mediator Settlement Strategies, 8 L. & POL'Y 7, 13 (1986) ("When parties resist settling,
mediators often make statements about the parties' alternatives. Since most cases were referred
by the court, it is the logical alternative to a mediation settlement."); see Leonard L. Riskin,
Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 34-35 (1982) (parties may be influenced by inaccurate assumptions about what a court would do).
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want to know what a court will do because it is asserted that a court will
apply the law if the parties do not reach an agreement. 3 In a certain
formal sense, this may be true, if one makes a bold assumption: absent an
agreement, parties can and will litigate to judgment. This bold assumption,
however, may not be warranted. As a general mater, empirical work suggests that only a small percentage of disputes filed are resolved by court
judgment.' 44 Moreover, the relevant number may not all be disputes, but
all disputes of the relevant type. As Janet Alexander suggested in the case
of securities class actions, litigation to judgment may not be an alternative

because there is a nontrivial chance of a horrible outcome or horrible damage from the process of trial, such as adverse publicity. 4 Similarly, with
many family law disputes, litigation to judgment is not an option for such
things as the feared consequences on children or the emotional turmoil on
the married parties themselves.'
143. See Condlin, supra note 136.
A settlement is attractive or not primarily in comparison with alternative dispositions.
In dispute-negotiation the principal alternative is a decision by a court. In settling, each
side compares a proposed agreement against its prediction of what a court will do, minus

the transaction costs of having a court do that.
Id. at 80.
144. The usual figure cited is that something less than five percent of cases go to trial. JOHN
S. MURRAY ET AL., PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS 218 (2d ed.

1996). Therefore, the most likely alternative to a particular form of ADR is not what a court
would do, but some other way that the parties would reach an agreement, such as through
negotiation or some ADR process, or what would happen if the parties just did nothing. See
Robert A. Baruch Bush, "What Do We Need a Mediator For?": Mediation's 'Value-Added' for
Negotiators, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 1, 6 (1996) ("Viewed in proper perspective, mediation and other third-party processes are alternatives not to court, but to unassisted settlement
efforts ...."); see also RICHARD L. ABEL, Introductionto 1 THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE 9
(Richard L. Abel ed., Academic Press, Inc. 1982) (advocates of "informal justice" deploy various
"rhetorical devices" including "false comparisons," such as when "[m]ediation is compared with
adjudication... but most mediated cases would have been handled by negotiation").
On the other hand, the 95% settlement statistic exaggerates the irrelevance of judicial decisions. The number excludes the substantial number of cases that judges resolve by motion, such
as motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim and motions for summary adjudication or summary judgment. See MURRAY Er AL., supra ("About one-third of the cases never get beyond the
complaint and answer stage, being dismissed upon request of the parties.., or upon a summary
judgment order"); Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of ForumShopping, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 1507, 1521-22 (1995) (more recent statistics on cases dismissed on
motion). And in some cases, parties may settle based on what they think a court would do. See
Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 11.
145. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do The Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities
Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REv. 497 (1991).
146. See, e.g., Howard S. Erlanger et al., Participation and Flexibility in Informal Processes:
Cautions From the Divorce Context, 21 L. & Soc'Y REv. 585, 593 (1987) ("The lawyers in particular describe a widespread professional belief that divorce litigation is traumatic and that good
lawyers keep their clients out of court, especially in cases involving children.").
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So, too, disputes between same-sex couples may fall into a category of
cases involving parties that heavily disfavor litigation.' 47 Part of this fear,
as discussed above, may stem from a concern of bias and animus because
gays and lesbians remain classic out-groups."' Indeed, one of the most
frequently cited appeals of alternative dispute resolution for lesbians and
gays is that it is more private than litigation. Part of this appeal for secrecy
may also reflect concerns about the group, such as a desire to present an
image more appealing to powerful groups, often defined as the majority.'49
Apart from the notion that mediators should inform parties about the
law because it is an alternative to agreement, some people identify law as a
"norm" or principle."' Precisely why law is a norm, or more particularly
why it is a norm different from other many other sources of norms, is not
always clear. One implicit argument is that law may be a special norm to
the extent that it is the outcome of democratic processes. As Carrie
Menkel-Meadow notes, however, it is not well articulated why that claim
should trump the claim that agreements should reflect the values of the
parties.' 5 ' Moreover, some emphasize that marriage, which evolved historically in the context of male subordination of women, does not provide
an attractive pedigree for twentieth-century same-sex couples.'52
Finally, one might imagine that mediators discuss legal arguments and
likely legal outcomes because they are easier to predict and discuss than the
norms or practices of communities. I am quite sympathetic to the claim
that it is difficult to say what a community "does" or
"believes"-particularly because it is hard to define the contours of any
147. See supra note 8.
148. On out-groups, see, for example, Lusky, supranote 73, at 2.
149. For a discussion, see infra Part III.F.
150. See, e.g., ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETINo To YES 89 (1981) (law as a potential principle to resolve a dispute); Gary Freedman, The Role of Law in Mediation (unpublished
materials, on file with author).
151. See Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Anyway?, supranote 9.
152. See Polikoff, supra note 60. There is some evidence that there were socially recognized
unions of same-sex couples many years ago. See supra note 1. Even assuming that some ceremony recognized such unions, it does not follow that the institution of marriage reflected the
needs or practices of the small number of same-sex couples who obtained such ceremonies.
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community." 3 Therefore, there will always be arguments about what the
relevant community is, and what the relevant community believes. But the
difficulty with defining what a relevant community believes is not obviously
more difficult than defining what a court is likely to do, let alone what a
court should do. As one study of divorce lawyers indicates, lawyers often
doubt they can predict what a court will do; those who think they can
make such predictions often disagree with each other about how courts will
54

rule. 1

In light of all the generic questions about why mediators introduce law
into mediations, and the more specific questions about why marriage law
might inform mediations involving same-sex couples who cannot marry, I
was surprised to find some empirical evidence that mediators do in fact use
divorce law in mediating same-sex couples. Katherine 'Triantifillou, who
wrote a pioneering piece on lesbian mediation in 1987, now refers same-sex
55
couples to one of three heterosexual mediators that she trusts.'
Although she decided to refer couples to these mediators because she
153. See Stephen J. Schnably, Property and Pragmatism: A Critique of Radin's Theory of
Property and Personhood, 45 STAN. L. REv. 347 (1993). What one might characterize as a
community "consensus," another might characterize as a product of power and historical struggles. See id. at 363-64; cf. id. at 371 ("In short, a focus on consensus simply cannot deliver what
it promises: a relatively uncontroversial basis for legal rules and decisionmaking."). How hard it
is to define a community may depend-in part-upon why one seeks to define the community.
Implicitly, Rubenstein's recent scholarship on gay and lesbian litigation assumes that it is easier
to identify the community of gay and lesbian litigators than it is to identify the entire gay and
lesbian community for the purpose of having a democratic vote on what goals the community
should pursue in litigation. Compare Rubenstein, supra note 17, at 1656 (referring to the difficulty in having a democratic vote because of the "ambiguous contours of the 'communities' at
issue"), with id. at 1680 (emphasizing the need to confer with a community of "professional civil
rights litigators").
154. See Erlanger et al., supra note 146.
Even the lawyers in our sample who do think there are set standards and who do say they
can predict outcomes differ in their opinion of the content of those court standards;
obviously, they cannot all be correct. Some lawyers attempt to "divide hardship," that
is,to make each parent absorb equal deficiencies of income. Others measure the
adequacy of support by looking at the custodial parent's budget, trying to make sure the
custodian can make ends meet, or by looking at the supporting parent's ability to pay.
Still others focus on a flat amount of support per child.
Id. at 599.
155. Telephone Interview with Katherine Triantafillou (Feb. 13, 1997).
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trusted their competence as mediators and their lack of homophobia, she
discussed one unintended consequence: heterosexual mediators who often
handle heterosexual divorces view same-sex mediations through the "prism
of divorce law":
Everyone has a view of what a family is, and what a contribution to
the family is. It depends on how you view the marital enterprise. If
you see two guys as individuals, you may see things one way. If you
see two guys as part of a marital enterprise, you may come down the
other way.
Having gay people go to straight mediators means mediators view
them jointly in the marital enterprise, through the prism of divorce
law, and will apply those kinds of concepts.'5 6
Oddly, then, same-sex couples may find themselves bargaining in the
shadow of the law of divorce even if there is little evidence courts apply
divorce law to unmarried same-sex couples.'57 This might mean that
such couples, for example, agree to split all assets earned during their relationship, even if a court would not order such a split.
Ultimately, one of the weaknesses of the passive neutrality model is
that it may fall short in leaving room for individuals to consider possible
values they would like to apply apart from legal values. In particular, passive neutrality may not give couples enough opportunity and
encouragement to consider how to apply communities' values that they find
meaningful to their situation. Passive neutrality may very well give couples
informed consent about the alternative they would face if they could afford
to have a court decide their dispute. But it gives little glimpse of the
various other visions of how they might lead and reorder their lives.' 58
156. Id. Triantafillou herself expresses ambivalence about the way that such mediation may
have such unintended consequences. Like many in same-sex relationships, she questions whether
same-sex couples really want the substantive law of marriage and divorce to govern such relationships. See id.
157. 1 say "little" evidence because one attorney reported that courts may be willing to infer
from evidence of couples' registration as domestic partners that they each intended that a court

would apply some version of divorce law if they were to separate. Panel Comments by Paul Freud
Wotman, American Association of Law Schools, Joint Meeting of Sections on Contracts and

Sexual Orientation Issues, San Antonio, Tex. (Jan. 1996).
158. One particularly important question about mediator neutrality is the treatment of
various manifestations of homophobia and anti-gay bias. Larry Brinkin, who mediated gay dis-

crimination cases in San Francisco, where discrimination based on sexual orientation is illegal,
noted that many lesbian and gay people did not recognize what he saw as discrimination, such as
being discouraged from putting pictures of a partner on an office wall. Interview with Larry
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A second disadvantage is that the practice of passive neutrality
changes the power between parties to a mediation. Just as Mnookin and
Kornhauser thought that law-or arguments about what the law is-could
serve as an endowment for parties to a negotiation, so might arguments
about what a community values and how a community might respond to
settlements. 59 One mediator described how one woman invoked community in a mediation with her same-sex partner: "I hear people refer to
the community ethic. One woman said, 'If I settle for that, people in the
community will think I'm a sucker.' 6 It became a question of how they'd
represent things to the community".'
Although such examples raise hope that private mediation may provide some alternative to public marriage, an excessive attention to law may
impede that role. A mediator's attention to legal issues, language, and legal
concepts may further entrench parties who want to cling to what they
perceive as strong legal positions. Although this may be true whether
mediation occurs in order to structure a relationship when parties want a
"marriage-like" commitment, or when partners make a significant joint
decision, such as parenting a child, it may be especially important when
parties terminate a relationship. In these earlier stages of a relationship,
parties may not be thinking about courts as "an alternative" but about
different ways of agreeing about how to live their lives together. When
parties terminate a relationship, however, attention to courts may increase
and-as many reports of those working with divorcing couples and my
interviews with mediators suggest-couples may begin to wonder if they will
end up in court. So long as courts will not recognize same-sex marriages,
this may mean, as a practical matter, that it will often be quite hard to see
community mediation as a process alternative for same-sex couples upon
Brinkin (an. 1991). "People," Brinkin said of lesbians and gays, "are often not as strong as you

want them to be. I try to make them feel more comfortable. I try to let them know discrimination is absolutely wrong-morally, ethically, and legally. In short, I try to empower
them." Id. Since Brinkin practices in a city that bans such discrimination, he is merely following the familiar mediation practice of mentioning legal rights. In other areas, however,
including many areas of child custody, the "legal" part of this argument would be less
clear-making it all the more important to consider what role, if any, mediators should have in
raising other values that characterize such discrimination as wrong.
159. Let me be clear: I view appeals to community as one way that parties may advance their
views and one way that they may order their lives. I do not rest on the far stronger view that
parties may only make arguments if they are situated within some community. See, e.g., ROBERT
C. POST, CONSTuTIONAL DOMAINS 14 (1995) ("(P]ersons who do not already have an identity
are incapable of meaningful choice. Choices have significance only within the context of an
anterior commitments.").
160. Telephone Interview with Carole Spears (Mar. 1991).

HeinOnline -- 44 UCLA L. Rev. 1741 1996-1997

1742

44 UCLA LAW REIW 1687 (1997)

separation-except for those same-sex couples that have the foresight to
6
document any agreement about their relationship.' '
F.

Summary: The Limits of Private Ordering

To sum up this Article's look at private ordering: Private ordering
holds out the idea that gay and lesbian mediation will free couples from
judicial bias and provide a safe space for creative problem solving. Sometimes this is a very plausible claim. In particular, when the primary source
of bias that parties do and should fear is some form of homophobia, then
mediation designed to eliminate homophobia may help. Even apart from
whether couples will face less bias in gay and lesbian mediation, couples
may feel more comfortable and reach better solutions merely because they
feel more comfortable.
On the other hand, there are two important limits to the vision of
private ordering. First, individuals may face other forms of bias that are not
equivalent to the vision of the gay and lesbian community or experience
that a mediator shares. Sometimes this will be because of other forms of
animus, based on such things as race, class, ethnicity, disability, and age, in
all their permutations and intersections. Other times the bias may include
a dimension of thick procedure that reflects different substantive values,
such as values about monogamy. Second, even if individuals do not face
bias, mediation may only expose individuals to a relatively cramped set of
values that might inform how they order their lives. Mediators, particularly
lawyer-mediators, may help couples consider legal values and legal alternatives, but may neglect possible values of communities that couples might
find valuable.
161. As one mediator explained, "The nonbiological mother knows if it ends up in court, she
will get nothing--there's a lot of pressure to give in when there's disagreement." Telephone
Interview with Martina Reeves (Mar. 1991). Similarly, Shelia Kuehl was also quite skeptical of
mediation as an alternative to court. "I'm not a fan of mediation," Kuehl said. Telephone Interview with Shelia Kuehl (Mar. 1991) (then director of Women's Law Center and now California
House Speaker Pro Tem). "Mediation presupposes two people with equal power able to argue for
and articulate their own self-interest. Where one person holds all the legal cards, it's a very
difficult prospect: one person having all power and the other person saying, 'Be a nice person.'"
Id. Kuehl estimated that, in 90% of all same-sex relationships, one person will "hold all the
cards." Kuehl speculated that the only counterweight in such circumstances might be the
stronger party's fear of being exposed as gay-being "outed," but quickly added that a mediator in
such a situation "might then find herself in a dynamic she wouldn't want." Id. On the other
hand, there is evidence that other out-groups submitted cases to private community courts. See
infra text accompanying notes 184-189 (use of community dispute resolution by Jews).
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IV. DOES MEDIATION SERVE COMMUNITY INTERESTS?
Is gay and lesbian mediation better for the gay and lesbian community
than going to court or some other alternative? This part examines two
possible arguments. The first set of arguments are privacy arguments: the
gay and lesbian community will be better off if disputes between gays and
lesbians are discussed privately rather than discussed in a larger population.
Although much of this part discusses the specific context of same-sex couples, much of what follows relates to the more general question concerning
how a set of individuals resolves disputes when members of a larger
community dislike them. In such instances, including those in same-sex
relationships in the United States today, it may be tempting to keep all disagreements from the larger public because information about those disagreements (or the disagreements themselves) might further contribute to
the group's unpopularity. 6 The second principal argument also applies
to other groups: should disputes involving members of a group be resolved
according to the norms and values of that group or according to larger
community? Whether private dispute resolution simply applies the same
law as public dispute resolution but with somewhat different procedures
(such as those designed to eliminate some forms of bias), or whether it
applies different substantive norms is an important question for any private
system of justice. Unfortunately, as discussed below, private justice may
sometimes apply different norms when parties may not be aware of this.
A. Community Interests and Privacy
1.

Keeping Everything Private: Not Scaring the Horses

One set of arguments for privatizing assumes that the less heterosexuals
know about gay and lesbian relationships, the more likely it is that the
public will support better treatment of lesbians and gays. The underlying
162. Although this subsection conflates the decision to have a specialized community forum
with the decision to have a private community forum, it is possible to have a specialized community forum that is open to the public. The Jewish Conciliation Board of New York was
designed as a community dispute resolution forum, but was open to the public. See ISRAEL
GOLDSTIiN, JEWISH JUSTICE AND CONCILIATION: HISTORY OF THE JEWISH CONCILIATION

BOARD, 1930-68, at 91 (1981). The Board, however, declined to let its live proceedings be
broadcast. Id. at 97. But see JAMES YAFFE, So SUE ME! THE STORY OF A COMMUNITY COURT

11 (1972) (popular account suggesting that a major appeal of Jewish Conciliation Board was to
protect the reputation of the Jewish community by keeping disputes within the community out of
the public eye).
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sentiment is, as the saying goes, that one should not do anything that
would "scare the horses." In the strongest versions, such arguments favor
keeping lesbian and gay relationships private without qualification; other
arguments may suggest instead that privatizing may be appropriate now, but
they leave open a transition to more public arguments in the future;'O
finally, some may explicitly view marriage as a long-term goal, but privatization as a short-term priority, much as some advocates for African
Americans and others saw restrictions on interracial marriage as a shortterm necessity.1 " Such arguments draw support from considerable survey
research on public attitudes toward lesbians and gays. Most recent surveys
show that overwhelming proportions of the public think gays and lesbians
should have the same opportunities to get the same jobs and live in the
same places as heterosexuals. But when surveys ask about attitudes toward
gay and lesbian sexual activities, large portions of the public continue to
think gay and lesbian sex is morally suspect. 65
In contrast to these various arguments to keep gay and lesbian relationships private, some argue that there should be more publicity about
lesbian and gay relationships for the sake of the gay and lesbian community.
Jane Schacter, for example, has argued that the publicity surrounding gays
and lesbians who seek to care for children promotes positive images of
lesbians and gays. 1 "6 Similarly, Andrew Jacobs argues that gays and
163. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution,70 IND. L.J. 1 (1994). But
see Marc A. Fajer, With All Deliberate Speed? A Reply to Professor Sunstein, 70 IND. L.J. 39, 42
(1994) ("Determining when Americans are 'ready' for a particular constitutional decision is complicated at best.").
164. On the strategy to defer challenges to laws prohibiting persons of different races from
marrying, see note 17 supra; see also Rubenstein, supra note 17, at 1636 n.64. On the parallels
between restrictions requiring people to marry persons of the same race and restrictions allowing
marriage only to persons of different sexes, see Andrew Koppelman, Note, The Miscegenation
Analogy: Sodomy Law as Sex Discrimination,98 YALE L.J. 145 (1988). For a condensed version of
the argument, see ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SoCIAL EQUALITY

154-58 (1996).
165. See, e.g., Brad Knickerbocker, Gay-Rights Advocates Step Up Campaigns, CHRISTIAN Scl.
MoNrroR, Aug. 12, 1994 (reporting majority supports "gay lifestyle"). But see Fajer, supra note
163, at 42 n.19 (noting that "antigay advocates often use 'gay lifestyle' as a shorthand for loveless, promiscuous lives").
166. See Jane Schacter, "Counted Among the Blessed": One Court and the Constitution of
Family, 74 TEX.L. REv. 1267 (1996); see also Fajer, supra note 105, at 649-50. One sees traces of
the pull to public debate and public discussion of lesbians and gays as well in H.L.A. Hart's
famous exchange with Devlin over the rights of lesbians and gays in the United Kingdom:
If in our own day the "overwhelming moral majority" has become divided or hesitant
over many issues of sexual morality, the main catalysts have been matters to which the
free discussion of sexual morals, in the light of the discoveries of anthropology and psychology, has drawn attention. These matters are very diverse: they include the harmless
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lesbians who win the right to care for children help "[assimilate] gays into
the arguable core of the American family archetype: motherhood. " 167
From one perspective, these arguments about privacy may represent an
exaggerated fixation on the courts."' Both sides of the keepingit-private
argument tend to equate publicity with courts deciding cases, and privacy
with any other process. Of course, there is a sense in which court decisions, particularly decisions of the Supreme Court, make media coverage
more likely. Similarly, there may be a tendency for academics, particularly
law professors, to pay more attention in course coverage and publications to
matters that courts resolve, rather than private processes such as mediation.169 Nevertheless, newspapers and other media have also discussed
same-sex couples even without reporting on pending legal decisions. In
other words, one might conclude that privacy arguments about same-sex
marriage represent a simple misunderstanding about the relative role of the
courts in shaping public attitudes more generally.
character of much sexual deviation, the variety of different sexual moralities in different
societies, the connection between restrictive sexual morality and harmful repression.
H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORAlrY 68 (1963). I think Hart's remarks only show traces
of more recent arguments because it is unclear whether Hart thought the "overwhelming moral
majority" was persuaded by reading the more academic sounding studies to which he alludes or
some other more detailed accounts of lesbian and gay life.
167. Andrew M. Jacobs, Romer Wasn't Built in a Day: The Subtle Transformation in Judicial
Argument over Gay Rights, 1996 WIS. L. REv. 893, 936. On the power of mother as an image in
contemporary American life, see FINEMAN, supra note 19; Dorothy E. Roberts, The Unrealized
Power of Mother, 5 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 141 (1995).
168. Sandel considers the argument that one may make arguments about respect for lesbians
and gays outside of litigation. See, e.g., SANDEL, supra note 36, at 107. In his view, however,
this argument "underestimates the extent to which constitutional discourse has come to define
the terms of political discourse in American public life." Id. at 108. Sandel's argument illustrates
the way in which arguments about privatizing same-sex relationships implicate much larger claims
about how much courts' actions affect society more generally. Although Sandel's important work
deserves a much fuller treatment than the occasion for this Article permits, it is worth noting
that his claim is a claim about national "discourse," not a claim that what courts do changes
attitudes of the public more generally. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE 178-79
(1991) (noting that although many credit the Roe decision with an increase in women's ability to
have abortions, the larger growth in abortion came in the years prior to Roe).
169. Many criticize this emphasis on what courts publish rather than what individuals and
institutions do. See Robert W. Gordon, Lawyers, Scholars, and the "Middle Ground," 91 MicH. L.
REV. 2075 (1993). More specifically, Galanter notes that, when discussing negotiation, we may
pay too much attention to the shadow that courts cast and too little to the shadow that other
institutions and practices cast. See Galanter, supra note 51, at 17 (stating that shadows are also
cast by institutions and practices other than courts, such as "home, neighborhood, workplace,
business deal [sic] and so on"); cf. id. at 22 ("If we have lost the experience of an allencompassing inclusive community, it is not to a world of arms-length dealings with
strangers, but in large measure to a world of loosely joined and partly overlapping partial and
fragmentary communities.").
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From another perspective, however, the keep-it-private arguments
represent competing visions of community. One vision of same-sex couples
imagines that such couples desire the "acceptance" of some other, larger
community. The communitarian philosopher Michael Sandel frames the
question as one of acceptance versus tolerance.1 70 Privacy, Sandel contends, will merely win tolerance but not true acceptance. The rhetoric of
"tolerance," however, implies a kind of compromised expectations,
something that is less valuable than acceptance. Acceptance, however, is not
without its problems. Often, acceptance implies that a more powerful
group deigns to accept a less powerful group; it does not mean that two
equal groups accept each other. The problem with the acceptance vision,
then, is that it implies that the decision of a dominant group to accept is a
relevant question. Even if the dominant group expresses "acceptance," it
still may perpetuate a sense of privileged position. To take a quite mundane example, when a professor asks students to call her by her first name,
she may not only create an air of informality but also may underline her
own power: she set the terms for conversation and titles, albeit choosing
informality. 71 For similar reasons, many now worry that the process of
coming out-communicating to people in one way or another that one is
gay-may reinforce the idea that loving someone of the same sex is something that must be explained and accepted/forgiven/understood by someone
7
who loves persons of a different sex.
170. Michael Sandel contrasts the "neutral case for toleration" with a notion of some "fuller
respect" for gays and lesbians:

The problem with the neutral case for toleration is ... [that] it leaves wholly unchal-

lenged the adverse views of homosexuality itself. But unless those views can be plausibly
addressed, even a court ruling in their favor is unlikely to win for homosexuals more than
a thin and fragile toleration. A fuller respect would require, if not admiration, at least
some appreciation of the lives homosexuals live.
SANDEL, supra note 36, at 537.
171. Compare what Richard Rorty says about the role of men in the struggle for women's
equality:
But I do not want to say that men have the power to make full persons out of women by
an act of grace, in the way in which sovereigns have the power to make nobles out of
commoners. On the contrary, I would insist that men could not do this if they
tried .... The utopia I foresee, in which these practices are simply forgotten, is not one
which could be attained by an act of condescension on the part of men, any more than
an absolute monarch could produce an egalitarian utopia by simultaneously ennobling all
her subjects.
Rorty, supra note 66, at 53 n.44.
172. Some emphasize the way that a strategy of trying to show that gays and lesbians are
"virtually normal," see SULLIVAN, supranote 45, may perpetuate the idea that those who are less
virtually normal deserve some lesser respect or even legal rights. See, e.g., Steven Seidman,
Queer Pedagogy / Queer-ing Sociology, 20 CRITICAL SOC. 169, 170 (1994). But see Walters, supra
note 121, at 853 (criticizing Seidman for assuming that coming out necessarily means coming out
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In light of the difficulties with an acceptance framework, one might try
to envision a community in which, over a somewhat large relevant range,
society, at least in public life, respects many different individuals rather
than deciding whether some individuals or activities should be "accepted."
Instead of seeking acceptance of some characteristics, one might seek a
world in which some characteristics were no longer relevant. This seems to
be the kind of model that explains how attitudes toward "miscegenation"
evolved: instead of arguing that relationships between people of "different"
races was good, one argued that the racial labels one attached were irrelevant to how one characterized the relationship, at least from a legal point
of view.'73 One might imagine a community of irrelevance of various
sorts. One such wider community would be a community in which certain
characteristics no longer mattered. In discussing women in society, for
example, Rorty says the best society may be one in which individuals are as
indifferent to the question of whether someone-even their own child-is a
man or a woman as they are to the notion whether a child is "noble or
base." The notion of noble or base means nothing to many North
7 4 Mary
Americans, but it once preoccupied people of the Middle Ages.
Anne Case has made a similar point by suggesting that discussions of gender may someday be as irrelevant as another notion from earlier times:
individuals have some essential humor, manifested in physical and moral
Ultimately, rather than envisioning a
qualities, such as melancholic.'
sub-community that accepts some community, one might imagine that
certain differences did not matter, at least for purposes of whether persons
were worthy of respect. For example, we recognize that parents describe
their children by listing their hair color or their profession, but we do not
think parents should love brunettes more than blondes or lawyers more
than doctors.' 76 And if not every community may transcend the judgas virtually normal in a way that stigmatizes others). In addition, others argue that coming out as
gay perpetuates the idea that all gay people would be normal but for their attraction to persons of
the same-sex; this neglects the way that, for example, people of color may continue to face racism. See Hutchinson, supra note 68. at 603-04.
173. See KOPPELMAN, supranote 164, at 157.
174. See Rorty, supra note 66, at 50. Consider, too, how Rorty discusses same-sex attraction:
To realize how far away such a future [in which the sex of a child is irrelevant) is,
consider ... Sedgwick's point that we shall only do justice to gays when we become as
indifferent to whether our children turn out gay or straight as we are to whether they
become doctors or lawyers. Surely she is right, and yet how many parents at the present
time can even imagine such indifference.
Id. at 50 n.41.
175. See Mary Ann Case, Remarks at Law & Society Meeting in Glasgow, Scotland
(uly, 1996).
176. See Freshman, supra note 16, at 124; see aLso Minow, supra note 69, at 665-66.
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ment of relationships between adults, then perhaps at least the state could
withdraw from such judgments.
2.

Keeping Some Things Private: "Good"/"Effective" Arguments

Apart from these relatively general arguments about public disputing
and private disputing, another set of arguments for privatizing focuses not
on general social discomfort with lesbian and gay sex, but rather on more
particular kinds of arguments made in court. The general form of such
arguments is that Argument X should not be made in public, particularly in
courts, because Argument X will undermine the interests of the gay and
lesbian community. One example of such an argument is Halley's argument that gay and lesbian litigators should not argue that homosexuality is
biologically determined because such arguments-even if accurate by scientific standards, which Halley doubts-would encourage bad social outcomes, such as genetic testing for employment or even for purposes of
identifying gay and lesbian unborn children that could be aborted.'
In
a recent variation on this general argument, some have questioned the
kinds of arguments that lesbians should make in custody cases. In an
increasing number of lesbian relationships, one woman gives birth to a
child that she and her female partner raise together; when such couples no
longer wish to live together, the question of which woman has what rights
and responsibilities over the child arises. In one highly publicized case, an
attorney argued against rights for the nonbiological parent, actress Amanda
Bearse."'7 The attorney, who had previously gotten referrals from the Los
Angeles Gay and Lesbian Center, argued generally that nonbiological
parents should have few, if any, rights-an argument that would undermine
many lesbians and gays who considered the biological children of their
177. See Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the
Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REv. 503, 523 (1994). But see Yoshino, supra note 3, at
1832-33 & 1833 n.356 (arguing that, among other things, scientific studies that purport to show
sexual orientation is relatively fixed and biologically based may result in "empathy gains,"
although Yoshino says he is "agnostic" about the claim that "homosexuality is immutable"). For
a general defense of the use of expert lawyers to decide effective legal arguments, see Rubenstein,
supra note 17. See generally Fajer, supra note 1 (advocates for same-sex marriage should make
arguments that respect many lesbians and gays).
178. See Katie Cotter, The Parent Trap, ADVOC., Feb. 4, 1997, at 29, 34.
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partners to be their own children as well. 179 As a result of the publicity,
the Los Angeles Gay and Lesbian Center ended all referrals to the
attorney. 18
What this argument illustrates in part is the implicit contest over
various ideas of community. Those who condemn the attorney implicitly
envision a community that makes no distinctions between birth parents
and other parents. This is not the only image of a community. There may
be compelling reasons to imagine a community that treats birth parents
differently from other parents. In a sense, then, many arguments about
"good" legal arguments shade into the question of what kinds of values
of whether community
should be enforced which becomes the question
81
norms.
community
enforce
mediation should
B.

Enforcing Community
Mediation

Norms

Through Community-Enhancing

The last section suggested that competing ideals of community are
implicit in arguments about whether disputes involving same-sex couples
should be private. This section considers the more straightforward argument that same-sex couples should use community mediation because they
should resolve their disagreements according to lesbian and gay community
norms. s2 This is the community-enhancing vision of dispute resolution:
dispute resolution should enhance the salience of a particular community in
either, or both, of two ways: (1) individuals should resolve disputes according to the community (including some combination of its norms, history,
and practices); and (2) individuals should leave the process more firmly
incorporating that community in their sense of who they are. This argument is sometimes made explicitly in the context of lesbians and gays, as in
the commitment by two women to practice "lesbian feminist mediation"
that would reflect the values of the lesbian feminist community.'8 To
179.

See id.at 35.

180. See id.
181. See Part V.B.
182. Some scholarship implies that the definition of "community mediation" includes the
way in which a community mediation applies community norms or at least facilitates a discussion
informed by norms of the relevant community. See PAVLICH, supra note 99, at 9; THE
POSSIBILITY OF POPULAR JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 3.

183.

See Engelhardt & Triantafillou, supra note 46.
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situate this argument, however, I first turn to a comparison with several
other communities that have practiced community-enfancig mediation.
1.

Examples from Other Communities: Jews, Native Americans, and
Muslims

One set of examples of community-enhancing mediation involves
trying to reconcile individuals to the way some group of individuals-often
described as "the community"-now acts. (Of course, the questions of
when a set of practices constitutes a community and how to resolve claims
between rival communities is often not considered.'
One example of
community-enhancing mediation is the practice of Jewish law by Jewish
courts. Historically, particularly in countries in which Jews lived separately
from others, various Jewish courts resolved disputes involving Jews. Some
of these courts applied particular written aspects of Jewish law. In other
cases, not explicitly covered by religious law, Jewish lay tribunals acted as
kinds of arbitrators to decide cases. Although the practice of both kinds of
Jewish courts declined widely when Jews became integrated into particular
societies, a small number of Jews continue to submit some disputes by agreement, even business disputes, to some form of Jewish court.l"I
In a variety of ways, such Jewish courts apply principles and practices
designed to resolve disputes according to Jewish law. In addition, some of
the pronouncements of such courts historically involved not merely binding
resolution of particular disputes, but also advice on proper conduct, albeit
conduct the court chose not to enforce. For example, pronouncements
might assert both that a parent could disinherit a child, and that a parent
usually should not: "When a person disinherits his sons... his act is legally
effective, but the Sages are displeased with him."'"
Thus, part of the
184. But see MODERN APPLICATIONS OF JEWISH LAW: RESOLUTION OF CONTEMPORARY
PROBLEMS ACCORDING TO JEWISH SOURCES IN ISRAELI COURTS 101 (Nahum Rakover ed.,

1992) [hereinafter MODERN JEWISH LAW] (discussing the conflict between practices of different
kinds of Jews and which practice should be given effect).
185.

See 1 ELON, supra note 90, at 6-39 (providing a general background on Jewish tri-

bunals). For a history of such Jewish tribunals in various countries, see also GOLDSTEIN, supra

note 162, at 9-83. Individuals in the United States continue to submit cases to such tribunals

and occasionally ask courts to give effect to such decisions. See, e.g., In re Mikel and Scharf, 432
N.Y.S.2d 602 (1980), affd, 444 N.Y.S. 2d 690 (1981) (commercial leasing dispute submitted to
Jewish court for arbitration, which secular court declined to enforce); Avitzur v. Avitzur, 446

N.E.2d 136 (N.Y. 1983).
186. 1 ELON, supra note 90, at 150.
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message of Jewish law is not merely that courts would enforce particular
laws or agreements, but that individuals should themselves conform to
certain Jewish norms.18 7
Such Jewish law also typifies community-enhancing mediation by
enforcing norms based on "custom" and practice, if not on Jewish law.
Principles of Jewish law enforce customs that are widely practiced in a
particular region, even if Jewish law does not otherwise take a position on
such customs.'" For example, a rabbinical court in Israel concluded that
severance pay was not sufficiently widespread to be customary law, but ten
years later concluded that severance pay was sufficiently widespread to be
enforced as customary law."8 9
In a similar way, some argue that Native American 9° courts once
did, and now should (and perhaps do) encourage disputants to resolve their
differences according to the current practices of the community. According
to one scholar, Zion, at least before Europeans arrived on North America,
Native Americans "had many sophisticated methods for halting bitter
disputes and reconciling wrongdoers to the community."' 91 As a doctrinal matter, federal regulations and tribal statutes require Native
American courts to look first to potentially applicable federal law of the
United States before seeking to apply tribal law. 92 Zion suggests that,
when applicable law permits Native American courts to look to tribal law,
187.

See ROTH, supra note 15.
188. See 1 ELON, supra note 90, at 926-32.
189. See id. at 929.
In addition to more purely religious forums, the Jewish Conciliation Board of New York,
founded in 1930, helped facilitate and arbitrate a number of disputes between Jews. See
GOLDSTIN, supra note 162, at 72. The board was not a religious court and could not, for example, grant religious divorces. See id. at 89. The board heard cases in panels that consisted of a

rabbi, a lawyer, a layperson, and often a consulting psychiatrist. Although it was not a religious
court, it did draw on community norms and commitment to a Jewish community. See id. at 90
("The judges were, for the most part, not trained lawyers or judges, but men and women who
nevertheless exercised moral authority at the hearings; seasoned experience, social concern,
communal leadership and ...common sense.., were their chief credentials.). At least according to its supporters, the board also "sought to represent every segment of Jewish society." See id.
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
190. For simplicity, I refer to "Native American" tribunals even though (1) practices may
vary by tribe, and (2) the conflation of all tribes into an amalgamated Native American identity
is a western notion, albeit one that even Native Americans have often come to use. See Carole
Goldberg-Ambrose, Of Native Americans and Tribal Members: The Impact of Law on Indian Group
Life, 28 L. & Soc'y REV. 1123, 1140 (1994).
191. James W. Zion, Harmony Among the People: Torts and Indian Courts, 45 MONT. L. REV.
265, 265 (1984). Although differences may vary among different Native American groups, I
sketch out some common aspects, which may vary to some degree among different groups.
192. See id. at 274.
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such courts look at what Native Americans actually do, what he calls
"usage":
A "usage" is something that is actually done in the community. It is
possible that a tribal judge might know of an old ceremonial that
would apply to a problem before the court, but unless the ceremonial
is known, accepted, and used by the people of the present day, it will
not be a custom or usage. 9 3
Zion makes a strong distinction between looking to what Native Americans
now do versus looking at what Native Americans did in the past. On his
reading of Native American law, there is no room for "tradition" in the
sense of past practices.' 94 Other research, however, suggests that some
Native American tribunals rely rather heavily on a connection to historic
beliefs and practices of Native Americans.' 95
In contrast to the Jewish and Native American traditions, which both
look to what people in the community presently do, a variation of
community-enhancing mediation looks to past practices. In this stronger,
backward-looking notion of community-enhancing, the goal is to reconcile
individuals not to what other members of the community now do, but-at
least in part-to what members of the community have done in the past or
what religious text from the past suggests they should do. A recent article

by two Islamic scholars explicitly suggests that community-based arbitration
and mediation would let parties "apply Islamic values in addressing their
needs and concerns, but which generally are unfamiliar in the [American]
'
judicial system."196
The article also suggests that such "values" will
actually reflect quite detailed and specific substantive norms because it
envisions "mediators" who "will have specialized knowledge about Islam,
dispute resolution, and possibly, the area of Islamic law in which they are
requested to assist."' 97 One particularly interesting area of the article is
its selection of quotations from the Qur'an, the Islamic holy book, to illustrate the claim that "[tihe imperative for Muslims to settle disputes through
193.

Id. at 275.

194. In my brief overview of Native American law as one example of community-enhancing
mediation, I do not claim to provide an exhaustive account of the various practices of various
tribes, let alone the various interpretations. Rather, I present one account of Native American
law as a kind of ideal for purposes of thinking about the idea of community-enhancing mediation.
195. 1 note that some research, for example, suggests that many Native American courts
draw on commitment to traditional and historic practices, not just contemporary practices. Interview with Donna Coker, Associate Professor of Law, University of Miami (May 1997). I am
grateful to Carol Goldberg-Ambrose for discussing her ongoing research in this area.
196. Abdal-Haqq & Abdal-Haqq, supra note 14, at 64.

197.

Id.at 68.
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arbitration and mediation is established in the Qur'an." One selection
quotes a provision that requires "divorced women" to "wait concerning
themselves for three monthly periods" because "their husbands have the
better right to take them back in that period.""19
Although some of the language of the proposal suggests that Islamic
mediation and arbitration would indeed encourage (in the case of mediation) or force (in the case of arbitration) parties to follow Islamic law, it is
not clear how thoroughly this would happen-or how thoroughly this would
be explained to parties. Elsewhere in the proposal, mediation is described
in process- and communication-oriented terms as if the mediators for
"divorcing women" would simply help husband and wife communicate, not
channel acceptance of Islamic law:
The mediator's main concern is to prevent or reduce hostility
between the parties and getting them to communicate clearly without being offensive. The mediator also should seek to eliminate
confusion by narrowing the issues and keeping the meeting on track.
If a party to the mediation appears to make an extreme demand, the
mediator must help them to see the unreasonableness of that
demand.' 99

This is very general language. What would a woman who consented
to Islamic mediation based on such a description expect? If she asked to
have the same rights as a man-without the kind of burden of a husband's
"right" to "take her back"-how would the mediator respond? If the husband did not object, would the mediator simply engage in passive neutrality, saying nothing, or would the mediator call the woman's request
"offensive" or "off the track" of Islam, or an "extreme" or "unreasonable"
demand?2°
2.

Traces of Lesbian and Gay Community-Enhancing

Compared to these varieties of community-enhancing mediators, the
mediators for lesbian and gay couples that I studied fit the contemporary
198.
199.
200.

Id.at 75-76 (emphasis added).
Id.at 70.
Similarly, the proposal is not entirely clear that all matters would be informed by back-

ward-looking reference to Islamic law because it also notes that community mediation would

"[p]rovide[! a forum for clarifying and establishing Islamic values." Id.at 73. The proposal also
suggests community mediation would "[sjecure the authority of the local, common people in the
formulation and application of Islamic law as opposed to a remote, centralized authority dominated by professional jurists and scholars." Id.
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practices model much more closely to the contemporary practices variety of
community-enhancing mediation. This should not be particularly surprising because much of the recent history of same-sex relationships shows
how the very concept of homosexuality as an identity is quite new. Likewise, this should not be surprising because the discussion of gay and lesbian
rights in the United States did not become public in a significant way until
the Stonewall Riots in the 19 70s. Nevertheless, although there may be no
lesbian and gay Islamic Qur'an or Jewish Talmud, there remains some
tension between the idea of mediation as facilitating private ordering and
mediation as promoting community values-albeit forward-looking notions
of what community values now are or should be.
The most comprehensive explicit notion of community-enhancing
mediation I have located is a description of a Boston mediation practice
that two women described as "lesbian feminist mediation."'
Triantafillou, the attorney, explained that she was attracted to mediation
because, among other reasons, it could help the lesbian feminist
community:
The third factor that led us to mediation was a commitment to the
lesbian feminist community. I wanted to create a new form of conflict resolution that was less damaging to women and more in tune
with my political beliefs. In my opinion there is no such thing as a
feminist attorney. I think the words feminist attorney are mutually
exclusive. Feminism is a belief system based in part on the efficacy
of the "feeling process.""'
Ironically, although Bonnie Engelhardt and Katherine Triantafillou are
explicit about a commitment to a lesbian feminist community, their writing
suggests a keen awareness of the problems of isolating identity as a lesbian
feminist as the only source of bias or the only source of values. This, no
doubt, partially reflects that the community value that Triantafillou emphasizes is the process value of the "feeling process." Both authors explicitly
discuss the way that two women who love each other may nevertheless
have different expectations based on such things as class.2 3 Ultimately,
the two also recognize a balance between providing a space in which two
women can explore the values of the lesbian community that the "wider
201. See Engelhardt & Triantafillou, supra note 46.
202. Id. at 332.
203. See id. at 329 ("Problems arise when partners discover intense reactions to differences in
class background and race that were not evident in the beginnings... of the relationship.").
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community" may not share, and the ability of different women (implicitly,
different lesbian feminists) to give different weight to such values:
It's a question of how to value those things we feel very emotional
about. Some things of value to lesbian feminists may not be valued
by the broader community. Consequently, we need to learn to put a
financial value on something for which we want to negotiate. We
come to the point of saying, "What is your bottom line?" "What
will make you feel OK?" Women say, "Oh, I can't do that, that's so
arbitrary." But that's what we are here for, an arbitrary feeling about
right for you.'0 4
what would be a/l
Some may question whether the structure and vocabulary of this
exercise-putting a dollar value on something-does not distort the way
that individuals balance values. Overall, however, the technique as
described does provide a space to consider lesbian feminist values without
treating such values as the exclusive consideration or giving them nearly
the same weight that the Native American, Jewish, and Muslim processes
suggest. 05
A second, less thoroughgoing form of community-enhancing mediation
appears relatively upfront in interviews with some mediators. In particular,
one sees elements of community-enforcing mediation in the way that
several mediators insist that mediating couples agree to value biological and
nonbiological parents. My interviews with mediators do not reveal mediators who asked parties to agree explicitly to follow norms of some lesbian
or gay community; they do, however, reveal attempts to have parties agree
that mediation would follow certain norms or principles-including principles and norms often associated with parts of lesbian and gay communities. Amy Oppenheimer, one of the founders of San Francisco-based
204. Id.at 337. When I asked Triantafillou recently what kinds of values she associated with
the lesbian feminist community when she first wrote about lesbian feminist mediation, she identified process values:
One tenet of feminism is the personal as political-take control of your life, empower
yourself. And you empower yourself when you are able to make decisions on your own
in a safe environment. Mediation seemed ideal then because gay people were not treated
well by the courts or were seen through a prism of negativity. Twelve years ago, a gay
man couldn't go to probate court in Massachusetts and be viewed as having the same
issues.
Telephone Interview with Katherine Triantafillou (Feb. 13, 1997).
205. Although the theoretical possibility of some kind of lesbian and gay communityenhancing mediation remains, Triantafillou today does not share all of her earlier hopes: "I'm not
sure people today understand lesbian feminism-it's the age of lipstick lesbians. A lot of gay
people grow up without any political consciousness." Telephone Interview with Katherine
Triantafillou, supra note 204.
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Gay and Lesbian Alternative Dispute Resolution Services, recalls a dispute
between two women who had been raising a child together. "I suggested
mediation on an agreed-upon principle of equality," Oppenheimer said "but
the other woman wanted to say that she, as biological mother, had all the
rights."'"
Oppenheimer characterizes the incident as typical of an
"ethical" question:
Just because a person can take a position legally doesn't mean they
can take it ethically. I've spoken with many lesbian mothers. Some
people sound as if they feel the legal position is more important, that
there's no way to ignore it or give it up. We're adults. We can
choose to ignore them or go on. 07
Another mediator described how she would not mediate a lesbian
custody dispute unless both women agreed each would be "honored as
parents. ,,08
In contrast to this relatively open way that mediators describe
community-enhancing mediation, there is a third, more troubling and
covert way that "culturally sensitive mediation" may function as a form of
covert community-enhancing mediation. Although raised by scholars in
the context of ethnic identity, a recent article on cultural competence
might easily be applied to the "culture" of those in same-sex relationships.
Three Canadian mediators describe their experience with what they
characterize as "different cultures. " ' The fundamental value judgment
that the authors describe is that "cultural competence" means that
"[miediators need to value diversity and respect the inherent dignity of all
cultural groups." '
Consider how the three authors recommend dealing
with Vietnamese couples who value women less than men:
Sons may receive preferred treatment over daughters and are more
likely to be encouraged (morally and financially) to further their
education. For instance, girls may be expected to help with domestic
chores. The difficulty for mediators is how to help parents explore
these issues without imposing the mediators' values upon the family.
One way that mediators can avoid losing neutrality is to bring in a
206. Oppenheimer Interview, supra note 10.
207. Id.
208. Reeves Interview, supra note 96 ("I can be neutral about a $100,000 house, but it's hard
not to want to bash heads when the biological mother is acting like the other mother has no
rights.").
209. Barsky et al., supra note 65.
210. Id. at 169 (citing K.H. KAVANAUGH & P.H. KENNEDY, PRoMOTING CULTURAL
DpvAisrrY (1992)).
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Vietnamese social worker who can tell the family his or her views on
how to balance traditional parenting practices with those of their
2
new community. "

The authors' concern is with the way that Vietnamese culture may shed
light on how couples act in mediation.21 However, the problematic and
unspoken assumption about "neutrality" and "cultural competence" is that
the only relevant culture is Vietnamese culture.
C.

The Problematic Nature of Community-Enhancing

The problem with identifying "cultural competence" as a form of
neutrality is that it downplays the very real choice that mediators make in
identifying "culture." In particular, the identification of Vietnamese as the
relevant "culture" neglects the possibility that "women" and "women's
values" are another relevant culture.21 3 When the mediator brings in a
Vietnamese social worker, the mediator is not neutral between competing
cultures: the mediator is inscribing Vietnamese culture at the potential
expense of women's culture. More generally, there is no "neutral" way to
have "cultural competence" because any three-dimensional person has
many cultures and communities that inform her existence." 4 And the
clash of cultures and communities is all the more pervasive and more
211. Id.at 173.
212. A mediator observed by Pavlich displayed a similar assumption that there was an obvious culture with obvious values; the mediator asked a woman, "Is it the same in your culture?"
PAVLICH, supra note 99, at 175 n.31. When I asked one mediator for lesbian and gay couples
whether she thought such mediators should themselves be lesbian or gay, she emphasized the
importance of cultural knowledge and volunteered her concern that she, as a non-Asian, feared
she had difficulty mediating Asian couples:
I feel blind sometimes. I know things are going on, but I can't figure out what. It
doesn't feel like the kind of healing that can happen in mediation-particularly for men.
There's stuff going on that I don't know how to deal with. I feel there may be cultural
taboos, but I don't know what they are.
Reeves Interview, supra note 96.
213. See, e.g., Rorty, supra note 66, at 31-32 (suggesting that one could imagine an emphasis
on what women do and what women's practices are, such as MacKinnon has attempted); cf.
MODERN JEWISH LAW, supra note 184, at 101 (it may be difficult to tell whether a given woman
has chosen one option under Jewish law or another because the woman may not be aware that
some interpretations of Jewish law would hold that accepting one kind of compensation as a
widow means giving up some other set of rights). As always, one should remember that in
describing what any set of people do, one must be mindful that there may be important differences within the group, such as racial differences among women. See, e.g., Harris, Race and
Essentialism, supra note 69 and supra Parts II.E. and III.B.
214. See Steven L. Winter, Contingency and Community in Normative Practice, 139 U. PENN.
L. REV. 963, 986 (1991) ("In the real world, a self has... many different communities... which
must coexist.").
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intense if we value not just existing communities, but potential future com215
munities.
Similarly, the unqualified assertion that mediators for same-sex couples
need to know about lesbians and gays may neglect other aspects, such as
race, class, and ethnicity. One very sensitive and personal account of
mediation involving lesbians and gays seems to equate sensitivity to lesbian
and gay life as the most important special feature of such mediation:
"[Blefore a mediator can attempt to mediate a child custody case, he or she
must be aware of the gay culture. With insight into the gay culture, a mediator can have a greater understanding of how gay people actually live and
how they raise their children." ' 6 The real danger is not merely the
neglect of these other sources of bias and values. It is also that parties
themselves may feel less able to raise issues of bias because they may think
to themselves, "After all, this is as fair as it gets. At least the mediator is
not homophobic."2'1 7 To put it more generally, parties may not object to
the introduction of the values of only one community because they do not
appreciate that there may be alternatives."' 8 An author rather casually
mentioned that panels of the Jewish Conciliation Board might have
embraced sexist assumptions about the proper roles of men and women, but
quickly excused this by noting that husbands and wives did not object."t 9
Lack of objection, however, is not equivalent to an informed choice;
215. Thus, what some characterize as a clash between rights of a group, such as those of some
national origin, can also be characterized as clashes between a group and another realized or
potential group. See infra note 220. And so I differ from those who see oppression of women as
only an individual versus group clash rather than a clash between two different groups. See, e.g.,
Jorgen Habermas, Multicdturalismand the Liberal State, 47 STAN. L. REV. 849, 850 (1995) (contrasting "collective rights" of Turkish immigrants with "basic individual rights" when "daughters
are, due to the Islamic tradition... prevented from participating in certain fields"); see also supra
notes 68-69.
216. McIntyre, supra note 96, at 143.
217. See generally Erica L. Fox, Alone in the Hallway: Challenges to Effective Self-Representation
in Negotiation, 1 HARV. NEG. L. REV. 85 (1996) (noting that individuals may not assert their legal
rights in landlord-tenant negotiations because they do not have a sense that it would be proper to
assert such rights).
218. See Freshman, supra note 16, at 119 (a father might not object to dropping his child at
day care rather than caring for the child himself because "[hie may very well never imagine that
he might care for the child himself," but if he were exposed to the idea that it is valuable work
for parents to care for children themselves, then perhaps he would try to care for his child himself).
219. The observer reported that the Jewish Conciliation Board members often embraced the
view that men should be strong and women warm. See YAFFE, supra note 162, at 134-35. Nevertheless, the author tacitly approved the practice by noting, "Women's Lib would probably not
approve, but the men and women who appear before this court do not seriously question these
basic assumptions." Id.
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indeed, lack of objection may even be consistent with a choice we might
label coerced.
The more fundamental problem with "cultural competence" is that it
fails to explain why existing cultures have priority over other cultures of
other persons or of cultures that could be imagined. In other words, cul°
tural competence overvalues the fit between existing culture' and a particular dispute. One problem with this is that there may be no easy way to
determine what a particular culture "values." The idea that a single
Vietnamese social worker will embody Vietnamese culture is bizarre, to say
the least.2 ' In addition, even if one could somehow identify the relevant
culture, it is unclear why the goal should be to match an individual to the
culture. As Margaret Jane Radin has observed, "We know we cannot argue
that any given sexist decision is wrong simply because it does not fit well
with all our history and institutions, for the problem is more likely that it
fits only too well." 22 The premise that "cultures" need to be "respected"
neglects the idea that a sincere attempt to apply some cultural values may
subordinate individuals, such as women. Some have attempted in general
2
to value groups and group values at the expense of individuals, 2 but this
is an argument about the relative importance of individuals and groups; it is
not neutrality.
Thus, in at least three ways, mediation may reflect concerns about
promoting the values of the community: explicitly in descriptions of lesbian
feminist mediation, implicitly in conditions that mediators may set before
mediating disputes, and rather covertly in attempts to be "culturally competent." All three of these varieties of community-enhancing mediation
raise a question of justification: Why should mediation promote community
220. See Rorty, supra note 66, at 19. According to Rorty, "Philosophy's function is rather to
clear the road for prophets and poets, to make intellectual life a bit simpler and safer for those

who have visions of new communities," id., and it is only a small leap to suggest that part of a
mediator's function, too, is to help parties think of such visions of new communities as well.

Another way to make a similar point is the notion of sensitivity to future selves: One should
have some respect not just for an individual now, but for the individual that a given individual

may become in the future, his potential future selves. See DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND
PERSONS 282-93 (1984); see also Richard A. Posner, Are We One Self or Multiple Selves?, 3 LEGAL
THEORY 23, 26-27 (1997).

221.

See Schnably, supra note 153.

222. Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, in PRAGMATISM IN LAW AND
SOCIETY 127, 136 (Michael Briat & William Weaver eds., 1991); see also POST, supra note 159,
at 4 (arguing that even if there is a community consensus, one may object that law should not be
"governed by shared social norms").
223. Cf. Ronald R. Garet, Communality and Existence: The Rights of Groups, 56 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1001 (1983) (describing the contrast between the usual concern with group rights as sum of
rights of individuals in a group with a concern with the rights of the group as a group).
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values? In the first two varieties, one may point to the possibility of meaningful consent: parties either agree to lesbian feminist mediation or parties
agree to particular preconditions, even if they are not explicitly identified
with a particular community. I say "possibility" because my research thus
far is based on interviews with mediators who describe their practice, not
with parties who have participated in such processes, let alone direct, systematic observations of attorneys or mediators "explaining" mediation.
Further research should identify not only how parties report they experienced a choice, but also whether the process that led to the choice allows
for informed consent. This includes questions about whether parties were
aware of other alternatives to particular mediators, how much mediators
negotiated over preconditions, and how aware parties were of any ability to
negotiate over preconditions. Such research should be particularly sensitive
to differences in knowledge among persons of different races, genders, and
cultural backgrounds.
Apart from research on actual practices, we also should think about
theories regarding the relationship between community and dispute resolution. It is certainly laudable to be concerned about respect for individuals
to be free from bias, as the private-ordering impulse suggests, and to be free
to adopt a range of community values. From both a private-ordering and a
communitarian perspective, however, we need to think more about how to
deal with a society filled with communities-intersecting communities that
individuals now may experience in phenomena like multiracial identity and
different potential communities that individuals may not feel able to imagine. The next part suggests one way to reconcile the way in which we may
value the attraction of community while also respecting the value of autonomy, the ability of individuals to retreat from particular communities, form
new communities, and even-to a very large extent-withdraw from
community.
V.

PRIVATE ORDERING AND COMMUNITY: AN OUTLINE OF
COMMUNITY-ENABLING MEDIATION

One Mediator's Perspective on Same-Sex Couples:
I'm there as eyes and ears. I'll say, "You haven't thought of this.
I've had 100 people cross my desk. You've thought of 20 things,
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here's another five." The mediator also said she anticipates prob224
lems as she has more cases involving lesbians and gays.
Many mediators would agree that a mediator should spot issues and
point out concerns. As this Article has suggested, however, how mediators
spot and describe issues of norms, particularly norms of communities, real
and potential, often remains problematic. This part sketches out a notion
of community-enabling mediation that seeks to address the shortcomings of
both the private-ordering vision and the community-enhancing vision of
mediation. In the passive-neutrality model of mediation-which often
accompanies the rationale of private ordering-parties may never consider
potential community values that they might find valuable. 2 5 In various
kinds of community-enhancing mediation, community may play a role,
consciously, as when mediators announce a commitment to "lesbian feminist" principles, or structurally, when mediators perceive the need to be
sensitive to what they identify as the relevant community. But the individual has much less freedom and encouragement to consider the mix of
community values that fits her experience, values, needs, and goals best.
Particularly when community-enhancing mediation involves experts on "the
community," parties may miss an opportunity to consider different
communities, different interpretations. 2 6 In contrast to communityenhancing mediation, community may still play a role in communityenabling mediation, but it is a role that respects the autonomy and
informed judgments of the parties.
224. Oppenheimer Interview, supra note 10. For example, in gay and lesbian couples, she
often suggests a provision over who can stay in a house after she has seen some people have their
new lovers move in. Similarly, a mediator who handled complaints of discrimination based on
sexual orientation said that when parties have "no idea" about settlements of discrimination
claims, he gives information of the kinds of settlements that other parties have reached. Brinkin
Interview, supra note 158.
225. See text accompanying supra notes 129-154.
226. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with

Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987):
[Ilt would not be a bad thing for judges to base constitutional decisions on their own
sense of what values best reflect our cultural tradition, so long as the conflicting perspectives competing to define those values are made explicit. The search to define those

values could then serve a clarifying, rather than a mystifying, role.
Id.at 386.
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An Outline of Community-Enabling Mediation

One key feature of the community-enabling concept is a notion of
active neutrality of the mediator, rather than passive neutrality. Active
neutrality means that the mediation process introduces a wide range of
values and encourages parties to consider how such values, or some combination of them, might fit their needs; they may accept some, reject
others, modify many, but they will do so with a sense of alternatives. A
community-enabling mediation would encourage parties to consider the
range of possible values.. 7 and practices that could affect how they resolve
a dispute or structure an agreement. This would include active consideration of the ways that others, including communities that the parties
find valuable, 228 have resolved similar disputes or reached similar agreements. It would also try to consider various other ways that individuals
could resolve disputes. In this sense, it would not be exclusively backwardlooking-what would be the decision in the past of a court, industry, community, or so on-but also how one might suggest that such standards
should be in the future. Under active neutrality, the mediator does not
raise issues in the exceptional case; the mediation process introduces var227. At least in the context of same-sex relationships, the many norms considered would not
include homophobic norms, such as the notion that same-sex relationships are always improper.
See Marc Fajer, Some Thoughts on Harassment: A Gay Male Perspective, MD. J. CONTEMP. L.
IsSUES 199, 200 (1993) ("I think one thing we might do is make explicit in any 'reasonable victim' standards we put into these [sexual harassment] policies that 'reasonable' does not include
racism, and 'reasonable' does not include homophobia."); Christine Littleton, Presentation at
Law and Society Meeting, Glasgow, Scotland (July, 1996) (definition of sexual harassment should
take perspective of reasonable nonhomophobic person). Although the exclusion of such thoroughgoing homophobia may be unproblematic, other questions may be less clear, such as the
treatment of those who are not birth parents. See supra text accompanying notes 178-180.
Another interesting question will be whether one should discuss the idea that no community
norms should inform a relationship-indeed, one might ask whether couples should be told that
they should question whether the pervasive notion that coupling is better than alternatives is
justified. See McFarland, supra note 120.
228. Many fear that an emphasis on how individuals can choose from an array of values and
identities tends to emphasize selfish values, and I mean to avoid this criticism by including values
of various communities as a source of values in mediation. See Joan C. Williams, Rorry,
Radicalism, Romanticism: The Politics of the Gaze, in PRAGMATISM IN LAW AND SOCIM, supra
note 222, at 155, 173 ("One of the most distasteful and unconvincing aspects of models of selfcreation that extol autonomy and mastery is their assumption that true self-fulfillment lies solely
in sustained pursuit of self-interest."). This is an important concern, but it conflates two
dynamics: (1) Whom does an individual care about? (2) Who decides whom an individual cares
about? Individual choice is consistent with the idea that an individual cares about others-but
the identity of those others (lover? friends? parents?) is decided by the individual. See FINEMAN,
supra note 19; Freshman, supra note 16 (exploring the idea that individuals care for those who
cannot care for themselves).
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ious norms as a matter of course in every mediation. By making this active
consideration the norm, active neutrality avoids some of the problems with
passive neutrality. Under a passive- neutrality understanding of mediation,
a mediator does not suggest values or solutions, but facilitates the way in
which the parties structure the discussion." 9 This often leads to the
question of whether the mediator should "bolster" the party that seems less
"capable" of participating or less "powerful."2w This is an issue because
the expectation is a silent mediator: silent about values, particularly values
that are not closely yoked to some relatively determinate legal rule. Under
active neutrality, the mediator does not treat ideas equally by being equally
silent but by being equally forthcoming: the mediator presents a variety of
values and ideas and makes the argument for them.
Of course, such a rich and detailed concept of mediation may require
more than one session-and more than one kind of session. Communityenabling mediation is not a goal for a single meeting, but for an entire
mediation process. It is not necessary that every aspect involve consideration by each person with the mediator present. Individuals might
learn about some possibilities in a variety of ways: individuals or couples
229. To some extent, the problem with passive neutrality in mediation is similar to the
problem with mere colorblindness in remedies for discrimination. As with passive neutrality,
colorblindness requires that a decision should not involve the consideration of race (or similar
characteristic). This is not enough for those who want individuals not merely to be free from
formal constraints because of race but actually want to be able to achieve certain kinds of ends.
Consider Culp's criticism of why the Court did not go far enough in striking down Virginia's law
that made it a crime for a white person to marry a black person: "The real moral duty in Loving is
not simply to permit those who wish to marry interracially to escape criminal prosecution, but
rather to be able to choose whomever they wish to marry, free from social and political violence." Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Colorblind Remedies and the Intersectionality of Oppression:
Policy Arguments Masquerading As Moral Claims, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 162, 173 (1994); see also
Rachel Moran, Interracial Intimacy (1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Similarly, passive neutrality may remove superficial bias, but may not enable individuals to make
informed choices.
230. Many mediators I interviewed emphasized the problem of power inequalities with
lesbian and gay couples and spoke more freely of intervening to balance such differentials, but
they continued to treat such interventions as exceptional:
What the mediator has to be careful of is that one person has more power and the other
person can get browbeaten into something just as they were in the relationship. Heterosexuals can fight in court-homosexuals can, but there's no recognition of the
relationship. The judge won't recognize the finer issues.... I become more
attuned ....
I try to keep a lid on the person with more power. I may say, "Be quiet.
He or she did not interrupt when you spoke." Often the one with more power is not
used to listening.... I will try not to be an advocate unless one is being a horse's ass. It
takes a little more time, but you can bring them back. If you can't, then maybe some
advocacy will work. I'll say, "If you found yourself in a court of law, this is what could
happen to you."
Benett Interview, supra note 10.
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might learn about different possibilities by: (1) passively watching videos;
(2) passively listening to tapes; (3) meeting with groups of other couples and
actively discussing different ways of ordering their relationships; (4) exploring options on interactive media that let individuals read some material and
then identify areas of additional reading or materials-for listening or viewing-that the individuals may want to consider. These multiple media and
activities partially address two potential doubts about community-enabling
mediation. First, these processes may address the objection of cost because
they may cost less than face-to-face meetings. Second, because they are
part of a process over time, they address the potential objection that indithings when
viduals really do not consider competing ways of looking at
23
they engage in face-to-face negotiations with short deadlines. '
B.

The Rationale for Community-Enabling Mediation

There are two related but distinct reasons why the mediation of samesex couples should aspire to community-enabling mediation. The first
reason is purely consequential and utilitarian: the parties may be happier
with an outcome they have not yet been able to contemplate. A modest
argument for this may be that parties in the midst of a dispute may display
behavior that does not even serve what they would characterize as their
own preferences. 232 The bolder premise I describe is that the mediator
should try to uncover what the parties' values really are because what parties say they want at a particular point may not serve their needs as well as
the choices they make after considering many alternatives.
This claim that the preferences are not true preferences depends on a
variety of theoretical perspectives that what individuals say they want at a
231. One study concluding that students, and by extension, lawyers, do not really listen to

legal arguments or different ideas about norms was based on face-to-face negotiations involving

law students in simulated negotiations. See Condlin, supra note 136. In fairness to Condlin, he
does note in the article that further research is needed into whether the generalizations based on
law student simulations apply to how practicing attorneys negotiate. Id. at 90 n.54 & 135-36.
Nine years later, however, Condlin's article is still cited in connection with more general skepticism that negotiations depend on arguments about competing applications of norms, legal or
otherwise. See Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle": Judicial Promotionand Regulation
of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1374 (1994).
232. See Ross, supra note 80; cf. BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 16, at 191 (a party in conflict
may not look beyond her own needs).
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particular point may be infected-even, in extreme cases, determined-by
social influences apart from the individual.233 This argument is most
frequently associated with critics of utilitarianism and neoclassical economics.23 It is also increasingly an understanding that even those once
identified. as orthodox economists, such as Gary Becker, have begun to
contemplate. 235

Although such preference skepticism is not brand new, it does deserve
a new reading in the context of mediation. This is because the resistance
to the idea of preference-skepticism partly depends on skepticism about
whether judges have the competence and legitimacy to question preferences.
The question of competence arises because a judge may not have the tools
to know what parties really want.236 And even if the judge could, a legitimate objection is that a judge must give effect to controlling legal
principles even if the parties would adopt different principles.237
These kinds of judicially focused arguments make it hard to think
about how a judge skeptical of preferences would actually decide cases, but
they do not apply with the same weight to mediation. As to legitimacy,
mediators need not always give effect to legal principles at odds with party
233. A stronger version of skepticism about preferences-or at least stronger sounding vocabulary-is the notion that a person's understanding of her own interest may diverge from her own
needs so much that one might say the person suffers from false consciousness. See, e.g., Radin,
supra note 222, at 136.
234. See, e.g., ROBIN WEST, NARRATIVE, AUTHORITY, AND LAW 318 (1993) (describing the
view that "[tihe relatively powerless prefer outcomes that are often detrimental to their true
interest because they have been unduly influenced by a worldview (and a correlative conception
of their place within it) that is the product of illegitimate, capitalist, racist, professionalist, or
patriarchal power"). West is skeptical that a judge will have a better sense of a party's preferences than parties themselves. I share this skepticism, but I think it is worth exploring
whether we can construct a mediation theory and practice that does allow individuals to develop
a more fulfilling or otherwise valuable sense of their own identity and preferences.
235.

See GARY S. BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR TASTE 3-4 (1996) (noting that the "econo-

mist's normal approach" to preferences is to assume they are "independent... of the behavior of
everyone else," but Becker's newer work expands "the definition of individual preferences to
include personal habits and addictions, peer pressure, parental influences on the tastes of children, advertising, love and sympathy, and other neglected behavior").
236. See WEST, supra note 234, at 307 ("Although a judge cannot know anything about our
subjective states, she can know our objective behavior."),
237. These objections track the familiar twin questions of legal process: Does a particular
institution have competence for some activity? Does a particular institution have legitimacy for
some activity? See genera/ly HART & SACKS, supra note 17.
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3
The
preferences, particularly when there are no dependents involved.
competence question is a more complicated question, which I consider in
greater detail below.

C.

Potential Objections to Community-Enabling Mediation

The model I have just sketched of community-enabling mediation is
quite skeletal, but I anticipate two sets of objections. One objection is that
community-enabling mediation would cost too much or would be inefficient. A second objection is that mediators, particularly lawyer mediators,
might not have the competence to provide community-enabling mediation.
Both objections deserve attention.
The first objection of cost depends in part on what one uses as a comparison. The simplest comparison would be between community-enabling
mediation and existing forms of mediation. In comparison to often quite
brief mediations, including mediation involving same-sex couples,
community-enabling mediation may take more time and otherwise cost
mediation looks less
more. 39 On the other hand, community-enabling
24
litigation.
to
it
compare
expensive if we
The related objection of efficiency is more complicated because there
may be different notions of efficiency. Any species of efficiency balances
costs and benefits, which means that much depends on how one defines
benefits and 2goals. To the extent that mediation aims simply to maximize
"satisfaction" '" by promoting an agreement the parties deem "acceptable," anything more than the most minimal interventions may take more
time with no efficient increase in "acceptability." One reason to want
parties to consider whether there are better solutions than the ones they
238. To the extent that the parties agree to a solution on their own, or with the help of
some other party, such as a mediator, courts are extremely likely to accept the agreement and

even enter it as a judgment. See MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 9, at 41-42. It is a different matter if the parties do not agree with an arbitrator. As a matter of formal doctrine, some
courts will not enforce arbitration agreements or awards when they involve custody or other
"public policy" aspects of family question. See supranote 42.
239. See Engelhardt & Triantafillou, supranote 46, at 335 (describing standard mediation for
lesbian couples as four-and-a-half-hours).
240. By litigation I do not mean the rare trial but a more usual set of pleadings, discovery,
and settlement that resembles what litigants more typically do. See Erlanger et al., supra
note 146.
241. See, e.g., Jeffrey Z. Rubin, Foreword, in BUSH & FOLOER, supra note 16, at xi ("Above
all else, mediation makes it possible for agreements to be reached, and for those agreements to be
ones that the disputants find satisfactory."). Rubin also goes on to emphasize an important secondary goal of promoting a "transformed" or "enhanced" relationship between the parties. Id. at
xi-xii.
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find acceptable relates to the way that what parties say they want at any
particular moment may not best reflect what they would say they wanted if
given more information about possible choices. A second independent
reason is that the kind of choices that individual parties make may perpetuate institutions and practices that are no longer efficient. Some economists emphasize that individuals and society may cling to old frameworks
even when they are not efficient. Nobel Prize-winning economist, Albert
North, has explained this concept as "path dependence," which "comes
from the increasing returns mechanisms that reinforce the direction once
on a given path." 42 At a very general level, North theorizes that incremental change that makes society more efficient comes from "acquiring
skills, knowledge, and information that will enhance their objectives." 43
When it comes to the way in which individuals structure their intimate
relationships, whether through marriage or otherwise, North's teaching
suggests that we might worry that such existing patterns may reflect past
practices more than contemporary needs.
Finally, we must consider questions of efficiency alongside a potentially
rival claim that mediation should promote informed choice as an end in
itself. We may believe that choices about relationships are more
valuable-or even only valuable-if they are based on some kind of
informed decision about other potential choices and arrangements. One
might believe, for example, that even if a couple chooses a highly individualistic concept of relationships rather than a conception of a joint
enterprise, the choice will be more valuable if the couple had the opportunity to consider the concept of a joint enterprise. Such a notion of
informed consent is a fundamental value in much American political
theory and legal practice. 2 " Such a conception of choice is consistent
242. LANCE E. DAVIS & DOUGLAS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE,
AND EcoNOMIC PERrORMANCE 112 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
243.

Id

244. See Mark Spiegel, Lawuyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the Legal
Profession, 128 U. PENN. L. REv. 41, 109 (1979). Informed consent, inturn, draws on the value
of autonomy. See DENNIS PATrERSON, LAW AND TRurH 152 n.8 (1997) ("If any single them
runs through the whole of modernity it is the idea of autonomy."); Bruce Winick, On Autonomy:
Legal and PsychologicalPerspectives, 37 VILL. L. REv. 1705, 1707-15 (1992). For an outstanding
argument that autonomy-including the choice of community practices-is consistent with support for a wide variety of communities, see Stephen Gardbaum, Liberalism, Autonomy, and Moral
Conflict, 48 STAN. L. REV. 385,415-16 (1996). Despite the value of informed consent, it may be
understandable in today's political climate that "informed consent" sets off some skepticism. A
few readers of this Article worried that community-enabling mediation might burden individuals
with information they did not want to know. More specifically, one reader worried that it
reminded her of proposals that women may not have abortions until they are informed about
other alternatives and the risks of abortions. In light of the assault on reproductive rights, the
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with many western religious views that emphasize informed choice. Nevertheless, it is worth acknowledging that a notion of community-enabling
mediation may be inconsistent with those who believe that communities or
groups have rights as groups, including the right to promote individual
identification with groups.2 45
The second major objection to community-enabling mediation is that
it is unrealistic at any price because mediators lack the requisite skills. This
competency objection fits many assumptions about what lawyers now do,
but it says less about what a mediation process could do. In many existing
mediations, lawyers function in conjunction with therapists.2 4 Moreover, community-enabling mediation as a process might well involve many
kinds of professionals and forums other than face-to-face meetings with a
lawyer or therapist. To some extent, then, the focus on lawyer mediators
and what lawyers may do rests on the dubious notion that mediators must
be lawyers.
Even to the extent that one looks at the potential of lawyers to play a
role in identity-enhancing mediation, the evidence is not clear cut. Marc
Galanter and Mia Cahill, for example, doubt that there is evidence that
lawyers can identify parties' true needs as Carrie Menkel-Meadow
hopes,247 or that parties settle according to the kind of private ordering
that Melvin Eisenberg"' envisions. Oddly, they do not express any skepticism about Bush's claim that mediation should have what they characterize as an "inward effect" on participants, but note that such "inward
effect" may be a standard for evaluating settlements.2 49 Maybe lawyers
reader's skepticism is quite understandable. Nevertheless, the sentiment that any reference to
informed consent is troublesome is undercut because there are ready examples of the use of
informed consent that supporters of reproductive freedom would find laudable. For example,
advocates of reproductive choice might well invoke notions of informed consent to explain why a
doctor should list abortion as one option to a woman who expresses reservations about giving
birth. (And many of those with reservations about abortion would also want a doctor to inform a
woman about abortion in at least some circumstances, such as when birth would risk the mother's

life.)
245. See Garet, supra note 223.
246. Bennett Interview, supra note 10 (describing plan to organize a Los Angeles project to
provide a team of a lawyer and a mediator to mediate disputes between same-sex couples);
Engelhardt & Triantafillou, supra note 46, at 327 (describing how lawyer and therapist began
mediating same-sex disputes together); see also supra note 123.
247. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of
Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 795 (1984); Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Anyway?,
supra note 9.
248. See Galanter & Cahill, supranote 231, at 1359-40 (referring to Melvin Aron Eisenberg,
Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement and Rulemaking, 89 HARV. L. REV. 637
(1976)).
249. See Galanter & Cahill, supra note 231, at 1378.
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cannot practice community-enabling mediation now.'5° If lawyers cannot
do this presently-which is a kind of generic objection to mediation-then
we should perhaps consider whether we need to reconfigure the kinds of
things that we expect lawyers to do.
Finally, in considering these various objections, we also need to ask
whether community-enabling mediation works as an ideal, even if we doubt
how well it could work fully in practice. Ultimately, even if we conclude
that community-enabling mediation is too expensive or inefficient in its
most ideal form, it may still have value as an ideal. As Geoffrey Hazard
and Paul Scott have noted, society may aspire to process values that we
cannot or will not fund.5 1 Similarly, as Martha Fineman has argued, it
may be helpful to revise how we should arrange our lives and institutions,
even if they seem "utopian.2 152 In addition, as I have argued elsewhere,
such re-visioning is particularly valuable when we appreciate how individuals (and communities of individuals) may enact ideals that larger groups
do not.5 3 Different mediators may experiment with different ways to incorporate community-enabling into their practices.
CONCLUSION

This Article has made a series of related but severable arguments.
Many may agree with one argument, but disagree with other arguments.
First, the Article cautions that attempts to facilitate private ordering by
resort to mediation by some subgroup, such as mediation by lesbian and gay
community mediators, may not be entirely successful. This is partly
because there may be forms of bias other than ones associated with the
community, so that, for example, one may banish homophobia but still
have vestiges of racism, class bias, and so on. Many may agree with this
critique, but think such private community justice is still better than any
250. See Daniel J. Guttman, For Better or Worse, Till ADR Do Us Part: Using Antenuptial
Agreements to Compel Alternatives to TraditionalAdversarial Ltigation, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP.
RESOL. 175, 179 (1996) (attorneys may lack the training and skills to deal with emotional issues
surrounding divorce).
251. See Geoffrey C. Hazard & Paul D. Scott, The Public Nature of Private Adjudication, 6
YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 42, 44 (1988) ("With respect to the administration of
justice... Americans evidently aspire to a higher standard of service than they are willing to pay
for on a sustained basis"); cf. HUNTINGTON, supra note 76, at 16 ("In other societies, ideologies
give priority to one value or the other, but in American society all these values coexist together
in theory, even as they may conflict with each other when applied in practice. They coexist,
indeed, not only within American society, but also within individual citizens.").
252.

See FINEMAN, supra note 19, at 226-36.

253.

See i.;
Freshman, supra note 16.
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alternative, such as resorting to courts; others may see the criticism as an
occasion to engage in sensitivity to other forms of bias. The Article, however, also suggests that a partial solution to the problem would be to introduce various competing notions of community values and practice into the
mediation process.
Second, the Article notes that some-including mediators and organizers of community mediation projects-may see mediation as an occasion
to advance some notion of community interests. Sometimes this may be
overt, as in those who offer things such as lesbian feminist mediation or
Islamic mediation, but sometimes it may be less clear, as in "cultural sensitivity." At a minimum, I suggest that parties should be aware of how
mediators see the role of community and community values. Of course,
mediators themselves may not always be clear on how much they just want
to help individuals engage in private ordering and how much they want to
serve (what they see as) community interests. To help clarify the possible
roles of community, I offer examples of community-enhancing notions in
other practices and traces of it that may occur in mediation involving samesex couples. Moreover, I argue that community-enhancing is often problematic because it enhances one kind of community at the expense of other
communities that individuals might value.
Third, the Article suggests one way to resolve the tension between
community-enhancing mediation, which gives community a very strong
role, and the passive neutrality of much mediation, which gives little room
to notions of community and community values. The Article suggests an
outline of community-enabling mediation that would encourage individuals
to consider a range of values from different communities, but would not be
designed to encourage individuals to adopt any particular set of such values
or even to adopt any of those values rather than some combination of their
own making. This proposal is related to my critique of the private-ordering
and community-enhancing visions of mediation: private-ordering values
community too little; community enhancing values particular notions of
community too much. A community-enabling vision of mediation attempts
to give community an appropriate place in letting individuals think about
how to lead their lives. Again, the argument is severable from either or
both of the other arguments about the limits of either the private-ordering
or community-enhancing visions of mediation.
Finally, however one ultimately resolves the competing visions of
mediation, those providing mediation or advising others about
mediation-particularly attorneys-should remember the very real differences in vision and in practice between the way various individuals
practice mediation. One should also appreciate the very different ways in
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which individuals, particularly individuals with various disadvantages, may
experience processes in different ways. For attorneys, the question becomes
how to counsel individuals who want to choose a process to resolve their
disputes and facilitate agreements. The relevant ethical consideration is
helping a client make important and informed decisions about his
representation. For those who design mediation programs, this means
understanding the very different goals one might envision for mediation,
including goals that affect communities beyond the parties in a particular
mediation.
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